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ABSTRACT. 
Tlxe Muslim philosophers a l - K i n d i and Avicenna 
founded t h e i r metaphysical system l a r g e l y on 
concepts t h a t they i n h e r i t e d from A r i s t o t l e o Of 
primary importance among these concepts i s t h a t 
of substance, which the Muslim philosophers d e f i n e d 
as t h a t which e x i s t s by itself» Thus i t may be 
seen t h a t a substance i s always a s e l f - s u b s i s t i n g 
e n t i t y 0 Opposed t o t h i s view i s the concept of 
accident, or pr o p e r t y which may accrue t o a subs- ~ 
tance at any one moment, and which does not a f f e c t 
i t s s u b s t a n t i a l existence<» 
I n as much as the concept of substance is; 
fundamental t o a l - K i n d i and Avicenna, so t h e i r 
d e f i n i t i o n s and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of i t are impor-
t a n t o For, 'substance' embraces, m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , 
s o u l s , and i n t e l l e c t s o 
On the d e f i n i t i o n of the m a t e r i a l substance 
a l - K i n d i and Avicenna d i f f e r e d widely<> They were, 
however, agreed i n ap p l y i n g the term 'substance' 
t o every m a t e r i a l body, and t h e i r disagreement i s 
seen t o be merely a t e c h n i c a l one» 
2 -
Al-Kindx and Avicenna b e l i e v e d i n the existence; 
of the s o u l , and attempted t o prove i t s sub s t a n t i a -
l i t y , , More d i f f i c u l t t o d i s c e r n i s t h e i r view of 
the f a c u l t i e s , o f the soulo Other problems t o be 
r a i s e d are whether the soul may t r a n s m i g r a t e , and. 
whether a l l souls may be u n i t e d i n t o one soul a f t e r 
deatho 
The i n t e l l e c t i s also a candidate f o r considera-
t i o n as a substanceo Some i n t e l l e c t s are merely a 
f a c u l t y of s o u l s and n e i t h e r t h i n k e r regards these 
as: substances 0 Each, however, considers t h e r e t o 
be s u b s t a n t i a l i n t e l l e c t s % one only f o r a l - K i n d i , 
but many f o r Avicenna, which he c a l l e d pure 
i n t e l l e c t s 0 
The s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of God i s a r e l i g i o u s : 
question, and. one of importance since PlatOo The 
a t t r i b u t e s of God are l i m i t e d t o a few Neo-platonic 
concepts i n the eyes of Muslim philosophers, and 
n e i t h e r the A r i s t o t e l i a n substance, nor the Neo-
P l a t o n i c hypostasis comes among the s e 0 Thus on 
r e l i g i o u s issues they are f i n a l l y compelled t o 
r e j e c t A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m which supplied the founda-
t i o n s of t h e i r metaphysicso 
- i -
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of substance has i t s h i s t o r i c a l 
o r i g i n s almost e n t i r e l y i n the works of A r i s t o t l e o 
Of these, the f i r s t t o give us general i n f o r m a t i o n 
on t h i s , subject i s Categories„ which i s comprised 
of three p a r t s o Chapters 1 = 4 deal mainly w i t h 
language and terms of p r e d i c a t i o n ; chapters 5 - 9 ° 
w i t h the d e s c r i p t i o n and p r o p e r t i e s of each of the 
t e n c a t e g o r i e s , and the remainder of the hook 
examines the meanings of terms such as ' p r i o r ' , 
'simultaneous;', and 'motion' <> I t i s i n chapter 5 
of Categories t h a t there appears the fundamental 
d i s t i n c t i o n "between primary substances, as i n d i -
v i d u a l s , and secondary substances,"as species and 
genus o 
Also, A r i s t o t l e devoted h i s Metaphysics t o a 
wide-ranging discussion of the problems of subs-
tance and beingo I n the f i r s t s i x books, he 
introduces h i s f o r m u l a t i o n s of t h i s q uestion, and 
i n t h e seventh and e i g h t h books* takes h i s discussion 
of substance t o a deeper l e v e l than i n Categories^ 
- 2 . -
I n Metaphysics V I I A r i s t o t l e r a i s e s the d i f f i -
c u l t y of f i n d i n g an adequate d e f i n i t i o n of 
'substance's which he f e e l s t o be a fundamental 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l problemo He gives; also a summary 
showing how the issue was t r e a t e d by h i s prede-
cessors o He s t a t e s e x p l i c i t l y t h a t the term 
'substance' may be a p p l i e d t o f o u r main o b j e c t s , 
( l ) the essence, ( 2 ) the u n i v e r s a l , ( 3 ) the genus 
and (l±) the substrate., 
Metaphysics V I I and V I I I are devoted t o the 
quest-ion of inseparable substances and t h e i r 
number, and book IX. considers p o t e n t i a l i t y and 
a c t u a l i t y o Book X deals w i t h u n i t y and m u l t i p l i -
c i t y which, A r i s t o t l e claims, are not capable of 
being described as substances.o 
•While book X I c o n t r i b u t e s l i t t l e t o the 
subject at hand, i t appears t h a t book X I I i s of 
the greatest importanceo I n t h i s t e x t , A r i s t o t l e 
attempts t o prove the existence of an e t e r n a l 
substance, which he i d e n t i f i e s w i t h God* Books 
X I I I and XIV examine former philosophers' views, 
of i mmaterial substances? the Platonist.'forms;', 
1 o The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , e d o by Richard! 
McKeon (New York 19kl) Metaphysics V I I , 1 , p 0 7 8 U o 
- 3 " 
and the Pythagorean 'mathematical numbers'o 
I n De Anima, t h e problem of the . s u b s t a n t i a l i t y 
of the soul i s not t r e a t e d at l e n g t h , yet i t appears 
t h a t A r i s t o t l e d i d not consider the soul t o be a 
separable substance., No account i s given o f the 
s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the i n t e l l e c t , when-it i s . d i s -
cussed i n book I I I o I t i s , however important t o 
note t h a t A r i s t o t l e admitted only one of h i s two 
p o s t u l a t e d i n t e l l e c t s t o be e t e r n a l and immortalo 
I t seems t h a t a l ~ K i n d i and Avicenna were w e l l 
acquainted w i t h the above works, of. Aristotle» For 
example, a l - K i n d l l i s t e d the most important, 
A r i s t o t e l i a n works i n a l e t t e r e n t i t l e d E I kammiyyat 
kutub. Aris/ku^all's, and Avicenna admitted t o having 
read A r i s t o t l e ' s Metaphysics f o r t y times.. He also 
2 
wrote commentaries on various other works, 
i n c l u d i n g Metaphysics: X I I and De Anima<> Thus, they 
b o t h were able t o adopt A r i s t o t e l i a n terminology i n 
t h e i r own i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o the problem of substance 0 
1 o Ibn Abi Usaibi'a, 'uyuhal-anba 9 f I tabaqat al° , 
atWoeL 9 » (Cairo 1 8 8 2 ) I I , p . J . 
2 o I t appears t h a t Avicenna also wrote a commentary 
on Categories, although the evidence here i s not 
e n t i r e l y conclusives I b i d , I I , p 0 5 ° 
Moreover, they were also i n f l u e n c e d by the Neo-
P l a t o n i s t concept of substance <> I n a Neo-Platonic; 
1 
work e n t i t l e d A r i s t o t l e s Theology the term 
'substance' i s employed as a name f o r the body, 
s o u l , and i n t e l l e c t < , God, t o o , i s given the name 
p 
of substance i n t h i s t e x t - Both a l - K i n d l and 
Avicenna were f a m i l i a r w i t h t h i s work, the former 
having co r r e c t e d i t s . t e x t , the l a t t e r having made 
a commentary upon it« Ne i t h e r appears t o accept 
t h i s book as a genuine A r i s t o t e l i a n work; i t is; 
not included i n a l - K i n d i ' s l i s t of the w r i t i n g s 
of A r i s t o t l e , and Avicenna declared t h a t i t i s 
problematic o^" 
I n another Neo-Platonic work, Proclus' The 
Elements of Theology 9 the nature and the d e f i n i -
t i o n of substance are t r e a t e d at l e n g t h o I t i s 
pos s i b l e t h a t from these and from other Neo-
P l a t o n i c works a l - K i n d l and Avicenna have taken 
1 o Aflu-feln 8ind a l ' a r a b , ed» by Badawl (Cairo, 1 9 4 7 ) 
P < > 3 7 ° 
2 o See below, chapter 6 „ 
3° Avicenna's commentary of t h i s t e x t i s published 
i n A r i s t t l ' i n d a l ' a r a b , e d o by A o Badawi (Cairo 
1 9 4 7 ) P ° 3 7 o 
ho Avicenna, K i t a b al-mabahlth, I b i d - p„ 1 2 1 o 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l concepts such as 'one's 'the f i r s t ' , 
' u n i t y ' , and 'simple'. I t i s also c l e a r t h a t the 
Neo-Platonic theory o f emanation of i n t e l l e c t was 
of considerable importance t o the l a t t e r philosopher.. 
The term 'substance' i s g e n e r a l l y assumed t o 
have been f i r s t i ntroduced i n t o I s lamic thought by 
1 
the e a r l y Muslim th e o l o g i a n s , who used i t as an 
a t t r i b u t e of what they c a l l e d the " i n d i v i s i b l e 
p a r t i c l e " ( a l - , i u z ? a l l a d h i l a y a t a . i a ^ 5 1 ) o They 
b e l i e v e d t h a t % "there e x i s t s nothing but substance 
and a c c i d e n t , and the p h y s i c a l forms of t h i n g s 
2 
belong t o the class of accidentso" Also they 
helds "the creator i s incapable of c r e a t i n g a 
substance devoid of ah accident, -for i t i s 
imp o s s i b l e 0 ! M They meant t h a t every substance 
(atom) created by God should have an accident, 
such as motion, c o l o u r , or t a s t e , but not q u a n t i t y , 
f o r being i n d i v i s i b l e , i t has no magnitude. 
1 o S o Pines, Madhhab adh-dharrah ' i n d al-muslimln, 
t r a n s l a t e d by Abu" Rldah (Cairo 1 9 U 6 ) PP°U? 5 ° 
2 o Guide of the perplexed o f Maimonides, t r a n s l a t e d 
by Mo Priedlander (London 1881) I , p 0329° 
3° Ibido,, p 0321. 
=• 6 
This view of minute i n d i v i s i b l e , p a r t i c l e s i s 
the f i r s t of those basic dif f e r e n c e s , between the 
theologians and philosophers, who b e l i e v e d t h a t 
every body has magnitude and divisibility„ The 
theologians considered the soul as an accident 
1 
e x i s t i n g i n one of the atoms., w h i l e the p h i l o s o -
phers, b e l i e v e d i t t o be a. substance arid, o f f e r e d 
proof t o t h i s effect° L a s t l y the theologians do 
not appear t o have regarded the i n t e l l e c t as a 
substance, but r a t h e r as an a c c i d e n t a l a t t r i b u t e 
" j o i n e d t o one of the atoms whi c h , c o n s t i t u t e ' t h e 
p 
whole o f the i n t e l l i g e n t being'V A l - K i n d l and 
Avicenna accept the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the 
i n t e l l e c t o . 
I n h i s book Aquinas s Copleston recognises. 
the importance of A r i s t o t e l i a n thought i n t h e 
3 
Isla m i c t h e o r i e s of substance and accidents He 
holds i t t o be a defensible view t h a t the Islamic 
philosophers f o l l o w t h i s d o c t r i n e because i t is; 
1o I b i d o , p o 3 2 0 o 
2 o I b i d o , p 0 3 2 1 o 
3 « F 0 G„ Copleston, Aquinas. (Harmondsworth 1 9 6 5 ) 
p 0 8 8 o 
- ' 7 , ~ 
A r i s t o t l e ' s , b u t , e q u a l l y , he stresses t h a t they 
also consider i t t o be t r u e . Considerable 
a t t e n t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , has been pa i d i n the f o l l o w i n g 
pages bot h t o the comparison of a l - K i n d l and 
Avicenna w i t h each other, and also w i t h Aristotle<> 
CHAPTER I 
The D e f i n i t i o n of Substance 
The purpose of t h i s chapter i s t o attempt a 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of a l - K i n d i ' s and Avicenna's d e f i n i -
t i o n s o f 'substance'o I t deals w i t h al-Kindi's. 
d e f i n i t i o n f i r s t and t h i s w i l l be f o l l o w e d by t h a t 
of Avicennao 
A l - K i n d i i n Risalah f l hudud al-ashya* 1 wa 
rusumihi (Aya Sofiya ^832) defines 'substance.' as. 
f o l l o w s o 
"Substances," he says, " i s t h a t which i s s e l f -
subsistento I t i s a bearer of the accidents 
Without any change a f f e c t i n g i t s essence. I t i s 
q u a l i f i e d by the other c a t e g o r i e s , without any 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n of them being p o s s i b l e on i t s p a r t e 
1 , R a s a ' i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed„ Abu-RTdah 
(Cairo, 1 9 5 Q ) I , . p . 1 6 6 „ 
^nsua J « > J ^ J yk^k 4^udJ-> j>\j5 \ > 
•v* 
- 9 -
Also i t i s s a i d t h a t i t i s n e i t h e r c r eat able nor-
d e s t r u c t i b l e j and n o t h i n g t h a t may happen t o 
creatable or d e s t r u c t i b l e objects a p p l i e s t o i t 
•j 
e s s e n t i a l l y . " 
I n a B r i t i s h Museum manuscript which contains 
a considerable number of a l ~ K i n d i ' s d e f i n i t i o n s 
and p h i l o s o p h i c a l terms, the same d e f i n i t i o n i s 
quoted i n t h i s way* "substance i s t h a t which i s 
2 
s e l f — s u b s i s t e n t , and the bearer o f the accidents." 
The remainder of the previous d e f i n i t i o n i s omitted 
from the B r i t i s h Museum manuscript, the only other 
d i f f e r e n c e being the use of "wa 'l-hami! l i ' i l a'rad" 
i n t h i s l a t t e r , and of the "wa huwa harnll l i ' i l -
a'rad" i n the former« 
A l - K i n d i i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n of 'substance' t r i e s 
t o d i s t i n g u i s h between two kinds of being (maw.judat), 
s u b s t a n t i a l and ac c i d e n t a l - He c a l l s the former 
'substance' (jjawhar) and the l a t t e r , 'accident' 
(a rad.) „ For a l - K i n d i , since substance e x i s t s of 
i t s e l f (al-qa"im b i - n i a f s i h ) , i t may bear the accidents. 
1 o R a s a ' i l a l - K i n d i al-ga^safiy_yah, ed» Abu-Rldah 
"(Cairo, 1 9 5 0 ) I , p 0l66<, 
2 . B r i t i s h Museum ( A d d < , 7 4 3 3 ) 1 and SoMoStern, note on 
al-KindT's t r e a t i s e on D e f i n i t i o n ^ . Journal of the 
Royal A s i a t i c Society (London 1 9 5 9 . ! ) .1960) p ° 3 3 ° 
(yahmil al-a'rad.) without s u s t a i n i n g any k i n d of 
change or a l t e r a t i o n i n respect of i t s essence 
(lam tataghayyar dhatiyyatuh) ° That i s t o say, 
whenever the substance hears the accidents, i t 
hears them as something t h a t does not "belong t o 
i t s e l f e s s e n t i a l l y . Consequently the accident 
( a l ' a r a d ) , f o r a l - K i n d i v a r i e s from hearer t o 
hearer (min foami! * i l a h a m i l ) , t h a t i s t o say 
from subject t o subject (min m a w d g g"ill mawdu'). 
Substance, as i t appears from the previous 
d e f i n i t i o n of a l - K i n d l , i s supposed t o be des-
c r i b e d or q u a l i f i e d by means of the other 
categories without being able t o be used as a 
means of t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n (mawsQf l a wasxf)„ 
But i t i s not made c l e a r i n a l - K i n d i ' s d e f i n i t i o n 
what k i n d of d e s c r i p t i o n he means here, and how 
the other categories may be employed i n the desr-
c r i p t i o n of substanceo This question w i l l be 
considered i n conduction w i t h the second of 
a l - K i n d i ' s d e f i n l t ions o 
I t appears th a t al~KindT, when i n the 
previous d e f i n i t i o n he says t h a t " i t i s s a i d t h a t 
- 1 1 = 
i t i s n e i t h e r creatable nor d e s t r u c t i b l e ( g h a i r 
q a b i l l i l - t a k w i n wa al-fasad) t r i e s , t o d i f f e r e n -
t i a t e between what A r i s t o t l e c a l l s substance as 
a 'formula' and what he c a l l s substance as a 
'concrete thing'„ Substance as a 'formula' ( m i t h a l ) , 
which i s form and matter as such, (and t h i s i s as 
t r u e f o r a l - K i n d i as i t i s f o r A r i s t o t l e ) , i s 
n e i t h e r capable of generation, nor of destruction.. 
Substance as a concrete t h i n g , e<>go, m a t e r i a l body, 
i s always capable of generation and d e s t r u c t i o n * 
A r i s t o t l e says ''since substance i s of two ki n d s , 
the concrete t h i n g and the formula ( I mean t h a t -
one k i n d of substance i s the formula i n i t s 
g e n e r a l i t y ) , substances i n the former sense are 
capable of d e s t r u c t i o n ( f o r they are capable also 
of g e n e r a t i o n ) , but there i s no d e s t r u c t i o n of 
the formula, i n the sense t h a t i t i s ever i n the. 
course o f being destroyed.." 
Therefore i t would appear t h a t al-=Kindi 
t r i e s t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e between form and matter 
1 o The basic works, of A r i s t o t l e , e d o Richard McKeon 
(New York, 1 9 U 1 ) Metaphysics V I I , 1 5 ; p 9 8 0 7 o 
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(al-?surah wa al-madah) as separable substances, and 
form and matter as two elements of one composite 
body<> For the body i s capable of d i s s o l u t i o n s 
w h i l e form and matter, of which i t i s composed, 
can n e i t h e r be destroyed nor lose t h e i r s u b s t a n t i a l i t y , . 
The second of a l - K i n d i ' s d e f i n i t i o n s o f substance 
should be quoted as fol l o w s ; from h i s l e t t e r F I annahu 
• 1 t u j a d u j'awahjr l a ajsamo He sayss 
"The e s s e n t i a l a t t r i b u t e s of substance which 
d i s t i n g u i s h i t from other t h i n g s are theses substance, 
which i s s e I f - s u b s i s t e n t , does not depend upon any 
other t h i n g f o r i t s existence<> Substance i s the 
bearer o f opposites (hot and c o l d , etc<.)° I t never , 
changes i n i t s essence„ Substance i s capable of 
being q u a l i f i e d by the r e s t o f the categories e i t h e r 
u n i v o c a l l y or d e r i v a t i v e l y , , The u n i v o c a l d e s c r i p t i o n 
( a l - n n a ' t al-mutawafr1 9) consists i n g i v i n g the name 
and the d e f i n i t i o n t o the q u a l i f i e d o b j e c t 0 The 
d e r i v a t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n which gives the t h i n g des-
c r i b e d n e i t h e r i t s name ( d i r e c t l y ) nor i t s d e f i n i t i o n ; 
1 o R a s a 9 i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed„ Abu-RIdah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p „ 2 6 6 „ 
.ja  
and i f i t does give i t i t s name9 i t does so by d e r i -
vat i o n ( b i - l ^ i s h t i q a q , ) . " 
There i s no need f o r f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the 
cases'' of substance as "being self-sub s i s t e nt (al-qa^im 
b i ~ d h a t i h ) t h e "bearer of opposites ( a l - h a m i l 
i k h f r i l a f a t ) , and unchanging i n i t s essence (wa huwa 
f i ' a i n i h i lam yatabaddal) 9 f o r they have."been already 
explained*. By the statement t h a t substance "does not 
depend upon any other t h i n g f o r i t s existence" a l - K i n d l 
t r i e s t o e x p l a i n t h a t substance i s always p r i o r t o the 
accident i n existenceo 
Let us proceed t o the consideration; o f what 
a l - K i n d i c a l l s the un i v o c a l (al-mutawafri 9) and 
the d e r i v a t i v e . . (al-mutashgbih) d e s c r i p t i o n s <> 
Probably by the u n i v o c a l d e s c r i p t i o n (al-nna'at a l ~ 
mutawafrl y) a l - K i n d i means any adequate representa-
t i o n of a subject 9 which i s able t o give b o t h the 
name and the e s s e n t i a l a t t r i b u t e s of the q u a l i f i -
c a t i o n -to the subject q u a l i f i e d , . I t seems t h a t 
a l - K i n d l uses the concept of the un i v o c a l d e s c r i p t i o n 
1 o R a s S g i l a l - K i n d l al-falsafiyyah» ed 0 AbH RIdah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p 0 2 6 6 „ 
i n an A r i s t o t e l i a n senseo A r i s t o t l e i n the Categories 
(Chapter I ) says t h a t "on the other handy t h i n g s 
are s a i d t o he named ' u n i v o c a l l y ' which have "both 
the name and the d e f i n i t i o n answering t o the name 
i n commono A man and an ox are "both 'animal' , and 
these are u n i v o c a l l y so namedo" I t may he, 
however, t h a t al-KindT's view of the u n i v o c a l des-
c r i p t i o n i s 'better explained as^followsio I f A i s ' 
sa i d o f B, vndt only A's name, hut also ..its d e f i n i -
t i o n i s predicable of B. 
j : ,As f o r the d e r i v a t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n (al-nna't 
a l - m u t a s h i b i h ) , i t seems t h a t t h i s type of des-
c r i p t i o n , f o r a l - K i n d t , though i t may give a name 
•rtio the' subject described,;.by d e r i v a t i o n s i s yet 
unable t o determine by t h a t name what the subject 
i s i n i t s essence^ For instance^, a man may be 
musical, and he derives t h i s name from, the word 
'music', but n e i t h e r the name nor the d e f i n i t i o n 
of 'music' ap p l i e s t o the man as a whole° Probably 
a l - K i n d l i n the d e f i n i t i o n under c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
holds the view t h a t i f A. i s s a i d o f B, n e i t h e r 
A's name (except by d e r i v a t i o n ) , nor i t s d e f i n i t i o n 
1 o The Works o f A r i s t o t l e q edo W» Do Ross (Oxford 
1 9 5 5 ) Categories I» See Mantiq A r i s t u , edo 
Badawi (Cairo 19h&) p ° 3 ° 
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i s p redicable o f B o A r i s t o t l e has expressed,the 
same view. He says, " t h i n g s are s a i d t o he named 
' d e r i v a t i v e l y ' , which d e r i v e t h e i r name from some 
other name, hut d i f f e r from i t i n termination,, 
Thus the grammarian derives h i s name from the word 
1 
'grammar'»" 
I n the preceding d e f i n i t i o n a l - K i n d i says 
e x p l i c i t l y how the categories are predicable of 
substanceo According t o al=Kindx, some of the 
categories: are p r e d i c a h l e of substance u n l v o c a l l y 
( b i - l - t a w a t u ' ) , the other predicable o f substance 
d e r i v a t i v e l y t b i - l ^ - t a s h a huh) The categories o f 
genus ( a l - . j i n s ) , species (al-naw'), i n d i v i d u a l 
(al^-shakhs), and d i f f e r e n t i a ( a l - f a l l ) are p r e d i -
cable of substance u n i v o c a l l y 0 I r i these categories 
not only the name but also the d e f i n i t i o n applies, 
t o t he Substanceo From a l - K i n d i ' s p o i n t of view 
th e r e i s no s u b s t a n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between them 
and the substance which they are predicable of«, 
1 o The Works of Aristotle„ edc W„ D o Ross (Oxford 
1 9 5 5 ) Categories I . 
2 . Rasa"!! a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i . y y a h o ed„ Abu" RIdah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p o 2 6 ? » 
The categories of q u a l i t y ( a l - k a i f ) , q u a n t i t y (al-kam), 
etco are only predicable of substance derivatively« 
They are only able t o q u a l i f y the substance by 
recounting the a c c i d e n t a l a t t r i b u t e s i t possesses, 
t h e r e f o r e , according t o a l - K i n d l , there i s no 
e s s e n t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n between them and the substance 
1 
of which they are predicable» Thus, wh i l e these 
l a t t e r categories, are themselves not t o be thought 
of as substances, those which are predicable univo-
c a l l y are i n f a c t substanceso 
I t has been explained i n the f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n 
what substance i s f o r a l - K i n d l , and i n the second 
d e f i n i t i o n what he means by u n i v o c a l and d e r i v a t i v e 
d e s c r i p t i o n s o S t i l l , i t seems, the r e i s another 
d e f i n i t i o n of a l - K i n d l ' s t h a t needs t o be considered, 
which may help t o i l l u m i n a t e h i s l i n e of thought on 
t h i s mattero Al-=Kindi i n h i s "book F I a l - f a l s a f a s h 
2 
a l ^ \ u l a , B a y s , o " t h e r e are two kinds; of substances; 
one i s c a l l e d ' c o l l e c t i v e ' ( j a m i ' ) and the other i s 
1 o R a s a ? i l a l - K i n d l a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed» Abu Ridah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p 0 2 6 7 c 
2o I b i d o , p o 9 7 ° 
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c a l l e d ' d i f f e r e n t i a l 8 ( m u f a r r i q ) . The c o l l e c t i v e 
substance i s predicable u n i v o c a l l y , e i t h e r o f 
i n d i v i d u a l s ( e.g« the term 'man' as a general 
expression i s predicable of every i n d i v i d u a l of 
the human species) or i t i o prodioablg* o f many 
species, and t h i s i s what i s c a l l e d genus;0 
The d i f f e r e n t i a l substance (al-.iawhar a l ^ 
mufarriq.) i s t h a t which d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between 
the d e f i n i t i o n s of t h i n g s , l i k e the expression 
' r a t i o n a l ' ( ' a q i l ) which d i f f e r e n t i a t e s man from 
other kinds of animals, and t h i s i s what i s 
2 
c a l l e d a d i f f e r e n t i a e " 
I t seems t h a t t he term ' c o l l e c t i v e ' (.jami") 
f o r a l - K i n d l means grouping one term under another 
i n a series from genus t o i n d i v i d u a l 0 Therefore 
al-KindT has grouped genus ( a l ^ ^ i n s ) , species 
(al-naw*), and i n d i v i d u a l (al-shakh§) under the 
concept o f ' c o l l e c t i v e substance' (al-,iawhar a l -
.jami') o The t e r m ' d i f f e r e n t i a l ' (al°mufarriq) 
f o r a l - K i n d l means being able t o d i s t i n g u i s h 
one t h i n g from anothero For instan c e , 
1 . i . e . a form of speecho 
2 . R a s a 3 i l a l - K i n d l a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abu RIdah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p o l 2 5 „ 
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the expression ' r a t i o n a l ' ( 8 % q i l ) i s capable of 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g man from beast, e s s e n t i a l l y o 
Probably i t i s i n t h i s sense t h a t a l - K i n d i has 
considered the d i f f e r e n t i a ( a l - f a s l ) t o be a 
d i f f e r e n t i a l substance (.jawhar m u f a r r i q ) . 
I t appears t h a t a l - K i n d i , i n h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of substance.into ' c o l l e c t i v e ' ( j a m i * ) and 
d i f f e r e n t i a l ( m u f a r r i q ) , does not f o l l o w 
A r i s t o t l e ' s d i s t i n c t i o n of substance i n t o primary 
(nawhar awwal) and secondary substance (jawhar 
1 
t h a n i ) o A r i s t o t l e holds t h a t primary substance 
i s the i n d i v i d u a l , and t h a t nothing except species 
and genus i s a secondary substanceo A r i s t o t l e 
says, "when we exclude primary substances, -we 
concede t o species and genera alone the name 
'secondary substances', f o r these of a l l p r e d i c a t e s 
convey knowledge of primary substance»" Although 
A r i s t o t l e has recognised the d i f f e r e n t i a ( a l ~ f a | l ) 
as a substance, f o r he says, " i t i s also, the case 
1 . W.'« B o Ross, A r i s t o t l e (New York 1 9 6 2 ) p 0 2 8 o 
2 o The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed« ]Sy Richard 
McKeon (New York 1 9 ^ 1 ) p o 1 0 „ 
t h a t the d i f f e r e n t i a e cannot he present i n a 
1 
s u b j e c t , " yet he does.; not say what.kind of 
substance the d i f f e r e n t i a i s 0 
I t i s probable t h a t a l - K i n d l has made here 
some development of A r i s t o t l e ' s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of substances. I t seems t h a t a l - K i n d l i s ; 
grouping what A r i s t o t l e c a l l s primary and 
secondary substance, i n t o one class of substance; 
which he c a l l s the ' c o l l e c t i v e substance' (al° 
.iawha-r a l - ,iami') , and has a p p l i e d t o the 
d i f f e r e n t i a the term ' d i f f e r e n t i a l substance' 
(al-,1awhar a l - m u f a r r i q ) <> 
There i s an a d d i t i o n a l p o i n t of d i f f e r e n c e 
between A r i s t o t l e and a l - K i h d i t h a t needs t o be 
noticed., A r i s t o t l e has considered substance as 
something simple (basifr) and as one by nature 
2 
(Wahid bi"l-tabi'ah)» A l - K i n d i does not appear 
t o agree w i t h A r i s t o t l e on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r point« 
1 o The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed« by Richard 
McKeon 'New York 1 9 W - ) p d O o 
2 o The Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed. WoDoRoss (Oxford 
1 9 , 5 5 ) I , the Categories V; and The Basia Works 
of A r i s t o t l e , ed., Richard McKeon (New York 
1 9*4 - 1 ) Metaphysics V, 6 ; p 0 7 6 0 „ 
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For a l ~ K i n d i n e i t h e r the c o l l e c t i v e substance ( a l -
.jawhar al°jami') nor the d i f f e r e n t i a l substance 
(al-jawhar a l - m u f a r r i q ) i s simple nor does i t have 
an e s s e n t i a l u n i t y <> More i n f o r m a t i o n concerning 
a l - K i n d i ' s view of the n o n - s i m p l i c i t y of substance, 
and the i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y of t h i s term as an a t t r i b u t e 
of God w i l l be considered i n the s i x t h chapter of 
t h i s thesiSo 
No c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the meaning of 'substance' 
would be complete without a mention of the meaning 
of 'accident' a l s o . To conclude our discussion of 
a l - K i n d l ' s concept of substance, t h e r e f o r e , we 
must consider i n b r i e f , what 'accident' (a l - ' a r a d ) 
means t o al - K i n d i o I n the passage from which the 
previous d e f i n i t i o n of 'substance' i s quoted, 
a l - K i n d l defines 'accident' ( a l - ' a r a d ) as follows„ 
He says: "That which i s not e s s e n t i a l should not be 
s e l f - s u b s i s t e n t 0 I t i s always present i n a substance, 
without being capable of existence apart from i t o 
That i s why the non-essential i s c a l l e d accident." 
And he continues? "The accident may e i t h e r be 
present i n one s u b j e c t , attached t o i t as a p e c u l i a r 
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p r o p e r t y , l i k e laughing f o r a human being, and 
b r a y i n g f o r a donkey. Each i s p e c u l i a r t o one 
i n d i v i d u a l as belonging t o t h a t alone» This, s o r t 
• 
o f accident i s c a l l e d p r operty (kha^sah); or i t 
may be present i n many t h i n g s , as white which i s 
present i n every white object l i k e c o t t o n and 
-1 
papero This i s the general a c c i d e n t 0 " 
Accident ( a l - ' a r a d ) , i n the previous d e f i -
n i t i o n of a l - K i n d l , i s not s e l f - s u b s i s t e n t . I t 
always e x i s t s i n something e l s e . This something 
else i s what a l - K i n d i c a l l s subject (mawdu'). 
Therefore the accident i s always present i n a 
s u b j e c t . A l - K i n d i i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n of 'accident' 
i s very near t o A r i s t o t l e ' s l i n e of thought, which 
i s t h a t accident i s "both predicable of subject 
p 
and present i n a subject.." As i s c l e a r , a l - K i n d i 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s between p r o p e r t y (al-khas/ah) and 
general accident ( a l ' a r a d al-'amm). 
1 o R a s a ' i l a l - K i n d i a l f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abu Rldah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p p . 1 2 6 , 1 2 6 „ 
2 . The Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed. WD D-. Ross. (Oxford 
1 9 5 5 ) I , The Categories. 2 . 
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Let us proceed now t o a discussion of Avicenna's 
d e f i n i t i o n of 'substance'» The f i r s t of Avicenna's 
d e f i n i t i o n s w i l l be quoted from h i s l e t t e r E I ' l -
1 
hududo He says, "substance i s a common name; 
one speaks of substance w i t h reference t o essence 
i n the case of anything whatever, such as man and 
whitenesso The term 'substance' i s also predicable 
of every being which e x i s t s i n i t s e l f , because, i n 
order t o r e a l i s e t h i s a c t u a l existence, i t needs, 
t o j o i n i t s e l f t o some other essence., This i s 
what they mean by substance as a s e l f - s u b s i s t e n t 
e n t i t y o 
Everything i n t h i s s t a t e , whose character i t 
i s t o receive opposites when they are consequent 
upon i t , can be c a l l e d substanceo And the term 
'substance' can be used w i t h reference t o any 
essence which does not dwell i n the receptacle of 
substance (kuHt dhat l a i s a t f l mahaUjawhar). 
And i t can be s a i d of any essence which does not 
1 o Avicenna« T i s * r a s a ' i l f i al-hikmah wa 
a l t t a b i ' i y y a t . (Constantinople 1 2 9 8 ) p ° 6 0 o 
2o i . e . which does not dwell i n matter. See 
Avicenna al-Na.iah (Cairo 1 9 3 8 ) p o 2 . 0 0 „ 
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e x i s t i n a s u b j e c t . Upon t h i s , ancient p h i l o -
sophers have agreed f r o r n ^ A r i s t o t l e . They mean by 
t h a t which i s not i n a s u b j e c t , t h a t which exists; 
s u b s i s t i n g of i t s e l f , unconnected w i t h matter, 
though i t could, we w i l l g r a n t , be i n matter, 
f o r matter could not be something i n a c t u a l i t y 
w i t hout i t . 
Therefore every existence such as whiteness, 
heat, and movement, i s a substance according t o 
the f i r s t meaning. The f i r s t p r i n c i p l e ( a l -
mabda al-awwal) i s a substance according t o the 
1 . Avicenna's use of the term 'essence' (dhat)seems 
t o be i d e n t i c a l w i t h h i s use elsewhere of the 
term ' q u i d d i t y ' (mahiyyah) e.g.'he says "There 
are f o u r substances, q u i d d i t y w i t h o u t matter, 
matter without form, form without matter, and 
t h a t which i s compound of matter and form." 
Avicenna, 'uyun al-foikmah, ed. Badawi (Cairo 
2 . A r i s t o t l e i n Metaphysics X I I , 7 s uses t h i s , 
concept. He says, "The f i r s t mover, then, 
e x i s t s of n e c e s s i t y , and i n so f a r as i t 
e x i s t s by n e c e s s i t y , i t s mode of being i s 
good, and i t i s i n t h i s sense a f i r s t p r i n c i p l e . " 
See The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed. R. McKeon 
(New York 19hl) P088O. For Avicenna, i t appears 
t h a t the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e i s a pure i n t e l l e c t 
C-aql" mahd). He says, "The f i r s t p r i n c i p l e i s 
an i n t e l l e c t t o t a l l y abstracted from matter- ... 
And i t s existence i s a f i r s t existence t o be 
emanated from the F i r s t Being." Avicenna s 
T i s ' r a s l i ' i l f l al-hikmah wa aLf?tabi' i y y a t . 
(Constantinople 1 2 9 8 ) p.56. 
second, f o u r t h , and the f i f t h meaning, and i t i a 
not substance according t o the t h i r d meaning. 
Matter i s a substance according t o the f o u r t h 
and the f i f t h meaning, and i t i s not substance 
according t o the second and the t h i r d meaning. 
The form i s a substance according t o the f i f t h 
meaning, and i t i s not a substance according t o 
1 
the second, t h i r d , and the f o u r t h meaning." 
The f i r s t meaning of the preceding d e f i n i -
t i o n , of Avicenna, shows t h a t the term 'substance' 
i s predicable of anything t h a t e x i s t s , such as 
whiteness and heat, when r e f e r r i n g t o them i n 
t h e i r essence. What Avicenna has i n mind i a 
t h a t e v e r y t h i n g which i s of the nature of w h i t e -
ness and heat, f o r example, i n so f a r as i t i s i 
an a b s t r a c t existence, may be c a l l e d substance. 
According t o the second meaning of Avicenna's 
d e f i n i t i o n , the term 'substance/ i s predicable of 
every being which e x i s t s i n i t s e l f ( l i - k u l l i 
maw.jud l i - d h a t i h ) . That i s t o say, every being 
which i s s e l f - s u b s i s t e n t (qa yim b i - d h a t i h ) can 
1 . Avicenna, T i s * r a s a ? i l f x al-hikmah wa 
a l ^ a b i ' i y y a t . (Constantinople 1 2 9 8 ) p . 5 6 . 
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be c a l l e d substance i n r e l a t i o n t o i t s essence« For 
according t o Avicenna every s e l f - s u b s i s t i n g being, 
i n so f a r as i t i s a substance, should d e r i v e i t s 
existence from an essence (dhat) <> This second 
meaning of Avicenna's d e f i n i t i o n gives an impression 
t h a t , i f there i s no essence, there w i l l be no 
s u b s t a n t i a l existence<> Also i t gives a f u r t h e r 
impression t h a t substance goes beyond i t s essence 
f o r i t s a c t u a l existence, as a s e l f - s u b s i s t i n g 
beingo For substance as i t appears i n the 
previous d e f i n i t i o n needs t o " j o i n another 
2 
essence t o r e a l i z e i t s a c t u a l existence.," 
The t h i r d meaning of Avicenna's d e f i n i t i o n of 
substance explains t h a t , w h i l e substance i s t h a t 
which i s i n i t s e l f ( a l ~ q a p i m b i - d h a t i h ) , i t is; 
capable of a d m i t t i n g contrary qualities<, For 
ins t a n c e , Zaid i s an i n d i v i d u a l substance; he 
i s at one time w h i t e , and at another black5 a t 
one time warm, at another e o l d j at one time good, 
and another bado But Zaid h i m s e l f , being an 
1 o I w i l l deal more f u l l y w i t h t h i s issue i n a l a t e r 
chaptero 
2 o Avicenna o T i s / r a s a ^ i l f I al-hikmah wa a l ^ a b i " iyyat' 
(Constantinople 1 2 9 8 ) p p 6 0 » 
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i n d i v i d u a l substance, stays as he is» 
According t o the fo u r t h meaning of Avicenna's 
d e f i n i t i o n , the term 'substance' i s predicable of 
every essence whose existence i s neither i n the 
sense of a form nor i n the sense of an accident 
i n matter (ku]l dhat l a i s a t f I mahall jawhar). 
Avicenna i n t h i s part of the d e f i n i t i o n probably 
has i n mind unformed matter (al-maddat al-ghair 
musawwarah)0 Matter i t s e l f devoid of form, shape, 
and dimensions, and of a l l sensible q u a l i t i e s , 
when i t i s considered i n i t s e l f , i s a substance<> 
According to the f i f t h meaning of Avicenna's 
d e f i n i t i o n , the term 'substance' i s predicable of. 
every essence that does not exist i n a subject 
(kulldhat l a i s a t f l mawdu'), Avicenna i n al°Na,iah 
says that "Every essence which does not exist i n a 
subject i s a substance, and every essence which i s 
2 
present i n a subject i s an accident»" I t seems 
t h a t , f o r Avicenna, only that essence which i s not 
1 o Avicenna uses the term (mahal*) i n the sense of 
of mattero See Avicenna, al-Na.jah (Cairo 1 9 3 8 ) 
P o 2 0 0 o 
2 o I b - i d o 
= 2 7 ° 
present i n a subject i s capable of "being considered 
as a substance<. Probably Avicenna has i n mind the; 
form (al-surah)<, The form i t s e l f , devoid of matter, 
i s a substance „^  
Avicenna has concluded his d e f i n i t i o n by-
c l a s s i f y i n g substance i n t o matter (maddah), form 
(surah), and the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e (al-mabday a l ~ 
awwal)o In terms of the d e f i n i t i o n under considera-
t i o n , matter i s a substance from the point of view 
of the f o u r t h , and the f i f t h meanings of the d e f i n i -
tiono Form i s a substance i n terms of the f i f t h 
meaning of the definition,, The f i r s t p r i n c i p l e 
(a1-mabda9 al°awwal) i s a substance i n terms of 
the second, the f o u r t h , and the f i f t h meanings of 
the definition,. 
I t seems that Avicenna i n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s 
presenting an A r i s t o t e l i a n l i n e of thought., 
A r i s t o t l e i n the Metaphysics V I I has explained the 
case i n which the term 'substance' i s predicable. 
1 o A r i s t o t l e defines form as a substance without 
mattero He says, "by form, I mean the essence 
of. each th i n g and i t s primary substance„" The 
Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed» Richard McKeon 
(New York 1 9 4 1 ) Metaphysics V I I , 7 , p o 7 9 2 „ 
= 2 8 . -
of the substratum (form, matter, and the compound of 
both), and the essence <> He says, "we have now d i s -
cussed two things which are commonly held t o "be 
p 
suhstance 9 substratum and essenceo l ! f" Even the 
term " f i r s t p r i n c i p l e ' (al~mabda9 al-.awwal) which 
Avicenna uses i n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i s of A r i s t o t e l i a n 
origin., A r i s t o t l e i n Metaphysics X I I says that 
"the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e or primary being i s not 
movable either i n i t s e l f or accidentally, but 
produces; the primary, eternal and single movement,"^ 
..We must now leave the defi n i t i o n s ; of F I y l -
hudud, and proceed to consider a second concept 
of substance found i n Avicenna's w r i t i n g s , though 
t h i s i s not claimed t o be a complete definition.. 
I n a passage of his book a l - i s h i f a 9 , Avicenna gives 
the f o l l o w i n g statement concerning the characterisr-
t i c s of substanceo He says, "The existence i n a 
thing may be either by essence, as the existence:: 
of man as a man, or by the accident as the exis-
tence of Zaid as. a white object, <,. The former 
1 , For A r i s t o t l e the substratum i s a substance, and 
t h i s i n one sense matter, and i n the other the form 
and t h i r d the complex Of these two. I b i d , Meta-
physics V I I , 1 , p08l2» 
2 o A r i s t o t l e Metaphysics 3 edited and translated by John Warrington (London 1 9 6 6 ) p „ 1 9 6 o 
3° The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed„ R o McKeon (New 
York 1 9 W Metaphysics X I I , 1 , p 0 8 8 1 o 
which i s the substance i s never present- i n a subjects 
The l a t t e r which i s the accident i s always present 
i n a subject? "by "being present i n a subject, one 
does not mean as parts are i n a whole,, but "being, 
1 
incapable of existence apart from what i t i s i n 0 ! f l 
Avicenna i n the preceding passage is; intending 
to d i s t i n g u i s h substance from accident o For, 
according t o him., the accident i s always present 
i n a subject, which may be either a substance or -
sometimes another accident, just as speed i s i n 
movement, while the substance can never be present; 
i n a subjecto For substance exists independently, 
while the accident does not, and so, f o r Avicenna, 
substance i s always p r i o r t o accidento Therefore 
the same thi n g cannot be both a substance andi 
3 
accident at the same t i m e 
After separating substance from accident, 
Avicenna, i n his same a r t i c l e from a l - i h i f a o goes 
on t o c l a s s i f y substance i n t o body (jism)„ the 
1 c Avicenna, a l ~ g h i f a , eds» Go Co Qanwatiand S. Zajryed 
(Cairo, 1 9 6 0 ) I , p 0 5 7 ° 
2 o I b i d o s, p o 5 8 ° 
3 o Ibido 
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elements of body (a.iza' .iism) B soul (nafs) , and 
i n t e l l e c t (*aql) <, He does not appear t o include 
God i n t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , but says, "Every subs-
tance i s either a body, or i t i s not a body 8 I f 
i t i s not a body i t w i l l be either an element of 
a body, or i t i s not an element of a body, that 
i s to say separated completely from bodies» And 
i f i t i s an element of a body, i t w i l l be either 
the form of the body or i t s matter» And i f i t i s 
separable without being an element of a body, i t 
w i l l either have a sort of control over bodies by 
moving them, and i n t h i s case i t w i l l be a soul, 
or i t w i l l have no connection with bodies, and i n 
t h i s case, i t w i l l be called i n t e l l e c t o " ' 
Having given an outline of Avicenna's d e f i n i -
t i o n of 'substance', i t i s proposed next t o examine 
i n b r i e f h is d e f i n i t i o n of 'accident' <, Avicenna's 
main conception of the accident f a l l s i n t o two 
p a r t S o F i r s t he says, "The term 'accident' i s 
predicable of everything which either dwells i n 
1 o Avicenna., a l - s h i f a s edso Go Go Qanwati and Sj» Zayyed 
(Cairo 1960), I , p 0 60„ 
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matter, or i s present i n a subject»" This reveals 
that Avicenna uses the term 'accident' (al- 4aradi) as. 
the opposite of 'substance'„ Therefore the accident 
i s always to be found i n matter or i n a subject, 
and never as e x i s t i n g i n i t s own righto Secondly, 
he says, "The term 'accident' applies t o the simple 
universal expression, which i s predicable of many 
2 
things though not essentially«"' This means that 
accidents are able t o qua l i f y things, only externally<> 
That i s , they do not qu a l i f y e s s e n t i a l l y 0 I n other 
words, 'accident' i s opposed t o 'essence'» 
In conclusion t o the present chapter, we would 
notice that when al-Kindi and Avicenna asked the 
question,what i s the d e f i n i t i o n of substance, they 
were facing an eternal problem,, For i t appears, that 
A r i s t o t l e before them had faced the same problem 0 
He says i n the Metaphysics, "and indeed the question 
which was raised of old and i s raised now and always, 
and i s always the subject of doubt, i 0 e 0 what being 
1 o Avicenna, Tis" r a s a y i l f i al-hikmah wa 
aTgkabi' iyyat (Constantinople 1 2 9 8 ) p o 6 0 „ 
2 » I b i d o 
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i s , i s just the question, what i s substance'?" 
Indeed, they have inh e r i t e d t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l problem, 
from Aristotle., and i t was often t o A r i s t o t l e that 
they turned f o r t h e i r methods and t h e i r material o 
Several Arabic translations of A r i s t o t l e were 
2 
available, and great i n t e r e s t , as i t appears from 
the previous discussion of the d e f i n i t i o n of subs-
tance, i s displayed by both al-K i n d l and Avicenhai 
i n the Categories; and the Metaphysicsi-
Because of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of d e f i n i t i o n , i t 
seems, i t became conventional to follow, each d e f i -
n i t i o n of substance w i t h a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of. 
substances.. One curious feature i s that G-od i s 
not included i n these classificationso Vifhen the 
s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of body, soul, and i n t e l l e c t have 
been examined, i t w i l l f i n a l l y be explained how 
al-Kindi and Avicenna tackle the problem "I s God 
a substance?" 
1 o The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , e.d<> Richard McEeon 
(New York 19U1) Metaphysics V I I , 1, pp.783s 784-> 
2o Richard Walzer, Greek i n t o Arabia, (Oxford I963O 
PP06, "J; and De Lacy 0'Leary,..How Greek Science 
passed t o the Arabs,, (London 1948) p<>l£9° 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Material Substance 
In t h i s chapter i t i s intended to consider 
al-Kindl's and Avicenna's concepts of the material 
substance (al-.jawhar al-maddi). The discussion w i l l 
s t a r t with al-Kindi's, and then i t w i l l be followed 
by Avicenna's concept of the material substanceo 
I n dealing w i t h al-Kindi's material substance, the 
discussion w i l l be considering his book Pi a l -
jawahir al-khamso As 33 i s known the Arabic version 
of t h i s text i s missingo There i s only the L a t i n 
2 
t r a n s l a t i o n , which has been retranslated i n t o 
Arabic by Professor AbH Ridah»v 
Although t h i s book seems a simple one compared 
to the other w r i t i n g s of al - K i n d l , i t needs 
much e f f o r t and consideration before al^Kindl's 
reasoning can be understood correctly» To avoid 
1 » The heavenly bodies, though material, w i l l not be 
discussed here, but i n the context of the intellect» 
2o Albino Nagy published the L a t i n version of t h i s 
book with other l e t t e r s of al-Kindi under the 
t i t l e Die Philosophischen Abhandlungen Ja'Q.tlb Ben 
Ishaq al-KindlV[Munster 18977° 
3° Rasa^il al-°Kindi a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abu Ridah 
(Cairo 1953) I I , p.B. 
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any confusion, or any misinterpretation, t h i s hook 
should "be considered alongside his other works, 
which are relevant t o t h i s subject c 
The f i r s t problem to he faced i n t h i s "book, 
i n dealing with the material substance (al-.iawhar 
al-maddl), i s that al-Kindi here t a l k s about the 
f i v e substances (al-jawahir al-khams) "de quinque. 
1 
e;Ssentus"o These so-called substances are matter 
(al-maddah), form (al-surah), place (al-makan), 
movement (al-harakah), and time (al~zaman)o Two 
of these, matter and form, are universally 
acknowledged as; substances = But movement, place, 
and time, when they are considered with regard to 
al-Kindi's d e f i n i t i o n of 'substance' f a i l to 
q u a l i f y as substanceso 
Let us state and explain what al-Kindi means 
by the material substanceo He says, b r i e f l y , that 
every material body which i s a substance, should 
be a compound of f i v e things; matter, form, places, 
movement, and time 0 That i s to say, every material 
1 o Rasa^il al-Kindl al°falsafiyyah, ed. Abxi Ridah 
(Cairo 1953) I I , p°9° 
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substance^ should have matter which i s i t s "basic 
constituent and a certain form t o make i t v i s i b l e 
and distinguishable from other objects.; i t should, 
be i n a place, because without being i n a place, 
i t w i l l have no certain l i m i t 0 Also i t should have 
a movement (harakah) which i s a cause of i t s gene-
r a t i o n (takwln) „ related to i t s essence i n places and 
time 0 Therefore, every material substance should 
have matter and form, and should also be moved i n 
place and time 0 Once i t has ceased t o possess any 
one of these f i v e elements the compound material 
substance i s dissolved and ceases to exist° 
These f i v e elements (al*anasir al^khams) which 
are found i n the material substance (al-.iawhar a I * * 
2 
fliaddi) can be explained by the fo l l o w i n g example» 
One can re f e r to a ship as a material substance 
haying these f i v e elements as basic constituents6 
Matter, i n r e l a t i o n t o t h i s ship, w i l l - be the i r o n 
and the wood of which i t has been made.. Form i n 
r e l a t i o n to t h i s ship w i l l be the corners, the angles 
1 o Rasg'il al-Kindl a l - f a l s a f i.yyah, ed° AbH Ridah 
(Cairo 1953) I I , P»lt ' 
2o I b i d o 
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and the shape i t has 0 Also t h i s ship should he i n 
some place, where i t can move during a period of 
1 
timeo Accordingly, as al-Kindr says, these f i v e 
things, when they have been considered together i n 
r e l a t i o n t o t h i s ship, as a material substance, may 
be each considered at t h i s stage as a substanceo 
I n t h i s case each of these things, according t b h i s 
t e x t , i s given the name ' substance' <, But does he 
r e a l l y mean that each one should be regarded as a. 
substance, having the same a t t r i b u t e s that subatances 
should have? 
A proper i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of al-Kindi' s. theory of 
the material substance would seem t o be as follows.,, 
When al=Kindi t a l k s about movement., space, and time, 
by giving them the name 'substance', he does not mean 
they are r e a l l y substances i n the f u l l sense of the; 
term« They are only substantial elements, when they 
are considered i n r e l a t i o n t o the material substance= 
That i s to say, besides form and matter, there are 
s t i l l some other basic elements which need to be added 
1o Rasa gil al-Kindl al°falsafiyyah, ed„ AbH Ridah 
(Cairo 1953) ppolU, 15° 
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i n order that the material substance can be constituted,; 
namely, movement, place, and timeo Thus the creation 
and the generation of the material substance- as a 
perceptible object, depend e n t i r e l y on these five; 
essential t h i n g s 0 
However, t h i s i s only so i n r e l a t i o n to the 
material object as a compound substance (.iawhar 
murakkab) having a l l of these a t t r i b u t e s at the same 
timeo Further, i f these f i v e things have been con-
sidered separately, two of them should be taken as 
substances, i n the f u l l sense of the meaning of the. 
word ' substances' » These are form and matter 
(al-sHrah wa al-maddah)» Whereas the other three, 
movement (al-harakah) 9 place (al-makanjl, and time 
(al-zaman) cannot, as i n d i v i d u a l s , be substances<> 
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s supported by the following, 
evidence 0 
1 
F i r s t l y , i n his book, F I a l - f a l s a f a t . al° .ula, 
he says, "when a t o t a l i t y of elements, together form 
one compound t h i n g , i t is. possible f o r each of these 
1 o RasH'il al-Kindl a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abu Radah 
(Cairo 1950) Is p0150o 
elements to "be given the substantial name and'the 
•i 
d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s newly compound thingo l , ! That 
i s to say, that when A, B, and G together establish 
one object, and t h i s object has the name S; as i t s 
a t t r i b u t e , then each of A, B, and C can be given the 
name So This appears t o constitute an i m p l i c i t 
reference t o movement, place and time as substances 
as such? Yet al-Kindi does; not seem t o be characte-
r i s i n g them thus, but only as. basic elements without 
which no material substance can be generatedo A 
reason f o r doubting whether al-Kindi regards movement 
place and time as substances, as such, i 0 e 0 as subs-
tances i n the s t r i c t sense of t h i s term, i s that i n 
none of his writings has he referred to any of these 
three elements by the word ' substance:' o F u l l inves-
t i g a t i o n and careful studies have been made i n a l l 
of his works, which are known to us, and no signs 
have been found of hi s regarding movement, place, and 
time as substances 0 
Secondly i t would seem u n l i k e l y that al-Kindi 
regards time, movement, and place as being self= 
subsistent, because they are a l l present i n a subject 
" 38 -
Clearly, one should not regard, them as substances i n 
the absence of any evidence t o support that view.o 
Al-Kinda's theory of the material substance can 
K 
be further interpreted by distinguishing the a t t r i -
bute- that any material substance should have i n t o 
primary attributes: ( a l f a t awwaliyyah) and secondary 
•". y 
attributes; ( s i f a t thanawwah) <, The p r i m a r y ' a t t r i -
butes are of a kind which i s essential f o r the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of any material substance, i»e0 'without 
which no material substance can e x i s t ; while the 
secondary attributes; are of a kind which^is nbt 
essential f o r the generation of the material bodyo 
Therefore, matter, form, movement, place, and time 
should be considered as primary a t t r i b u t e s ? They1 
are i n e v i t a b l y connected with every material body, 
while colour, t a s t e , smell, and weight should be 
considered as secondary a t t r i b u t e s * 
I t i s hoped that the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n that ; has; 
been put forward i n t h i s chapter w i l l eliminate any 
inconsistency or contradiction that may be found i n 
al-Kindl's doctrine of substance.. I t seems that he 
- 39 ~ 
takes an empirical p o s i t i o n with regard to the exis;-
tence of the material substance» For him, the material 
substance i s a matter of fact because i t moves from one 
plac:e to another during a period of time., I t can be 
1 
seen and can be experienced at any time» 
I t i s indi c a t i v e of t h i s empirical approach that 
i n dealing with these f i v e essential attributes; 
separately, al-Kindl gives> p r i o r i t y t o matter, by 
considering i t before the other four i n his book F I 
2 
al~jawahir al-khamsaho I t should, also be said that 
3 
al=Kinda, unlike A r i s t o t l e , considers matter even 
before. form 0 His j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s t h a t , since matter 
i s the receiver of the form, i t should be considered 
before the form which i s received., Although h i s 
reason may not be convincing, yet as he chooses t o 
examine matter f i r s t , so i t i s necessary f o r us t o 
adhere t o his order<, 
For al=Kindi matter cannot be known through i t s ; 
d e f i n i t i o n , i t i s knowable only through i t s ; charac-
t e r i s t i c s ; 0 His j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s that matter i s a 
1o Ras§?il al-Kindx a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed» Abu Ridah 
(Cairo 1959) s . I j Pol<37„ 
2. Ibido s I I , p 0 l 6 o 
3° The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed« Richard McKeon 
(New York I9kl) Metaphysics V I I , 3* PP°785, 786 0 
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iSommon genus.j d e f i n i t i o n i s applicable only t o compound 
objects that have both genus ( j i n s ) and d i f f e r e n t i a 
( f a s l ) o Matter can have no genus; more universal than 
i t s e l f , nor i s i t a compound object, thus, i t cannot 
be known by i t s definition,, Therefore i t i s only 
apprehended through i t s ; characteristics... 
Enumerating b r i e f l y the characteristics, that; 
matter has, he says;s ( l ) I t i s the bearer of oppositeso 
(2) I t receives form and q u a l i t i e s when they have been 
attached to i t , while i t i t s e l f i s unable to. he 
'received'o (3) I t i s i t s nature not to be affected 
by the a l t e r a t i o n of the q u a l i t i e s i t has received,. 
(1+) Basically, matter i s the o r i g i n of a l l material 
objects that exist i n the physical world- (5) Episte-
mologically, matter has no d e f i n i t i o n at a l l , and i s 
1 
known only through i t s characteristics;,. 
H i s t o r i c a l l y speaking, al-Kindl was facing the 
same problem that had faced A r i s t o t l e before him, and 
that afterwards faced some of the seventeenth century 
philosophers, including John Locke 0 I n the case of 
1 „ RasS ?il al-Rindi a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed» Ab\i RIdah 
(Cairo 1953) , I I , p°18c 
A r i s t o t l e t h i s problem remained without a f i n a l 
h i s commentators o f , f o r i n s t a n c e , the d i s t i n c t i o n ^ 
of matter i n t o primary and secondary matter<> But, 
f o r A r i s t o t l e , matter, although i t i s the p r i n c i p l e 
of i n d i v i d u a t i o n , i t i s unknowable. S i m i l a r l y 
John Locke sai d i t i s impossible t o have e m p i r i c a l 
p 
knowledge of the essence of matter„ A l - K i n d i , 
however, be l i e v e s t h a t i t i s poss i b l e t o know the 
essence of matter through i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . , 
although t h i s knowledge could not be a c e r t a i n and 
adequate one.. 
The second of the f i v e primary a t t r i b u t e s t o 
be considered i s the form., A l - K i n d i distinguishes, 
between two concepts of form, the sensible form . 
( a l - s u r a h a l - l a t i taqa' t a h t a a l - h x s s ) , and the 
r a t i o n a l form ( a l - s u r a h ' a l - l a t i taqa' t a h t a a l - j i n s ) o 
Sensible form, which i s the object of the present:, 
d i s c u s s i o n , a l - K i n d i defines as f o l l o w s , u s u a l l y 
1 0 Joseph Owens, Matter and P r e d i c a t i o n , i n A i ^ t o t l e 
a C o l l e c t i o n of C r i t i c a l Essays (London 1 9 S 8 ) 
pp.. 1 9 1 t o 21ko 
2 o John Locke, vEj5s^^oncernin^Human Understanding 8 Book I I I , 8 o 
3 o The r a t i o n a l form w i l l be discussed i n connection 
w i t h the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the soulo 
solution., 1 Many i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s have been made by 
c o n s i d e r i n g i t as the dimensions of the m a t e r i a l 
objecto He says, "The f i r s t s primary, simple subs-
tances, which c o n s t i t u t e the m a t e r i a l body are matter 
and form <,<,<, I t i s a m a t e r i a l body, because i t is; 
composed of matter and dimensions, which are i t s ; 
1 
formo'*1 Moreover, he says "what I mean by the form 
i s t h a t i n the case of the form of ;al-dlnSr , when 
the form has; been p r i n t e d on the g o l d , • a 1 - d i n a r has 
been formed. uf~ A l - K i n d i means by the form, the; 
shape t h a t pure matter takes, when i t has been 
moulded i n three dimensions« For instances molten 
i r o n cannot become a d i s t i n c t p e r c e p t i b l e object 
u n t i l i t has been cast i n some d e f i n i t e t h r e e -
dimensional form 0 
The p e r c e p t i b l e form or the m a t e r i a l form (al° 
sSrah al^maddiyah) has; been considered by a l - K i n d i 
as a power which e x i s t s i n u n q u a l i f i e d matter^ Which 
he has c a l l e d simple matter (al-maddah al-baslfrah) °v 
For him, there i s i n simple matter, i . e . unqualified 1. 
1 o R a s a / i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abu" Rxdah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p o ! 5 0 » 
2 . Ibido 0 p 0 2 1 7 o 
matter^ a power (quwwah) which allows the m a t e r i a l 
object t o he generated from it» I n t h i s case, does 
a l - K i n d i mean that, f o r m : e x i s t s p o t e n t i a l l y w i t h i n 
matter i t s e l f - w i t h o u t having any e x t e r n a l existence? 
As f a r as one can say, '3Lt: seems t h a t he d i d mean ;>that 
For he gives the f o l l o w i n g example t o e x p l a i n what he 
means by saying t h a t form i s a power which e x i s t s i n 
the simple matter,, He says t h a t heat and dryness, 
which are i n simple matter cause a f i r e when they 
come t o g e t h e r o F i r e , at t h i s stage, as a form of 
these two simple elements, i s merely.a power t h a t 
e x i s t s p o t e n t i a l l y i n heat and dryness. However, 
a l - K i i i d i does not present good evidence i n support 
of h i s view t h a t form i s a mere power t h a t e x i s t s 
i n simple matter» . 
The: t h i r d of the f i v e primary, c attri'butes; of.: 
a l - K i n d i ' s m a t e r i a l substance i s movement (al° 
harakah)<, A l - K i n d l defines movement i n h i s l e t t e r 
F.i -hudld al-ashya* wa rusSmiha as f o l l o w s o "Movement 
1 o R a s a ' i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i.yyan 9 ed. Abu Rida 
(Cairo 1 9 5 3 ) I I j p » 2 5 ° 
- Z t f i . . - -
i s the a l t e r a t i o n of the mode of the essence."1 Change 
or the a l t e r a t i o n of the mode of the essence (hell * 
a l - d h a t ) . seems t o take place e x t e r n a l l y or internally„ 
The e x t e r n a l change i s a k i n d of a l t e r a t i o n which 
occurs t o the e x t e r n a l q u a l i t i e s of the o b j e c t , w h i l e 
the i n t e r n a l change i s a k i n d of a l t e r a t i o n which 
increases or decreases the q u a n t i t y or q u a l i t a t i v e 
aspects of the object» I t seems here t h a t a l - K i n d l ' s 
d e f i n i t i o n of 'movement's, i s not an A r i s t o t e l i a n one, 
"because A r i s t o t l e defines: 'movement' as f o l l o w s . 
"The f u l f i l m e n t of what e x i s t s p o t e n t i a l l y . , i n so 
f a r as i t e x i s t s p o t e n t i a l l y * W h i l e there appears, 
t o he a considerable d i f f e r e n c e "between the d e f i n i -
t i o n s of a l ~ K i n d i and of A r i s t o t l e , "both consider 
motion as something not extending t o infinity» For, 
A r i s t o t l e p o s t u l a t e s h i s unmoved mover (al~muharrik 
a l - l a d h i l a yataharrk) as the only answer t o an 
i n f i n i t e r e gression, w h i l e a l - K i n d i ' s change i n the 
modes of the essence does not imply any necessary 
c o n t i n u i t y of motion 0 
1 o Rasa 9 i l al-Kinda a l ~ f a l s a f i y y a h , edo Abu" Ridah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p „ l 6 7 ° 
2.o The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , edo Richard McKeon 
(New York 1 9 4 1 ) Physics I I I , I , p 0 2 5 4 ° 
As f o r the types of movement, there; i s no "basic 
d i f f e r e n c e "between a l - K i n d i and A r i s t o t l e •> A l - K i n d i 
i s c o n s i d e r i n g the kinds of movement as f o l l o w s (a& 
A r i s t o t l e d i d ) o They are ( l ) locomotion ( a l - n u q l a h ) , 
( 2 ) i n c r e a s i n g movement (al°-rubu?) , ( 3 ) decreasing 
movement'' (al° " i d m i h l a l ) , (k) movement of a l t e r a t i o n 
( a l - ' i s t l h a l a h ) , ( 5 ) movement of c r e a t i o n (al-kawn), 
( 6 ) movement of degeneration (al-faBad.). , Lojeomb-
t i o n p e r t a i n s t o t h a t which can "be c a r r i e d from one 
place t o another, without any a l t e r a t i o n a f f e c t i n g 
i t s dimensions, or any q u a l i t y i t has.* The 
i n c r e a s i n g movement w i l l extend the dimensions of 
the "body, while the decreasing movement w i l l shorten 
i t s l i m i t S o Therefore the i n c r e a s i n g and the 
decreasing movements always apply t o the category 
of q u a n t i t y B The category of substance i s hot 
3 ' 
subject t o any of these kinds, of movement» 
The movement of a l t e r a t i o n ( a l - 9 i s t i h a l a h ) i s 
t h a t k i n d of change which happens t o some of the 
1 o The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed<, Richard .McKeon 
(New York 1 9 U 1 ) Physics I I I , I , " p . 2 5 U . 
2 o R a s a p i l a l - K i n d l a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed 0 Abu" Rldah 
(Cairo 1953) I I , p»22:o For more knowledge of 
a l - K i n d i concept of motion see I b i d o , I , p p D 2 5 9 ~ 
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e x t e r n a l aspects o f the changed o b j e c t . .But no 
e f f e c t i v e change could he s u f f e r e d by the s u b s t a n t i a l 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of the object i t s e l f . For instances,.' 
a l ~ K i n d i says, when a p a r t i c u l a r man i s i n good 
h e a l t h he has a d i f f e r e n t appearance from when he 
i s not w e l l or weary a f t e r a long journey. One may 
admit a s l i g h t change l i k e t h a t , but there w i l l be 
no s u b s t a n t i a l change. Therefore t h i s k i n d of 
movement i s always a p p l i c a b l e t o the category of 
•i 
q u a l i t y , but not t o the category of substance. 
The c r e a t i v e and degenerative (al-kawn wa a l -
fasad) movement i s supposed t o change the object 
from the s t a t e of being t o the s t a t e of no t - b e i n g , 
or v i c e versa. I t always occurs t o the compound! 
substances, i . e . i n d i v i d u a l substance. For instance, 
a l - K i n d i says that.heat and c o l d are present i n the 
human matter, and may change, t h i s matter i n t o a 
l i v i n g being. This i s the c r e a t i v e motion, from 
which a l i v i n g being has been produced. The degen&= 
r a t i v e motion i s the d i s s o l u t i o n of the p a r t s , and 
as a r e s u l t the object w i l l pass out of the s t a t e 
1 o R a s a 9 i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abu Ridah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 3 ) I I ? P o 2 l + . : 
of beingo Therefore movement of c r e a t i o n and degen^ra-
t i o n always happen t o the compound substance,,- As i t 
appears, al-Kindl* does not add anything considerable 
t o A r i s t o t l e ' s view of the movement of c r e a t i o n and 
2 
degeneration.. 
The degree and the speed of movement d i f f e r s 
from one body t o another„ Large and compound bodies 
need more e f f o r t than simple and small bodies i n 
order t o be set i n motion,. Motion should be communi-
cated from l a r g e and compound objects t o t h a t which 
i s smaller and more simple, w h i l e no body can a f f e c t 
what i s l a r g e r than itself» 
" The f o u r t h of the f i v e primary a t t r i b u t e s t o be 
considered i s place „ A l - K i n d l assserts the a c t u a l 
existence of place, and i n so doing he may be 
grouped amongst those philosophers known as Realists„ 
Thus place i s necessary, because without i t bodies 
cannot move t o inter-communicate t h e i r mot i o n <, For 
any change by increase or d i m i n u t i o n , as w e l l as the 
1 o Rasa^il a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed„ AbH Ridah 
(Cairo 1953) I I , .p.;2l+. 
2 o The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed„ Richard McKeon 
(New York 1941) Physics 111,1, p„254o See Averroes, 
K i t a b al-sama" a l - t a b i ' i (Haidarabad/1365) PP° 22, 
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other kinds of movement, must take place i n an 
environment wider than the object moved. Therefore 
place has, been defined as "the container o f the, 
moving body". A l - K i n d i ' s d e f i n i t i o n of 'place)' 
i s s i m i l a r t o A r i s t o t l e ' s , which i s "The innermost 
2 
motionless boundary of what contains i s place"' 0 
No i n t r i n s i c d i f f e r e n c e can be found between the 
two d e f i n i t i o n s j o 
A l ~ K i n d i r e j e c t s e n t i r e l y any c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
of place as a body 0 He holds t h a t i f place i s a. 
body, which accepts another body, then the. r e a l 
body w i l l be i n another body. I n t h i s case i t 
would be poss i b l e f o r any body t o be immersed i n 
any o t h e r , and an i n f i n i t e r e gression Would be 
i n v o l v e d , whereby one body contains another, which 
i n t u r n contains yet another, and so on without 
endo Therefore i t should be admitted t h a t place 
i s not a body. A l ~ K i n d i i s j u s t r e p e a t i n g the 
3 
same argument t h a t A r i s t o t l e has r a i s e d against. 
1 c R a s a ' i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed„ AbG Ridah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 3 ) I I , P-2B. -
2 0 The Basic works of A r i s t o t l e , ed. Richard McKeon 
(New York 1 9 W-) Physics IV, h, p 0 2 7 8 o 
3 c I b i d . , p o 2 7 2 ° 
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P l a t o 9 who appears t o suggest t h a t place i s a body 0 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that; a l - K i n d i regards place 
as something two-dimensional , or as coming from t h a t 
k i n d of matter which i s of twoodimensions , t h a t i s 
p 
t o say from surfaceso Thus place d i f f e r s from 
3 
body which i s always of three dimensions, and i t 
cannot f u l f i l the c r i t e r i o n of "bodily substanceo 
A l - K i n d i "believes t h a t there i s a necessary 
connection "between place (makan) and the l o c a t e d 
o b j e c t (al~mutamakkin) o That i s t o say i f .there 
i s a place, i t i s necessary t h a t there w i l l be a 
l o c a t e d object f i l l i n g t h a t placeo Moreover, i f 
t h e r e i s a loc a t e d object (mut amakkin). i t i s 
necessary t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a place (makSn) 
surrounding i t o Therefore;, according t o al-KindT's 
1o P l a t o , i n the Tim&©is compares"his receptacle w i t h 
a mass of p l a s t i c m a t e r i a l , and. hence may be 
understood t o mean t h a t a b o d i l y substance i s 
r e c e i ^ i h g other bodiesv Francis M, Cornfordj-
P l a t o ' s cosmology (New York 1957) PP° 181 P 183o 
2 o R a s a y i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abu1 Ridah 
(Cairo 1953) I I , P ° 3 0 ° 
3 o I n h i s l e t t e r F i alHaudud,,:he d e f i n e s body as 
" t h a t w h i c h has t h r e e dimensibho" I b i d o 0 I , 
p 0165 o ; 
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concept of place, there i s no voido Every, place 
should he occupied w i t h a body l o c a t e d i n it« More-
over, place i s not i n f i n i t e , f o r t h a t would merely 
he i n f i n i t e space which has no r e a l existence -
We may now deal w i t h time as the f i f t h of the 
primary a t t r i b u t e s t o be considered i n r e l a t i o n t o 
the m a t e r i a l substanceo A l - K i n d i defines 'time' 
as follows? "time i s a d u r a t i o n measured by move-
i 
ment, and i t has no f i x e d p a r t s o " Moreover, he 
says, "There could be no corporeal body which does 
not e x i s t i n t i m e , because time i s the number of 
movement, which means t h a t i t i s a d u r a t i o n measured 
by movemento Therefore i f there i s a movement there 
w i l l be a time and i f there i s no movement there 
2 
w i l l be no t i m e 0 " This i n d i c a t e s t h a t time, f o r 
a l - K i n d i , should.have a beginning and an endo I t s 
beginning i s the beginning of the motion of the 
m a t e r i a l substance, and i t s end should be the end 
of t h a t motiono 
1 o R a s a ^ i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. AbGRIdah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p d 6 7 = 
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Moreover, al-Kindx i s considering time as 
continuous q u a n t i t y (al-'adad a l - m u t t a s i l ) , which 
connects past events w i t h f u t u r e events» He 
considers t h e present d u r a t i o n of any time as: the 
centre of the connexion, "because i t i s the end of 
the past events and the "beginning of the f u t u r e o 
The present t i m e , which he c a l l s 'now' ( a l - ^ S n ) , 
i s no more than a connecting r e l a t i o n which i s 
b r i d g i n g the gap between the past and the f u t u r e <> 
I n t h i s case '.time' i s capable of being- given a 
second d e f i n i t i o n s "Time i s an imaginary i n s t a n t , 
which i s used t o connect the antecedent and con-
2 
sequent events of the past and the f u t u r e o " 
I t remains t o be s a i d t h a t a l - K i n d l i s consi-
d e r i n g movement, place, and t i m e , as t h r e e o b j e c t s 
i n coexistence, i n the sense t h a t no one of them 
comes before or a f t e r the other.. Thus any m a t e r i a l 
body should be UmQV,e,d;l i n a place d u r i n g a p e r i o d 
of timec. I t i s c l e a r l y s t a t e d by a l - K i n d l i n many 
places i n h i s . w r i t i n g s t h a t n e i t h e r body nor 
1 = R a s a 9 i l al-Kindx a l - f a l s a f i y y a h B ed» Abil RIdah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 3 ) I I , - p . 
2 0 I b i d o 9 I , p 0 1 2 2 o 
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movements nor ti m e , i s p r i o r t o nor p o s t e r i o r t o 
any other o * 
Having shown the nature of the m a t e r i a l "body 
and the e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s of i t s existences 
according t o a l - K i n d i , we may proceed t o discuss 
Avicenna's view on t h i s subjeeto 
I t i s probable t h a t Avicenna i s an opponent of 
the t r a d i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n , which regards the 
m a t e r i a l body as; a substance by v i r t u e of the three 
dimensions s le n g t h ( a l - f r Q l ) s> breadth ( a l ' a r d ) , and 
he i g h t ( a l - ^ i r t i f a * ) o .For Avicenna, the m a t e r i a l 
body i s hot a substance because of i t s dimensions, 
nor because i t moves i n space d u r i n g a p e r i o d of 
timeo Therefore he r e j e c t s al-Kindx's; i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n of the m a t e r i a l substance which has been 
reproduced i n the f i r s t p a r t of t h i s ; chaptero 
I n r e f u t i n g a l - K i n d i ' s view o f the m a t e r i a l 
substance Avicenna says t h a t i t i s not necessary 
f o r every body t o have a l i n e a r extension (/imtidad) 
1 o R a s a ' i l a l - K i n d l a l ~ f a l s a f i y y a h 8 ed. Abu" Ridah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , pp 0 1 2 0 , 1 9 7 , 1 1 7 . 
2io Avicennao ai-shifa» eds» Qanav/a.t'i and S o Zayyedi 
(Cairo 1 9 6 0 ) I , . 2 ; p 0 7 l < > 
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(any one o f the three dimensions) i n order t h a t i t 
should he a m a t e r i a l body<> For instance, he says 
t h a t the h a l l has no a c t u a l l i n e at a l l , and i t s 
a x i s (mihwar) cannot he determined unless i t moves., 
even though the h a l l i s a m a t e r i a l substance <> 
Therefore the b a l l i s a body f o r some other reason, 
p r i o r t o i t s being subject t o movement and before 
1 
any l i n e a r extension can be apprehended<> 
Moreover, the m a t e r i a l body i s not a substance 
because of the surfaces which enclose i t 0 That i s 
t o say t h a t the m a t e r i a l body i n order t o be a 
substance, does not n e c e s s a r i l y have t o have a r e a l 
2 
surfaceo For the surfaces, are not n e c e s s a r i l y 
r e q u i r e d f o r the establishment of the m a t e r i a l body. 
The surface i n r e l a t i o n t o the m a t e r i a l substance, 
as i t i s considered by Avicenna, i s a q u a n t i t y 
a p p l i e d t o the l i m i t s o f the body (nihayat al-.iismK 
For the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the m a t e r i a l body does not 
r e l a t e t o i t s surfaces, since, as he says, the b a l l 
i s a body and i t has only one surface« Surfaces, 
1 o I b i d o , I , p » 6 2 0 
2 o I b l d c , I , p o 6 2 o 
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according t o Avicenna, should he considered as -some-
t h i n g only capable of being supposed i n the m a t e r i a l 
substances I n other words, f o r him, : the surface i s 
something t h a t we suppose the body t o have, while 
the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the body does not r e l a t e t o 
i t s surfaceso Therefore the su p p o s i t i o n of the 
three dimensions or the surfaces does not imply the 
surfaces w i t h i n the m a t e r i a l substance, as i s i n 
a l - K i n d i ' s viewo 
Unlike a l - K i n d i , Avicenna does not b e l i e v e t h a t 
the m a t e r i a l body i s a substance because i t has a 
place i n the p h y s i c a l world. The s u b s t a n t i a l i t y 
o f the m a t e r i a l body should not be derived from 
1 
being i n a place "under the heavens'o Therefore 
the m a t e r i a l body i s n e i t h e r a substance, nor has 
the name 'substance' s p e c i f i c a l l y , because i t has 
th r e e dimensions and e x i s t s i n a place as an 
object of our d i r e c t sense experience« Not at 
a l l , i t i s a substance because o f some other 
f a c t o r o 
1 o' Avicenna, al-Shifa„ eda-= Qanawatl and So Zayye.d 
(Cairo 1 9 6 0 ) 1 , 2 , p „ 6 2 = . 
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There i s no douht t h a t Avieenna i s here adopting 
a s c e p t i c a l a t t i t u d e towards A r i s t o t l e ' s , and 
a l - K i n d l ' s } d o c t r i n e s of the m a t e r i a l substance, w i t h 
regard t o the dimensions and the e x t e r n a l existence 
t h a t the m a t e r i a l substance has 0 I t may be n o t i c e d 
t h a t i n i n s i s t i n g t h a t the m a t e r i a l substance: should 
not be defin e d w i t h regard t o consequentials such as; 
movement, space, and t i m e , he i s developing h i s own 
d o c t r i n e of the m a t e r i a l substanceo 
As f a r as Avicenna's d e f i n i t i o n of the m a t e r i a l 
substance i s concerned, he p r e f e r s t o define i t as 
followso t'he m a t e r i a l body i s a substance which i s 
compounded of form and matter and having three 
dimensions, which are capable of being supposed i n 
2 
i t c Moreover, he says t h a t the t r u e c o r p o r e a l i t y 
( a l - j i s m i y a h f i al-haqiqah) of the m a t e r i a l body 
does not l i e i n i t s dimensions, but i t i s t h a t form 
1 o A r i s t o t l e considers the thr e e dimensions as t o be 
found p r i m a r i l y i n the m a t e r i a l substance.. He 
says, "But substance i s r a t h e r t h a t t o which these 
belong p r i m a r i l y o But when l e n g t h and breadth and 
depth are taken away we see n o t h i n g l e f t unless 
t h e r e i s something STD bounded by these <>" 
The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed„ Richard McKeon 
(New York 19W-) Metaphysics V I I , 3 ; p°785° 
2o Avicenna, al°shifa9 eds« Qanawati and S o Zayyed 
(Cairo I 9 6 0 ) I , p063<, 
of composition which we may suppose, t o accept the 
three dimensions. Then he says, " I f a piece of. 
wax has "been modelled i n a c e r t a i n manner, l e t us. 
suppose t h a t i t has dimensions t h a t have been 
sur e l y and accurate l y measured and ascertained.. 
Now i f t h a t design i s changed, none of those dimen-
sions remains as i t i s Q There w i l l be new 
2 
dimensions d i f f e r e n t i n measurement 0" 
Avicenna uses the passage above as a j u s t i f i = 
c a t i o n f o r the n o n - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the m a t e r i a l 
substance w i t h i t s dimensions<> For, f i r s t l y , they 
are d i f f e r e n t i n q u a n t i t y from one body t o another 
and, secondly, they are c l a s s i f i e d under the 
category of q u a n t i t y Q I t i s a substance because 
i t s matter i s always ready t o accept a corporeal 
form (sUvah .fismiyyati) t o make one s i n g l e m a t e r i a l 
-substance.. The s u b s t a n t i a l i t y o f - t h e m a t e r i a l body 
n e i t h e r r e l a t e s t o i t s matter as a substance, nor 
t o the form as a substance 0 I t relat.es t o the 
1 ° I b i d o , 1 , P06U. 
2 o I b i d o , I , P06I+; and Avicenna, T i s ' r a s a ' i l f l 
al-hikmah wa a l - f r b l ' i y a t (Constantinople, 1 2 9 8 ) 
P06O0 
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•4 readiness (isti'dad.) of matter t o "be moulded into a 
simple e n t i t y and also relates t o the readiness of a 
form t o j o i n matter t o make t h i s a coherent substance« 
This impulse t o combine i s known by Avicenna as a 
'quiddity' (mahiyyah)<> As a r e s u l t , that by which a 
2 
material body i s a substance f t i s the 'quiddity' <> 
To be precise, i t should be noticed that there 
i s a difference between the corporeality of the 
body (al-jismiyyah) and i t s dimensions» For Avicenna, 
the dimensions, as has been said before, are always 
subject t o many changes, while the corporeality, 
which i s the readiness of matter t o be fashioned i n t o 
a p a r t i c u l a r body i s something always permanent i n 
matter. So when i t i s said that the material body 
i s a substance by i t s corporeality, that means, by 
a power (quwwah) 9 i 0e<, i t s quiddity*. This does not 
involve the dimensions necessarily included i n the 
d e f i n i t i o n of the material substance as was the 
case f o r al~Kindio For t h i s reason Avicenna says 
1 o Avicenna, a l - S h i f a 9 edso Qanawati and S„ ZSyyed 
(Cairo 1 9 6 0 ) I , pp-72, 7 7 ° 
2 o I b i d o , I , p 0 6 l o 
that "when a p a r t i c u l a r body (such as a piece of wax) 
has "been frozen or heated, the amount of i t s 
corporeality (the dimensions) w i l l he changed from 
one case to another, "but the corporeality i t s e l f , as 
we have mentioned, stays as i t i s without any changeo 
The term 'corporeality' i n t h i s quotation, i s 
used "by Avicenna t o ref e r to something essential i n 
matter, which i s the quiddity of the material body, ; 
whereas the term 'dimensions' i s used! t o refer to the 
external shape or features that matter takes when i t 
i s subject to change from a p a r t i c u l a r state to 
anothero These external features or shape enable 
us t o distinguish easily between the i n d i v i d u a l 
substanceso 
There are two alternative interpretations of 
his view with regard t o the d e f i n i t i o n of the 
material substance., I t may be said that he i s i 
simply t r y i n g t o give another explanation of 
A r i s t o t l e ' s concept of matter and form i n r e l a t i o n 
to the material substance, an explanation which 
1 o I b i d o , 1 , p 0 6 I u 
- 5 9 -
takes i n t o consideration the need to avoid defining 
the material substance "by.the dimensionso The 
other i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s that the material "body i s 
a substance "because of i t s permanent quiddity, and 
that the term 'quiddity' (mahiyyah) i0e<> 'corporea-
l i t y ' (al-,iismiyyah) i s used t o refer to the 
readiness^ ( i s t i ' d a d ) of matter and form to combine <> 
Therefore the material substance i s a substance by 
reason of i t s quiddity.. The quiddity i n the 
material substance belongs neither to form alone 
nor t o matter alone, but to that which i s composed 
of botho St. Thomas Aquinas gives the same i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of Avicenna's standpoint with regard t o 
the quiddity (essence) of composite substanceso He 
says, "Avicenna, too, declares that the quiddity of 
composite substances i s the composition i t s e l f of 
3 _ ~ 
form and mattero" This implies that every material 
substance i n t h i s case should have one qui d d i t y 0 No 
two quiddities can be found i n one single substance« 
1 o J b i d o s I , ppo 6 7 j , 6 8 9 7 3 ° 
2 U l i b i d o 9 I P p o 7 6 o 
3 o Saint Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence9 Trans-
lated by Armand Mourer (Toronto 19^9) p<>31° 
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Comparison with Descartes may. prove useful at 
"tills points and one should notice p a r t i c u l a r l y a 
s i m i l a r i t y "between his view and that of Avicenhao 
Both use the.example of wax to show t h a i the 
dimensions and q u a l i t i e s are ir r e l e v a n t to the 
essence or quiddity of a material substance« 
Descartes says, "Take f o r example, this : piece 1 of, 
wax, i t i s :quite fresh <,<><, Let i t he placed near 
the f i r e - what remained of taste exhales, the. 
evaporated, the colour changes, i t s f i g u r e is. 
destroyed, i t s size increases, i t "becomes l i q u i d , 
i t grows hot o o 0 Does the same wax s t i l l remain 
a f t e r t h i s change? I t must "be admitted that i t 
doea remain; no one doubts " i t or judges otherwise» 
When Avicerma says dimensions are something 
capable of supposition i n the material substance, 
h§ i s possibly t r y i n g t o avoid the confusion 
between the state of appearance and the state of 
r e a l i t y , to which many ancient philosophers have 
1. Descartes, The, second Meditation* The 
Rationalists» transo John Veith (New York ?) 
pp 0 123, 12lU 
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succumbedo For him., there w i l l . h e no d i s t i n c t i o n 
between c e r t a i n t y and appearance i f the material, 
object has been defined i n terms of i t s dimensions<> 
For the same material object many times- appears to 
have d i f f e r e n t measurements and d i f f e r e n t q u a l i t i e s , 
f o r instance, the same tower from a short distance 
and from a greater distance i n each case appears to 
have a d i f f e r e n t size and shapeo - Avicenna refuses 
to deny the ce r t a i n existence of the material, object, 
so he i s opposed to any d e f i n i t i o n of the material 
object i n terms of i t s dimensions, because such a 
d e f i n i t i o n may cause illusion.* 
With reference t o the characteristics of.the . 
material substance, Avicenna considers every material 
substance, whether simple or compound, as capable of 
division :. He: opposes those Muslim theologians: ( a l -
mutakllimtfa) who have believed that there are very 
small, i n d i v i s i b l e , natural substances which they 
have called the i n d i v i s i b l e p a r t i c l e s , (al-.iawahir 5 
al-far&dah), Because these small i n d i v i d u a l bodies 
- are of the same nature,, having neither shape nor 
size, and being invisib1e, they are prevehted f o r 
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a l l of these reasons from "being subject to any kindi 
of divisibility» These small, atomic, natural 
bodies can neither be dissolved i n t o small .pieces 
because of t h e i r hardness, nor even be imagined or' 
supposed to be d i v i s i b l e , nor can be ;divided into., 
partso Avicenna opposes t h i s doctrine, believing 
that every material body i s d i v i s i b l e 0 
Avicenna distinguishes four kinds of d i v i s i b i ^ 
l i t y i n the nature of the material body 0 For him, 
every material object i s subject t o one or two 
kinds o f - d i v i s i b i l i t y o Either i t i s easily breakable, 
or another t o o l can be used to help i n separating 
that, object i n t o small" part s.o Also i t can be 
imagined t o be d i v i s i b l e i n t o small parts* More-
over i t can be supposed to have such d i v i s i b i l i t y o 
Therefore, every malarial body i s subject;.to the /: 
d i v i s i b i l i t y of destruction or c u t t i n g , or the-
k 
d i v i s i b i l i t y of imagination, or of supposition.. 
1 <, Al-Razi, al-mabahith al-mashriqiyyah (Haidarabad 
1 3 U 3 ) I I , P P I O O 
2 o I b l d o 9 I I , : p p » 2 - 2 5 ; and al-Shahrastani, Kitab 
niha.yatu al~iq-dam f I ' ilm al-kalam, ed= A l f r e d 
Guillaume (Oxford 193k) p<»505o 
3 o Avicenna, al-shif'a, edSo Qanawati and S o Z§yyed 
(Cairo I 9 6 O ) I , p 7 6 l 0 
ko Avicenna, al-Isharat wa a l - t a n b i h a t 9 e d o S o Dunya (Cairo 19i+8TTl, p p 0 1 3 - 2 1 o . ' 
~ 6 3 ~ 
Three aspects of t h i s doctrine remain to he 
noticedj f i r s t l y that any of the four above-
mentioned kinds of d i v i s i b i l i t y should distinguish 
each divided subject i n t o measurable parts, sharing 
equally the t o t a l volume of the divided object» 
Each part of these divisions should have matter 
and" formo Secondly, any d i v i s i b i l i t y whatsoever, 
whether i t i s imaginable, supposable.or r e a l , 
should be based on a f i n i t e measure« Thi r d l y , 
Avicenna considers d i v i s i b i l i t y as a basic ' 
1 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the material substance« 
Avicenna does not refer to extension ( a l -
imtidBd) as a basic characteristic of the material 
substanceo -For him, i t i s possible t o conceive 
a material body without i t s having any extension <> 
But i t i s u n l i k e l y that one would perceive or 
conceive any material object without i t s having 
same one or more of the stated kinds of d i v i s i b i l i t y . . 
For d i v i s i b i l i t y i s n a t u r a l l y t o be found as a 
chara c t e r i s t i c of the corporeality of the material 
1 o Avicenna, a l - s l i i f a , eds. Qanawati and S o Zayyed 
(Cairo 1 § 6 0 ) I , p 0 6 6 0 
substanceo Therefore, d i v i s i b i l i t y should he consi° 
dered as characteristic of every material substance 
as sucho But extension which i s considered by 
Avicenna as a dimension, i s capable of being 
supposed only i n the material substance, whether 
that substance i s r e a l l y extended or note 
Furthermore, when Avicenna says that d i v i s i ~ 
b i l i t y i s the basic chara c t e r i s t i c of the material 
substance he t r i e s t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the 
material and the s p i r i t u a l substanceso Such a 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s based upon the observable 
d i v i s i b i l i t y of the material substance and upon 
the i n d i v i s i b i l i t y of s p i r i t u a l substances, which 
w i l l be explained i n the next, chapter> For 
instance, the same piece of wax used as an 
example of a material substance, can be divided 
i n t o many parts and each part separately can be 
considered as a substanceo But, i n the case of 
the s p i r i t u a l substance, no kind of d i v i s i b i l i t y 
can apply to i t , nor can any human soul be supposed 
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to be extended i n space during a period of tiine° 
Our discussion of the presentation of Avicenna';s 
view of the •material substance w i l l be followed by 
the consideration of movement, time, and place as 
the consequentials of the material substance 0 I n 
dealing with movement, as the f i r s t of the three 
eonsequentials, Avi carina i d e n t i f ies - i t as^  ~f ol^owsst . 
"Movement i s a f i r s t perfection of that which is. • 
po t e n t i a l as such, i n the sense that i t i s the 
gradual act u a l i z a t i o n of that which i s p o t e n t i a l 0 " 
To compare Avicenna's d e f i n i t i o n with that of 
A r i s t o t l e , we f i n d that. Avicenna considers that 
the act of ac t u a l i z a t i o n follows step by step 0 
No rapid a c t u a l i z a t i o n may occur t o that which i s 
p o t e n t i a l as sucho Therefore the motions of creation 
1 o Avicenna here may be compared wi t h Descartes 6 t h 
Meditation,, " « o » There i s a vast difference 
between mind and body,,in respect that body, 
from i t s nature, i s always d i v i s i b l e , and mind 
i s e n t i r e l y i n d i v i s i b l e o , , ! The Rationalists 
(New York ?) p p d y i j 1 7 2 5 ; ..' : v . ./.".. •• 
2 o Avicenna, Tis* ra.sS yil f i al-hikmah wa al-frabl* -
ijfyat ( C onst ant i n o p l e / 1 2 9 8 ) p o 6 3 » 
3 » "The f u l f i l m e n t of what exists p o t e n t i a l l y , i n so 
fa r as i t exists p o t e n t i a l l y , i s motion.," The 
Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed a Richard McKeon . 
- (New York 1 9 ^ 1 ) Physics I I I , 1 ; p o 2 5 4 o 
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and degeneration which always happen ra p i d l y do hot 
appear t o be considered by Avicenna as a kind of 
movement o 
Movement f o r Avicenna which i s the gradual 
change of the permanent condition of the body, i s 
either q u a l i t a t i v e ( k a i f ) and quantitative (kam) 
or of s i t u a t i o n and place (makan)» Movement 
affect s only the external features of the body 0 
I t relates only t o the follo w i n g categories % 
q u a l i t y , quantity, s i t u a t i o n , and placeo But the 
category of substance, being abstracted from any 
accidental attachment, i s not subject t o any kind 
of movement0} 
I t i s with regard to movement that Avicenna-. 
defines] 'time' » He says, "Time i s the amount of, 
movement i n respect of the antecedent and the 
c o n s e q u e n t H e also says, "Time i s the amount 
of the c i r c u l a r movement i n respect of the 
antecedent and the consequent not i n respect of. 
1 o Avicenna, Tis* r a s a ^ i l f i al-hikmah wa al-f r a b l a 
.i!yat, (Constantinople/1298) p=i|-o 
1 
2 o I b i d o , P 0 6 3 o 
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-1 • . 
the distanceo " Avicenna's d e f i n i t i o n of 'time' i s 
similar t;0 the follo w i n g d e f i n i t i o n of - ArltB^qti^!,^--' 
"Time i s the number of movement i n respect of "before 
and a f t e r o " ; Both discriminate the more and less 
by number o and the more and less 1 of movement by 
timeo Therefore time i s the measure of the quantity 
of changeo Time, then., " i s a kind of number0,s : 
I t must be pointed out t h a t , f o r Avicenna , time; 
i s posterior to the movement» As the mover i s the 
cause of movement, i t i s also, and secondly, the 
• h - ' i • / ••••• - -cause of time.. By regarding time as posterior to 
movement, Avicenna i s forced t o depart fromjal--KiiidI :'% ; 
concept of the coexistence of movement ,^place', and 
timeo Time i s not eternal because' i t 'Has a beginning ; 
and endo I t s beginning i s the beginning :qf,; mot ion, > • 
and i t s end. i s the end of motion,, Clearly time i s 
considered by Avicenna, as by a l - K i n d i , as.a 
connecting r e l a t i o n anterior and posterior» Itt t h i s 
respect no measure of difference can be detected 
1 o A o M c Goichon, Lexique de l a langue philoaophique 
d ' l b n Sinao (Paris 1 9 3 8 ) p» W. . v . - ; 
2 o The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , e d o Richard McKeon 
"(New York 1 9 4 1 ) P o 2 9 2 » 
3 o lbid.0 , p o 2 9 2 » • 
h- Avicenna, T i s 8 r a s a s i l f%_ al^hikmah wa al~t^abl*_ -
jfyat, (Constantinople / 1 2 9 8 ) . p 0 1 2 v . And Avicenna, 'uyOn al-hikmah, ed. Badawi (Cairo 1 9 5 * + ) p ° 2 8 o 
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between Avicenna's and al-Kindl's concepts of time 
and A r i s t o t l e ' S o • .. 
To consider pfiace as the l a s t of the coneequen-
t i a l s of the material substance, there i s likewise 
no difference between Avicenna's and A r i s t o t l e ' s 
concepts of place<> Both believe that place i a 
neither form, nor matter, hor body, nor the dimen-
sions of the body D I t i s the boundary of the 
containing bodyo I t i s the inner l i m i t s of the 
container that touch the external l i m i t s of the 
1 
contained bodyo Avicenna i s , here just 
repeating A r i s t o t l e ' s concept of place,, and there 
i s no need t o consider t h i s matter f u r t h e r 0 ' 
We may conclude that there are both s i m i l a r i t i e s 
and differences between the Muslim philosophers i n 
the matter of material substance 0 Upon the d e f i n i -
t i o n of 'substance.' and rel a t e d matters they d i f f e r 
widely, but i n many d e t a i l s they appear t o agree 
1 o Avicenna, al-Na.lah, (Cairo 1 9 3 0 ) P°12Zl-o 
2 o For fu r t h e r d e t a i l s of A r i s t o t l e ' s view of place-
I . r e f e r to Sir David Ross, A r i s t o t l e (London I 9 6 8 ) 
P o 8 5 o 
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both, with each other and with A r i s t o t l e o I t seems 
i t was the more o r i g i n a l d e f i n i t i o n of Avieenna's 
that became popular with l a t e r Muslim, philosophers s 
such as al=Razi i n his ..book al-mabahith al-mashri ~ 
1 6 - 2 
qiyyah P and al-Ghazali i n Maqasid a l - f a l a s i f a h . 
Both adhere t o Avicenna's d e f i n i t i o n rather than 
t o that of al-Kindi i . 
1 o P. al-Razip al-mabahith al-mashrlqiyyah ? 
Haidarabad/13^3) l i p P P ^ o 5 » :' 
2 o Al-Ghazali , Maqasid al-^-f a l a s i f ah, (Cairo 1 9 3 6 ) I I 
pp 0 1 0 p l i p 1 2 o 
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' • CHAPTER- 3 
' The s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the so u l 
I t i s not only m a t e r i a l bodies t h a t can be termed 
'substances' according to a l ~ K i n d i and Avicenna, but 
so u l too i s regarded as a substance of a d i f f e r e n t kind,. 
The primary t o p i c s to be r a i s e d i n connexion with s o u l 
as a substance are as follows? (1 ) The d e f i n i t i o n of 
the soulo (2) Proofs afee«=fe the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the 
soulo ( 3 ) The : f a c u i t i e s , of the soulo (k) The 
r e l a t i o n between the s o u l and the body, as two 
d i f f e r e n t s u b s t a n c e S o ( 5 ) The relation"between human 
so u l s as separable substanceso The f i r s t two of these 
problems w i l l be the subject matter of t h i s chapter» 
The other three problems: w i l l be considered i n the 
next chaptero 
A l - K i n d l , i n h i s l e t t e r F i hudud al-ashy a * wa 
\ 
rusumiha d i v i d e d soul i n t o three k i n d s , n u t r i t i v e 
1o Rasa H i a l - K i n d l a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , edo Aba Ridah 
( C a i r o 1950) I , p 0l65o And So Mo S t e r n , "Note on 
A l - K i n d l ' s T r e a t i s e on D e f i n i t i o n s , and D e s c r i p t i o n 
of Things", The Jo u r n a l of the .-.Royal-Asiatic: 
S o c i e t y , (1959 I-i9^0p rp 033o 
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(al-ghadhiyah) , perceptive (al"his,iyyah) , and r a t i o n a l 
('Sqilah). The n u t r i t i v e soul i s defined as "The 
perfection (kamal) of a natural "body having an orga-
nism which receives l i f e . . " , But t h i s i s not s u f f i c i e n t 
t o define the perceptive and the r a t i o n a l souls<> 
Further q u a l i f i c a t i o n i s required t o make the d e f i -
n i t i o n suitable t o embrace the perceptive and the 
r a t i o n a l soul's <> Therefore the complete d e f i n i t i o n 
i s as follows;? "The soul i s a f i r s t perfection 
(kamal awwal) of a natural body having l i f e 
1 
p o t e n t i a l l y "'c 
I n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g r a t i o n a l soul (al-nafs a l -
"gqilah) from perceptive soul (al-nafs al-hassah), 
he sayss "And i t i s also said that the soul i s a 
r a t i o n a l substance having self-movement according 
t o a oosposiie numberc"'' Soul with regard t o this; 
11 o R a s a y i l al-Rindl a l - f alsaf i.yyah0 e d o Abu" Ridah ^ (Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p 0 1 6 5 o 
2 ° I b i d o a I , p 0 l 6 5 o I t may be that al-Kindl i n the la s t part of the,, d e f i n i t i o n r e f e r s to the, powers, 
of the soul which he has mentioned i n his. l e t t e r s , 
"Fi mah:prat al-naum wa al^ru s|7yah" , i b i d o p 0 2 9 4 , 
and "FI al-jawShir al=khams", i b i d o , I I , p 0 9 ° 
Notice; Al-Kindl does; not explain what he means by 
the term "according t o a composite number" (Bi'adad 
m u - a l l a f ) V The grandson of Plato, Xenoerates;, 
defined soul as a self-moving number» R. Heinze, 
Xenocrates; (Leipzig 1 8 9 2 . ) Fragments; 6 0 = 6 5 ° 
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d e f i n i t i o n i s a substance with two functions- The 
f i r s t function i s as the o r i g i n of any reasoning 
which occurs i n r a t i o n a l human beings<> The second 
function i s as the o r i g i n of the movement of the 
l i v i n g body, whether or not that movement is. d e l i -
berates, perceptive, or rationale Also al-Kindl 
defines the soul as the o r i g i n of l i f e of the 
human body D He sayss "The essence of l i f e of the 
human body i s that which we c a l l soul, therefore 
i t i s necessary to investigate whether i t i s a 
1 
substance or an accident*" Soul here i s not 
considered to be l i f e i t s e l f , but rather i t i s 
the cause of the l i f e of the human body D 
Lastly, al-Kindl defines the soul as the 
2 o 
" r a t i o n a l form of the l i v i n g " (Surat al-hayy 
al-'aqliyyah) 0 We have explained i n the previous 
chapter that he distinguishes between two kinds 
of forms, one sensible (sHrah taqa* taht al-hiss) 
and the other r a t i o n a l (surah taqa* taht a l - j i n s ) «" 
1 o Rasa9 i l a l -Kindi a l - f a l s a f iyyah, ed. Atnl Ridah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p.266.. 
2 o I b i d c , I , p o 2 6 7 „ 
3 ° Ibido , I I , p o 2 0 o 
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The former a l ~ K i n d i regards as the e x t e r n a l f e a t u r e a 
or sensible shape of the body, while the l a t t e r i s 
the u n i v e r s a l 9 i0e<» genus and species* When he 
defines 'soul' as a r a t i o n a l form, he means t h a t i t 
i s the "form of the species" ( a l - s u r a h al-jnaw'iyyah)= 
This i s separable from the "body, "beyond the percep-
t i b l e f e a t u r e s , having n e i t h e r shape nor size nor 
q u a l i t y o 
When Avicenna examines the matter of the d e f i -
n i t i o n of the s o u l , he d i f f e r s considerably from 
a l - K i n d l o For Avicenna i s anxious t o prove the 
existence of the soul before making any attempt t o 
defi n e i t o For t h i s reason Avicenna sayss "The 
f i r s t t h i n g we have t o do i s t o prove what we c a l l 
s o u l , then we w i l l speak about what comes a f t e r 
1 
t h a t o " Moreover, he says; "He who wants t o des-
c r i b e something has t o prove i t s existence before 
2 
g i v i n g any d e s c r i p t i o n " , : whereas a l - K i n d l does not 
1 . Avicenna, De Anima 1 , 1 , pp D 9» 1 0 < , These r e f e r e n -
ces a r e t h e discourses, chapter, and pages of 
Jan Bokas ( e d . ) , Psychologic d'Ibn Sina (Avicenna) 
d'apres son oeuvre a l - ^ s i f g (Prague 1 9 5 0 ) ° 
2 . . Avicenna, Hadj^yat a l - r a ' I s , mabhath'an al-quv^a(?al-
fflafsanjyah, au k i t a b f i a l - n a f s 'ala sunnat al° 
ikhtTsar;, ed. E. Van Dyeck (Cairo 1 3 2 5 ) P ° 2 0 . 
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mention whether the d e f i n i t i o n of the soul comes, 
"before the proof or v i c e versa<> I t i s poss i b l e t h a t 
1 Avicenna here follows; P l a t o i n the f i r s t A l c i b i a d e s , 
where he was t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the existence 
2 
of the soul "before i t s d e f i n i t i o n . . 
I n d e a l i n g w i t h the s o u l , from Avicenna's p o i n t 
of view, we s h a l l t a c k l e the problem i n what he con-
sidered t o he the appropriate order„ Therefore, i t 
i s necessary t o r e f e r t o some of h i s proofs of the 
existence of the s o u l , "before we are able t o consider 
h i s d e f i n i t i o n , , The f i r s t of Avicenna's proofs, t o "be 
mentioned here, i s "based on the an a l y s i s of s e l f -
perception., His demonstration shows t h a t the s e l f 
or the soul cannot he perceived through the senses; 
('an t a r i q al-hawass), nor through the mind ( a l - ' a q l ) , 
nor through any of the other members of the "body, 
l i k e the heart and the "brain.. His r e f u s a l t o iden-
t i f y sense, mind, and the other members of the body 
1 o Numerous Arabic t r a n s l a t i o n s of P l a t o were a v a i l a b l e , 
and although not i n f l u e n c e d by P l a t o t o the extent 
t h a t al=Farabi was, Avicenna would probably have read, 
many of Plato's works, e s p e c i a l l y the Timaeus, 
Republic Q AjxjJ^iades 1° Ibn al-Nadim, K i t a b a l -
f i h r i s t ( L e i p z i g 1872) p.2ij.6. 
2-o P l a t o , Alcibiades: I 130 f f 0 And MahmHd Qasim, f x 
a l - n a f s wa. a l ' a q l l i f a l a s i f a t al°yighriq wa, 
alyislam~TCa3jFol95U) P°77<. 
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as the o r i g i n o f s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n i s based upon the 
f o l l o w i n g groundso Since the senses deal w i t h t h i n g s 
which e x i s t outside ourselves, they cannot "be the 
instrument of self-perception.. Nor can the mind ( a l -
'aql) he the means of s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n , "because the 
mind forms knowledge through demonstration, and no 
demonstration can "be given without the employment 
1 
of a middle term,. Moreover, s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n cannot 
depend on the other members of the "body l i k e the 
heart and the b r a i n , because these f a c u l t i e s do not 
perceive d i r e c t l y but only through some other i n t e r -
mediary o Therefore, the p r i n c i p l e of self-percep-
2 
t i o n i s what Avicenna c a l l s fflsoulMo 
A proof s i m i l a r t o t h i s i s given i n a l - S h i f a 0 
where Avicenna asks h i s reader t o imagine hi m s e l f 
created as a complete a d u l t , f l o a t i n g b l i n d - f o l d e d 
i n space, unable t o touch anything, hot even h i s own 
limbs which are kept separate from each other o A l l 
1 o By demonstration i s meant here a s y l l o g i s t i c pro-
p o s i t i o n e 0 g o i f B i s predicable of A, and C i s 
p r e d icable of B, then C i s p r e dicable of A. 
Knowledge of t h i s s o r t of reasoning cannot.be 
received immediately without the employment of a 
middle term. The Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed. ff. D. 
Ross (Oxford 1 9 5 5 ) A n a l y t i c a prions.I,i4 .o 
2 o Avicenna, a l - I s h a r a t wa a l t a n b i h a t , ed. S o Dunya, 
(Cairo 1 9 * 1 - 9 ) I I , P P ° 3 0 5 t o 3 2 k . 
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he may do i s t o meditate upon h i s own existence, and 
i t i s h i s essence (dhatuh) alone of which he w i l l be 
a w a r e A s he can conceive of no dimension when i n 
t h i s s t a t e , t h i s essence w i l l he abstracted from a l l 
l e n g t h , "breadth, and h e i g h t . Thus i t i s something 
1 
d i f f e r e n t from h i s body; i t i s the s o u l . 
Many more proofs of the existence of the soul 
are s c a t t e r e d throughout Avicenna's works, but i t i s 
soul as a substance w i t h which we are now concerned, 
and f o r t h i s purpose i t i s necessary t o examine the 
d e f i n i t i o n of the soulo The f i r s t d e f i n i t i o n of the 
soul f o r Avicenna i s quoted from h i s book al-Na.jah 
( I I , 5 ) where he r e f e r s t o t h r e e kinds of soulo They 
are the vegetable s o u l , which i s "The f i r s t p e r f e c -
t i o n of a n a t u r a l body which i s an organism i n so 
f a r as i t reproduces, grows, and i s nourishedo" The 
animal s o u l , which i s "The f i r s t p e r f e c t i o n . o f a 
n a t u r a l body which i s an organism i n so f a r as i t 
perceives i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s and moves by v o l i t i o n . " 
The human soul ( a l - n a f s al-insanixsrah) i s "The f i r s t 
1 o Avicenna, De Anima, 1,1, pdSo 
p e r f e c t i o n (kamal) of a n a t u r a l "body which i s an 
organism i n so f a r as i t performs acts of a r a t i o n a l 
choice and deduction through opinion and i n so f a r 
\ 
as i t perceives u n i v e r s a l matter <>" 
Although Avicenna agrees t o define a l l souls by 
the term " f i r s t p e r f e c t i o n " (kamal awwal), according 
t o the above d e f i n i t i o n , he refuses t o r e f e r t o the 
human soul by any term t h a t implies, i t s , being^power 
of a body or i t s form D For him, as Ss i s explained 
2 
i n h i s De Anima," the human soul can be c a l l e d n e i t h e r 
f a c u l t y nor form, i n the A r i s t o t e l i a n sense<> For 
Avicenna these terms ( " f a c u l t y " and "form") as they 
are used by A r i s t o t l e are only a p p l i c a b l e t o the 
vegetable and animal souls»^ 
Probably the basic d i f f e r e n c e between A r i s t o t l e ' s 
and Avicenna's d e f i n i t i o n s of the soul i s that; 
A r i s t o t l e considers every soul as a substance i n the 
1 . Avicenna, al-Na,iah ( ? 1 3 5 7 / 1 9 3 8 ) p 0 1 5 8 ; and 
P o Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology (London 1 9 5 2 ) 
P o 2 5 » 
2 o Avicenna, De Anima s 1 , 1 , p p o 9 ~ 1 1 i ° 
3 o S i r David Ross, A r i s t o t l e (London 1 9 6 8 ) p d 3 4 o 
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sense of the form of the body» A r i s t o t l e says" "Hence 
the soul must be a substance i n the sense of the form 
of a n a t u r a l body having l i f e p o t e n t i a l l y w i t h i n i t o 
But substance i s an a c t u a l i t y , and the soul i s the 
a c t u a l i t y of a body as above characterized,. 
Avicenna refused such an A r i s t o t e l i a n d e f i n i t i o n 
because i t does •not d i s t i n g u i s h the human soul from 
other souls, and because A r i s t o t l e ' s d e f i n i t i o n r e l a t e s 
the matter of the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the human soul t o 
i t s being a f©0mo Avicenna sayss " I f anyone c a l l s the 
soul 'substance' i n the sense t h a t i t i s a form, w i t h -
out considering i t as having a meaning more general 
than the term 'form', i 0 e 0 i n the sense t h a t the idea 
t h a t the soul i s a substance i s equivalent t o the 
idea t h a t i t i s a form, ( t h i s i s what c e r t a i n people 
s a i d ) , t here i s no place f o r discussion and contro-
versy w i t h him 0 For the sense of h i s expression; the 
soul i s a substance, as i t i s a form, i s s i m i l a r t o 
h i s expression the form i s a substance.. I n t h i s case, 
i t w i l l be as> i f he were t o say the form i s - a form, or 
shape, and man i s a man, or a human being, and t h i s i a 
,,2 
nonsenseo" 
1 o The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , edo Richard McKedn 
(New York 19 W On the so u l , 11,1, Po555» 
2o Avicenna, De Anima 1,1, pp 0 12, 13° 
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Thus i t i s c l e a r t h a t Avicenna regards the s t a t e -
ment t h a t soul i s substance because i t i s form, as a 
t a u t o l o g y t h a t does not even.merit debate<> 
The second d e f i n i t i o n of Avicenna's w i l l be 
quoted from h i s l e t t e r F T 1 hudHdc He sayss "''soul' 
i s a common name having two meaningso The f i r s t 
d e fines i t as a f i r s t p e r f e c t i o n of a n a t u r a l body 
which i s an organism having l i f e p o t e n t i a l l y i n it° 
This meaning has been a l l o c a t e d as a common d e f i -
n i t i o n t o the human, the animal g and the vegetable 
soulso Whereas the second meaning of the term 
' s o u l ' , which i s employed t o define the human ( a l ~ 
n afs al°insaniyyah) and the angelic soul (al°nafs 
al-malakiyyah), i s the following<> Soul which i s 
not a m a t e r i a l substance, i s a f i r s t p e r f e c t i o n of 
v o l u n t a r i l y moved body, which i t moves a c t u a l l y or 
p o t e n t i a l l y acaording t o a r a t i o n a l principle„ The 
i n t e l l e c t which i s p o t e n t i a l i s a p r o p e r t y of the 
human s o u l , and t h a t which i s a c t u a l i s a property 
of t h e u n i v e r s a l angelic soulo And i t i s s a i d t h a t 
j u s t as the r e e x i s t s both the i n t e l l e c t i n the; 
u n i v e r s a l sense ( a l - ' a q l a l - k u l l i ) 0 a n d the i n t e l l e c t 
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of the universe ('aql a l - k u l l ) i . e . w o r l d - i n t e l l e c t s , 
so also the soul i n the u n i v e r s a l sense ( a l - n a f s al° 
k u l l i ) , and the soul o f the universe (nafs a l - k u l l ) 
'1 
i . e . w o r l d - s o u l , are r e f e r r e d t o . 1 1 
The f i r s t p a r t of the above d e f i n i t i o n has been 
explained i n the l a s t pages, and t h e r e i s no need t o 
consider i t further» The second p a r t of the d e f i n i -
t i o n i s complexo- I t , has been devoted t o d e f i n i n g 
two kinds o f souls, which are r e s p e c t i v e l y the 
'human' ( a l - n a f s a l - i n s a n i y y a h ) and the 'angelic' 
( a l - n a f s al-malakiyyah)° Each soul has t o be consi-
dered as a non-material substance, as w e l l as the 
p r i n c i p l e of v o l u n t a r y r a t i o n a l movement, wether 
t h a t movement i s p o t e n t i a l or a c t u a l . When Avicenna 
says t h i s , he d i s t i n g u i s h e s between the movement of 
so u l s , which i s a pure r a t i o n a l movement having no 
m a t e r i a l involvement, and the movement of the 
m a t e r i a l substance which i s h e l d t o be i n place and 
ti m e . He also d i s t i n g u i s h e s between the human soul 
( a l - n a f s a l - i n s a n i y y a h ) , whose r a t i o n a l movement i s 
1 o Avicenna, T i s ' T a s a ^ i l f l al-hikmah w a a l - f c a b l ' i y y a t 
(Constantinople 1298) p . 5 6 • 
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potentials, and the angelic soul ( a l ~ n a f s al^malakiyyah), 
whose r a t i o n a l movement i s actual<> The human, and the 
angelic souls are considered t o he substances i n the 
sense t h a t they are p e r f e c t i o n s (kamalat), because , 
they are the p r i n c i p l e or the o r i g i n o f the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
knowledge of t h e i r bodies, whether human or angelic» 
I n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n Avicenna also uses 'soul' 
oh . 
(1) as a u n i v e r s a l term (nafs a l ~ k u l l i ) and ( 2 ) i n 
the sense of 'soul of the universe* (nafs a l r k u l l ) . 
These .two senses of 'soul' are d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n the 
same manner as those of ' i n t e l l e c t ' (1) as a un i v e r -
s a l term ( a l - ' a q l a l - k u l i l ) and (2:) i n the sense of 
' i n t e l l e c t of the universe' ('aql al°kull)o The 
i n t e l l e c t i n the u n i v e r s a l sense ( a l - ' a q l a l - k u l l i ) 
f o r Avicenna i s a general concept which embraces, 
every human i n t e l l e c t , and i s a nominal not a r e a l 
concepto For he sayss "The i n t e l l e c t i n t he u n i v e r -
s a l sense i s a r a t i o n a l concept predicable of many 
i n t e l l e c t s , belonging t o many i n d i v i d u a l s of the 
human species<> This term does not e x i s t as an a c t u a l 
2 
f a c t , but i s r a t h e r an abstract concept 0" 
1 . The angelic bodies, i 0 e 0 heavenly bodies, w i l l be 
considered i n conjunction w i t h the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y 
of the i n t e l l e c t o 
2 o Avicenna, T i s ' r a s a 5 1 ! ! f 1 al-hikmah wa a l - t a b i " i y y a t 
(Constantinople 1 2 9 8 ) p < > 5 6 ° 
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I n the same manner the soul i n the u n i v e r s a l sense 
(al-^nafs a l - k u l l l ) i s no more than a general concept 9 
which embraces the soul of every l i v i n g being. For 
instance the soul of mankind embraces every human so u l . 
Avicenna explains t h i s as follows? "The soul i n the 
u n i v e r s a l sense ( a l - n a f s a l - k u l l i ) i s a general concept 
which i s a p p l i e d t o many i n d i v i d u a l e n t i t i e s and each 
of these e n t i t i e s belongs t o an i n d i v i d u a l persono" 
However, the i n t e l l e c t of the universe ('aql a l -
k u l l ) and the soul of the universe (nafs a l - k u l l ) are 
b o t h s e l f - e x i s t i n g e n t i t i e s . I t seems t h a t Avicenna 
p 
here f o l l o w s Plato's Timaeus i n presupposing a s i n g l e 
soul which i s responsible f o r the movement of the 
world as a whole, and a w o r l d - i n t e l l e c t t h a t i s placed 
i n t h i s soulo"^ I n Avicenna's case, the i n t e l l e c t of 
the universe seems t o be regarded as the t o t a l i t y of 
the pure intellects<> He says: "The i n t e l l e c t of the 
1 o Avicenna, T i s * r a s g ' i l f l al-hikmah wa a l - T a b i ' i y y a t 
(Constantinople 1 2 9 8 ) p. 5 6 . ~ 
2 c Francis M o Cornford, Plato's; Cosmology (New York 
1 9 5 7 ) P o 3 3 ( 3 0 B ) . 
3 o P l a t o says: " I n v i r t u e of t h i s reasoning, when he 
framed the u n i v e r s e , he fashioned reason w i t h i n 
soul and soul w i t h i n body." I b i d . p. 3 3 ° 
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universe i s the t o t a l i t y o f the separable e n t i t i e s 
1 
which have no concern w i t h matter i n any mannero" 
While he regards the soul of the universe (nafs a l -
k u l l ) 9 or wo r l d - s o u l , as the sum of the souls o f the 
c e l e s t i a l bodies. For he says: "The soul of the 
universe i s the t o t a l i t y of the immaterial substances;, 
which are the p e r f e c t i o n s of the c e l e s t i a l bodies, 
which they move according t o r a t i o n a l choice3^ 
Yet i n s p i t e of the great d i f f e r e n c e between the 
soul of the universe (world-soul) and the soul i n the 
u n i v e r s a l sense ( a l - n a f s a l - k u l i x ) , Avicenna regards, 
them both as substances, j u s t as i n the case of each 
i n d i v i d u a l soulo 
Having considered the d e f i n i t i o n of the s o u l , we 
must now move on t o the proofs of i t s substantiality» 
I n d e a l i n g w i t h a l - K i n d i ' s view concerning the subs-
t a n t i a l i t y of the s o u l , we are confronted w i t h a l a c k 
3 
of any d e t a i l e d proof i n the works which we possess» 
1 o Avicenna, T i s ' r a s a " ! ! f l al-hikmah wa al,-frabi'iyyat 
(Constantinople 1 2 9 8 ) p 0 5 6 » 
2 o I b i d o , p o 5 7 ° 
3 . George No A t i y e h i n h i s book A l - K i n d i says: "The 
w r i t i n g s of a l - K i n d l on the soul are n e i t h e r 
numerous nor comprehensive«" 
George No A t i y e h , A l - K i n d l (Rawalpindi 1 9 6 6 ) p c 9 9 » 
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Therefore we depend e n t i r e l y on fragments from various 
works of hiso 
A l - K i n d i gives the f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s which may 
"be taken as an i n d i c a t i o n of the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of 
the soulo He says; "God has created a l l the universe 
from substances. And these substances are e i t h e r 
simple., which i s n e i t h e r form nor matter, or compound 
substance.. The compound substance which i s shaped 
matter, i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n t o n o n - l i v i n g and l i v i n g 
substanceso The n o n - l i v i n g substance which i s not 
soul (or has no s o u l ) , i s the f o u r elements.. The 
l i v i n g substance i s also d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e i n t o two 
which are the n o n - r a t i o n a l and the r a t i o n a l substance« 
The n o n - r a t i o n a l l i v i n g compound substance, e i t h e r has 
only the a b i l i t y of growth as i t s p r o p e r t y l i k e the 
p l a n t , or has the a b i l i t y of sensation l i k e the 
animalo The compound l i v i n g r a t i o n a l substance i s 
e i t h e r concerned w i t h the human or the higher i n d i v i -
duals (al-ashkhas a l - ' a l i y a h ) ( c e l e s t i a l bodies)» 
The l a t t e r which concerns the higher i n d i v i d u a l s i s 
not subject t o d e s t r u c t i o n , whereas w i t h the former, 
which concerns the human i n d i v i d u a l s , each of i t s 
i n d i v i d u a l s i s subject t o dissolution„" 
1. Rasa'il a l - K i n d l a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abu Rldah 
(Cairo 1950) I , PP<> 257, 25o-
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Although a l - K l n d i i n the previous passage does, 
not give, a d e t a i l e d argument t o prove t h a t the soul 
i s a substance, i t may be admitted t h a t he i s consi-
d e r i n g i t as one of the substances t h a t e x i s t i n t h e 
u n i v e r s e o For i t may be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the simple 
substance which i s n e i t h e r form nor matter, as 
a l - K i n d l c o n s t a n t l y r e f e r s t o soul as a simple subs-
tance o For instance he says: "The soul i s a simple 
1 
substance o . o I t s essence i s of d i v i n e origin<>" 
I t i s not clear how and i n what manner a l - K i n d l , 
i n the previous passage, considers every l i v i n g 
compound body as substance» For we do not know 
whether the term 'substance' i s given t o i t because 
i t i s composed of form and matter, or whether i t has 
• been given t o the p r i n c i p l e of l i f e ( t he soul), which 
i s i n i t o I f i t has been given t o the p r i n c i p l e of 
l i f e , we should l i k e t o know whether t h i s term has. 
been given t o every s o u l , animal and vegetable a l i k e . 
I t may also be asked what a l - K i n d l means by the 
term 'higher i n d i v i d u a l s ' (al-ashkhas al°'ali.vah) 0 
1 . I b i d o , I , p c 2 7 3 » 
2 o I b i d o , I , p „ 2 5 8 o 
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This question i s explained i n h i s l e t t e r P I a l - ' i l l a h 
a l - l a t i laha yabrud a ula al-.iau wa yaskhun ma qarub 
min a l - a r d . He means "by t h i s term the c e l e s t i a l 
bodies, sun, moon, and pl a n e t s , a l l of which he 
2 
seems t o consider as compound r a t i o n a l bodies. They 
are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from a l l other l i v i n g compound 
"bodies "by t h e i r being i n d e s t r u c t i b l e . 
I t seems t h a t al-Kindx i n h i s l e t t e r F I annahu 
tu.jadu jawahir l a a.isam, has the i n t e n t i o n of demons-
t r a t i n g the matter of the proof of the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y 
of the soulo For he says; " I t i s necessary t o inves-
t i g a t e whether the soul i s a substance or an accidents 
and i f i t i s proved as a substance, we should enquire 
also whether i t i s a body or not. " As £Js appears 
from the l e t t e r under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , h i s reasoning 
lacks coherence and consistency. 
As f o r a l - K i n d i ' s proof of the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y 
of the s o u l , he ssyss "soul i s the r a t i o n a l form of 
the i n d i v i d u a l l i v i n g being i n the sense t h a t i t i s 
1 . I b i d . , I I , p p „ 9 1 = 9 8 o 
2 c I b i d . , I , p o 2 5 8 c 
3 . I b i d . , I , p . 2 6 6 o 
i t s species o Since the i n d i v i d u a l l i v i n g being i s a 
substance, then i t s species i s also a substanceo 
Therefore the soul which i s described as a species, 
i s also a substance i n the sense t h a t i t i s not a 
body9 1 1 A l - K i n d i here j u s t repeats a t r a d i t i o n a l 
view which d i s t i n g u i s h e s between r a t i o n a l form (al° 
surah a l - 'aqliyyah) and a p e r c e p t i b l e form, 
Even though the manner of demonstration (which 
i s the s y n t h e t i c method) and the terminology 
employed i n t h i s l e t t e r are A r i s t o t e l i a n , the pur-
pose of demonstration, which i s the proof of the 
s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the s o u l , i s not <» For A r i s t o t l e , 
as i t appears, gives no clue whether the human soul 
2 
I s capable o f being proved as a substance or n o t . 
As f a r as a l - K i n d i ' s proof o f the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y 
of the soul i s concerned, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o say more 
i n t h i s context than t o mention the f o l l o w i n g s t a t e -
ment o He sayss "Things are e i t h e r corporeal or non-
co r p o r e a l ; the non-corporeal t h i n g s are e i t h e r 
1 o I b i d . , I , p o 2 6 6 . 
2 . The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed» Richard McKeon 
(New York 1 9 4 1 ) De Anima, 1 1 , 1 , p 0 5 5 5 » 
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substances or accidents<> Man co n s i s t s of body? soul 
and accidents. Soul i s a substance, not a body.," 
We are l e f t t o decide f o r ourselves why i t i s a 
substance. One may surmise t h a t a l - K i n d i desired t o 
emphasise the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the s o u l , but t h a t 
he d i d not f u l f i l a l l h i s aims i n t h i s f i e l d o I t i s 
l e f t f o r Avicenna t o t a c k l e the subject l a t e r , and 
t o s t a t e c l e a r l y the case f o r the soul's 
s u b s t a n t i a l i t y , . 
To consider t h i s matter from Avicenna's p o i n t 
of view, i t seems t h a t i t has been given s p e c i a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n h i s l e t t e r F i al-sa'adah w a ' l - h u j a j 
2 
a l ' ashrah ' a l l ann a l - n a f s a l 3 insaniyyah .jawhar 
3 
where Avicenna gives t e n arguments which, have been 
summarised and t r a n s l a t e d i n t o E n g l i s h , as f o l l o w s , ^ 
1 » R a s a y i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , , ed. Abu Ridah 
(Cairo 195°) Is P°l73l and S o M o Stern Isaac 
I s r a e l i (Oxford 1958). p 028, 
2» Avicenna, RiseQah f i a l - s a'idah w a y l - h u j a j a l -
'ashrah 'ala anna a l - n a f s a l " i n s a n i y y a h .jawhar 
(Haidarabad 135U/1935) p.5« 
3. I n al-Na.iah (Cairo 1938) pp,177-180, one w i l l f i n d 
another r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the arguments I , I I , V, 
V I I I , X o I n h i s work, Hadiyat a l - r a ^ i s 
Mabhath "an al-quwa al-nafsaniyyah, au k i t a b f i 
a l - n a f s "ala sunnati a l ' i k h t i s a r , ed. E. Van Dyck 
(Cairo 1325/1907) pp,67-72, one w i l l f i n d a 
s i m i l a r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the arguments I , I I , I I I , 
IV, V, VIII„ 
ho The above are not t r a n s l a t i o n s o f Avicenna's 
arguments, but are paraphrases o f them. 
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Io Arguments 
Avicenna s t a r t s h i s f i r s t argpoment by assuming 
t h a t there are innate u n i v e r s a l ideas w r i t t e n some-
where i n a place, i<>e° hearer (hamil) of the human 
1 
body.. These ideas may he exemplified by the 
f o l l o w i n g propositions<» ( l ) The a l l i s more than 
the parto ( 2 ) The same t h i n g cannot be t r u e and 
f a l s e at the same time.. Now., i f the place, (the 
r e c i p i e n t ) of these ideas i s not an immaterial 
substance, l e t the received ideas be accidents. 
Y e t j i t i s known, i n terms of the d e f i n i t i o n of 
'substance' 9 t h a t the accident cannot e x i s t by 
i t s e l f , because f o r such an existence i t needs a 
bearer ( h a m i l ) o Therefore the bearer of the idea 
i s a substanceo 
I t i s s t i l l t o be known whether the r e c e i v e r 
(bearer) of the u n i v e r s a l ideas i s the body or a 
substance d i f f e r e n t from the body 0 According t o 
Avicenna the place of the u n i v e r s a l ideas i s not a 
1 o The f i r s t p a r t o f t h i s argument may be used also 
as a proof o f the innateness of the ideas« 
Averr©es i n h i s De Anima r e f u t e s Avicenna's view 
of the innate ideas- Averroes, De Anima, 
(Haidarabad I 3 6 6 / I 9 U O . ) p 0 8 l » 
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body, -fetessi the u n i v e r s a l ideas shotald "be d i v i s i b l e 
1 
t o g e t h e r w i t h the "body. Since no idea i s subject 
t o d i v i s i b i l i t y and d e s t r u c t i o n , the body i s hot 
the place (the r e c i p i e n t ) of the u n i v e r s a l i d e a s 0 
Moreover, n e i t h e r i s the corporeal form which 
i s subject t o d i v i s i b i l i t y along w i t h i t s hody^ the 
r e c i p i e n t f o r which we are searching,, Nor does the 
form of the species ( a l - s u r a h al-jnaw*iyyah) which 
i s a general concept and r e f e r s t o i n d i v i d u a l s i n 
a b s t r a c t i o n without being l o c a t e d i n any body, act 
as the place of the u n i v e r s a l ideas» Therefore, 
the place o f the u n i v e r s a l ideas i n r e l a t i o n t o the 
2 
human body i s a substance of a d i f f e r e n t n a t u r e o 
I I o Argument; 
I n t h i s argument the proof of the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y 
of the soul has been considered i n the l i g h t of the 
f u n c t i o n o f the p a r t s of the body as t o o l s of sense 
p e r c e p t i o n , and the f u n c t i o n of the soul as the 
1 o D i v i s i b i l i t y i s the basic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the 
m a t e r i a l body, see above, Chapter I I 9 p p 0 6 1 = 6 3 ° 
2 o Ayicenna, i Risalah f l al-sa'adah wa'l - h u j a j 
al-'ashrah 'ala.anna a l - n a f s a l - ? insaniyyah j awhar, 
(Haidarabad, 135V1935) p ° 5 ; and al°Na,ilh ( C a i r o , 
1938) P P o l 7 U - 1 7 7 o 
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o r i g i n of t h i n k i n g and r a t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e I t says: 
"Rone o f the "bodies i s the place of wisdom, because 
no human body can receive wisdom (al-hikmah) d i r e c t l y 
w i t h o u t the help of something e l s e , say a power ? or 
form, or meaning <> None of these ' f a c u l t i e s ' ( a l -
quwa) i s able t o carry out the f u n c t i o n o f per-
c e i v i n g without the help of the body which i s t h e i r 
i nstrumento Also i t i s observable t h a t the strong 
impression which i s produced i n these f a c u l t i e s 
through the sense organ i s able t o destroy the weak 
impression,, Furthermore, when the f a c u l t i e s of per-
cepti o n have stopped using the other f a c u l t i e s of 
the body and are engaged w i t h t h a t strong impres-
sion , i n t h i s case they are. unable t o perceive or 
even t o r e f l e c t upon the weak impression. But no 
such t h i n g occurs t o the substance which i s the 
place of wisdomo For i t i s observable t h a t when-
ever i t s knowledge increases, i t s power o f t h i n k i n g 
(quwwat a l - t a ' a q q u l ) increases as a r e s u l t s and i t 
i s able t o r e f l e c t upon a l l the knowledge i t has, 
even without the help of the f a c u l t i e s of the body= 
Therefore, i f the place o f wisdom i s a body, then the 
- 9 2 -
r e s u l t w i l l "be of a d i f f e r e n t kindo Thus the subs-
tance which the human "being uses f o r reasoning i s ; 
not a "body but a substance of a d i f f e r e n t nature o " 
I I I . Arguments-
This argument t r i e s l o g i c a l l y t o prove t h a t 
the soul i s a substance, "by the use of the law of 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n as a p p l i e d t o the mind, hot t o the 
bodyo I t says t h a t i f there were some r a t i o n a l 
knowledge l o c a t e d i n the "body, then i t Yi/ould "be. 
unable t o conceive the opposites together i n a 
s i n g l e impression,. Since the opposites are 
supposed t o be grasped r a t i o n a l l y i n a s i n g l e act 
of c o g n i t i o n s then the r e c e i v e r (the place) of 
r a t i o n a l knowledge i s not a m a t e r i a l substance. 
2 
I t i s a substance d i f f e r e n t from the body 0 
IVo Arguments 
The matter of s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the soul i n 
t h i s argument has been considered w i t h reference 
t o the k i n d o f a c t i o n t h a t the body and the soul 
^ ° 9 p p o 7 " 8 « 
2 o Ibido 9 p » 9 o 
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would produce, when each i s considered as the place 
of wisdomo I t says: " I f the "body i s the place of 
wisdom, the acceptance of wisdom should r e l a t e t o 
i t i n a passive way. For, i n f a c t , any "body i s 
supposed t o receive the forms, whatsoever they may 
"be, i n a passive manner» But the substance which 
i s a c t u a l l y reasoning the r e s u l t s D i s supposed t o 
conceive knowledge, through tf3S deduction and the 
an a l y s i s of the ideas which are in n a t e i n i t s 
essence, i n an a c t i v e way0 Therefore the substance 
which i s the o r i g i n of the a c t i v e a c t i o n of t h i n k i n g 
i s not a body, but a substance d i f f e r e n t from the 
bodyo,fl 
Vo Arguments 
This argument takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the proof 
of the soul as a immaterial substance i n terms o f 
the b i o l o g i c a l changes t h a t may occur t o a human 
body d u r i n g l i f e I t says? " I t i s observed t h a t the 
human bodies and t h e i r f a c u l t i e s begin t o d e t e r i o r a t e 
when they have reached o l d age* Now i f the place of 
wisdom and knowledge i s the body, or any of i t s 
1 o I b i d o , p 09° 
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f a c u l t i e s , i n a manner such t h a t the p e r f e c t i o n of 
the place of wisdom and knowledge r e l a t e s t o the 
p e r f e c t i o n of the "body and i t s f a c u l t i e s , then o l d 
age should hinder the r a t i o n a l substance from con-
c e i v i n g knowledge and wisdom„ But i n f a c t there 
are many people who have reached a very o l d age, 
and i n s p i t e of the d e t e r i o r a t i o n of t h e i r bodies, 
are s t i l l able t o make r a t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n s i n a 
p e r f e c t manner„ Nov/,, i f the place of wisdom and 
knowledge i s the body, then no such r a t i o n a l d i s -
t i n c t i o n could be made by them<> Therefore, as a 
r e s u l t , the place of wisdom i s not the body but a 
substance of d i f f e r e n t nature„" 
2? o Argument; 
The proof of the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the soul has 
been argued here i n terms of the harmony t h a t has 
been n a t u r a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d among the elements of 
p h y s i c a l bodies 0 I t says: " I t i s observable i n 
physics ( n a t u r a l science) t h a t the human body has 
been composed i n a p e r f e c t harmony, where no h i n d -
rance or disobedience can be n o t i c e d among i t s . 
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elements i n t h e i r actions and reactions,- i n the sense 
t h a t i t does not r e j e c t or r e s i s t any a c t i o n t h a t i s 
supposed t o o r i g i n a t e from d i f f e r e n t elements of the 
same body., Now i f the place of wisdom and the o r i g i n 
of r a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g i s the body, then there should 
be the same s o r t of harmony between i t and the 
f a c u l t i e s of the a c t u a l i s a t i o n o f thoughts i n t o 
deeds. But i n f a c t whenever the reason wants t o 
commit any a c t i o n , i t faces many o b j e c t i o n s from the 
other f a c u l t i e s of the body, which i t has t o over-
come i n order t o commit t h a t action.. Consequently 
the o r i g i n of t h i n k i n g and of man's w i l l i s not the 
•i 
body, but a substance of a d i f f e r e n t nature." 
VIIo Argument; 
I n t h i s argument the proof of the soul as. a 
substance i s considered together w i t h t h e - f a c t t h a t 
m a t e r i a l objects are supposed t o movev i n a 
place whereas the soul i s note I t says: "When 
bodies act upon each o t h e r , the body which r e a c t s 
p a s s i v e l y ^ cannot get r i d of or stop the a c t i o n 
which i s produced i n i t , unless i t leaves i t s place 
1 . Ibido„ p p o 9 - 1 0 o 
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and i s separated from the a c t i v e bodyo But the 
substance which i s the o r i g i n of t h i n k i n g , however 
i t may be a f f e c t e d by the other f a c u l t i e s of t h e 
body, does not need t o move i n place i n order t o 
stop the a c t i o n of those f a c u l t i e s . . Therefore the 
substance which i s the o r i g i n of knowledge i s not 
•4 
a body but a substance of d i f f e r e n t nature,." 
V I I I o Arguments 
I n t h i s argument the proof of the soul as an 
immaterial substance i s considered from the p o i n t 
of view of the d i v i s i b i l i t y of tfe3 m a t e r i a l bodies, 
and the i n d i v i s i b i l i t y of tfes i n f i n i t e immaterial 
objects* I t says; "The geometrical and the nume-
r i c a l forms are i n f i n i t e fend. ..indivisible), i n t h e i r 
essence 0 Yet the human power of reasoning i s able 
t o conceive a l l these forms, however many they may 
be» Consequently the human power of reasoning i s 
i n f i n i t e , and since a l l t h a t i s d i v i s i b l e i s f i n i t e , 
t h i s power i s also i n d i v i s i b l e o 
Now, w i t h regard t o the f a c t t h a t the f a c u l t i e s 
of the body are d i v i s i b l e w i t h t h e i r bodies, and 
1 o Ibido polo. 
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the human power of r a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g i s i n d i v i s i b l e , 
then the place of wisdom i s not the "body but a 
•j 
substance of a d i f f e r e n t nature«" 
IX„ Argument; 
I n t h i s argument the proof of the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y 
of the soul has been drawn from the a b i l i t y of the 
soul and i n a b i l i t y of the body t o conceive, t o form, 
and t o remember knowledge<> I t sayss " I f knowledge 
i s an accident l o c a t e d i n the body, then knowledge 
cannot be repeated or remembered, when i t has been 
forgotteno But i t i s n o t i c e a b l e t h a t one can repeat 
knowledge and r e f l e c t upon i t , even a f t e r i t has. been 
f o r g o t t e n , w i t h o u t the help of t h e . f a c u l t i e s of t h e 
bodyo Therefore, the place of wisdom i s not a body, 
but a substance of a d i f f e r e n t nature <> This; 
immaterial substance has as . i t s a t t r i b u t e the 
a b i l i t y t o receive d i f f e r e n t a b s t r a c t forms of 
knowledge, keep them p o t e n t i a l l y , and r e f l e c t on them 
any time i t wishes* But the m a t e r i a l substance is. 
n e i t h e r able t o accept more than one corporeal form, 
nor can i t receive any s o r t of knowledge» Therefore, 
1. I b i d o , p o l O o 
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t h a t which knows and remembers i s not the body but a 
1 
substance of a d i f f e r e n t kindo" 
Xo Argument s 
I n t h i s argument, s e l f - p e r c e p t i o n i s used t o 
prove t h a t the soul i s an immaterial substance° I t 
sayss "The t o o l t h a t man uses f o r reasoning i s not 
a body but a r a t i o n a l power i h the human body 0 This 
r a t i o n a l power can conceive i t s e l f through i t s e l f 
w ithout the help of any e x t e r n a l intermediaryo I t 
i s known ( i n terms of the d e f i n i t i o n of 'substance'), 
t h a t e v e r ything t h a t i s able t o conceive i t s e l f 
through i t s e l f i s a substance. I n t h i s regard the 
2 
r a t i o n a l power of s e l f ^ p e r c e p t i o n i s a substanceo" 
Concluding Avicenna's arguments f o r the substan-
t i a l i t y of the s o u l , we should l i k e t o make the 
f o l l o w i n g observations.. I n these t e n d e t a i l e d 
arguments Avicenna i s a t t a c k i n g the problem of the 
s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the soul from d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s of. 
view, using d i f f e r e n t evidence i n each caseo 
1 o I b i d - , p „ l l o 
2° Ibid.„ pp« 11, 12o 
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Furthermore, many other arguments of a s i m i l a r k i n d 
appear i n other places i n h i s works. Although many 
of h i s arguments are subject t o controversy and disr-
cussion, there i s s t i l l a sound basis of reasoning 
t o be found i n them, and they represent the f i r s t 
step forward by an Islamic philosopher i n a f i e l d 
t h a t was l a t e r t o become the subject of considerable 
2 
debate o 
Yet, however convincing Avicehna's arguments 
f o r the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the soul might be, even 
he, j u s t as a l ^ K i n d i before him, was unable t o 
c l a r i f y the guestion of the soul's e s s e n t i a l nature 
and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o N e i t h e r t h e i r proof of i t s 
existence nor t h e i r proof of i t s s u b s t a n t i a l i t y 
could e n l i g h t e n t h e i r readers as t o what the soul 
r e a l l y i s 6 Our co n s i d e r a t i o n of these proofs shows 
Ho See f o o t n o t e 3 below, p 0 . 8 8 o 
2.o I r e f e r t o Averroes, Tahafut at t a h a f u t - ( B e i r u t 
1 9 3 0 ) ppo5k3**5159 where t h i s matter i s a subject 
of controversy between al-G-hazall and Averroes» 
But, i t should be n o t i c e d , even though al-= 
G-hazHli at t a c k s most of Avicenna's proofs of the 
s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the soulj, al=Ghazali h i m s e l f 
uses the same proofs f o r the existence of the 
soulo 
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t h a t the Muslim philosophers are not content t o accept 
A r i s t o t l e ' s d o c t r i n e of the human s o u l , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
w i t h regard t o i t s s u b s t a n t i a l i t y and s e p a r a b i l i t y o 
Indeed, i n many ways Avicenna appears r a t h e r t o 
f o l l o w Plato i n h i s dialogue . Alcibiades 9 where 
Socrates i s seen t o prove the existence of the soul 
as a separable substance using a s i m i l a r 
argument at i on„ 
We might ask why the Muslim philosophers devote 
a l l t h i s e f f o r t t o proving t h a t besides; the m a t e r i a l 
substance there i s s p i r i t u a l substance,, Do they 
argue against some of the m a t e r i a l i s t s of t h e i r 
time? This may be one of the main reasons, although 
t h e r e does not seem t o be any p o s i t i v e evidence t o 
2 
j u s t i f y t h i s claim» Probably, two fa c t o r s : are 
in v o l v e d here, one p h i l o s o p h i c a l , the other 
r e l i g i o u s o I n a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t e x t , the Muslim 
philosophers who are arguing f o r the s e p a r a b i l i t y 
from the body of the soul,, as a substance, have t o 
1 c P l a t o , A l c i b i a d e s I , 1 3 0 f f . 
2 . Mahmud Qasim, ffi al-Nafs wa a l ' a q l , (Cairo 1 9 5 ^ ) 
p o 7 8 . 
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j u s t i f y t h e i r demonstration on r a t i o n a l groundso 
Consequently they devote much e f f o r t t o reaching 
t h a t . g o a l o With regard t o the r e l i g i o u s aspect, 
i t seems t h a t a l - K i n d l and Avicenna are j u s t i f y i n g 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n as philosophers<> For philosophy 
was associated w i t h A r i s t o t l e , and. A r i s t o t l e ' s 
views on the soul were considered atheistic<. They 
would have heen regarded as non-believers d f they 
had not drawn the e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the human soul and the human body c The p h i l o s o -
p h i c a l d o c t r i n e t o which they adhere seems 
capable of r e c o n c i l i n g the philosopher w i t h the 
man of r e l i g i o n by emphasising t h i s very 
d i s t i n c t i o n o 
CHAPTER h 
The F a c u l t i e s of; the Soul 
and i t s R elationships 
I n the previous chapter we examined the questions 
of the d e f i n i t i o n and the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the s o u l , 
and we s h a l l now proceed t o discuss three aspects of 
i t s . n a t u r e s f i r s t l y , i t s separate f a c u l t i e s ; 
secondly, i t s r e l a t i o n t o the body; and, l a s t l y , 
the r e l a t i o n e x i s t i n g between i n d i v i d u a l souls. 
The number and nature o f the soul's f a c u l t i e s 
are basic t o any discussion of the circumstances o f 
i t s existence. I n t h i s connection, i t i s e s s e n t i a l 
t o r e f e r t o a l - K i n d l ' s l e t t e r F I mahiyyat al-^nawm 
;wa a l - r u p f f y a h . I n t h i s t e x t he r e f e r s t o the soul 
as having t h r e e , d i s t i n c t , main powers. They are, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y , the 'sensation' (al-quwwat al-hassah), 
the 'formative power' (al-quwwat al-musawwirah), 
and the ' r a t i o n a l power' (al-quwwat a l - ' a q l i y y a h ) . 
1 . Ra»sa " i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abu RIdah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 ° ) I> P ° 2 9 3 ° 
I n a d d i t i o n one must mention t h a t al-Kindx, i n h i s 
1 
"book F I al^.jawahir al-khams, r e f e r s t o h i s e a r l i e r 
2 
hook F I al-maqglat, where he has d i s t i n g u i s h e d the 
power of the soul i n t o 'sensation' and 'mind'o 
However, the l a t t e r hook i s untraceable, so our 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n of h i s concept of the f a c u l t i e s of 
soul w i l l he r e s t r i c t e d ( p r i m a r i l y ) t o the hook 
Fl^majii.yyat a l - j n a r o j a al-ruyyah° 
I t seems t h a t al-Kindx f o l l o w s A r i s t o t l e ' s 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the powers of the .soul by 
p u t t i n g the f a c u l t y of sensation (al-quwwat a l -
hassah) at the beginning and the f a c u l t y of 
reasoning (al-quwwat a l - ' a q i l a h ) at the end of 
any epistemological operation,, For A r i s t o t l e , 
every man i s born w i t h the f a c u l t y of sensation, 
and from t h i s f a c u l t y , memory (al - d h a k i r a h ) i s 
produced, from memory experience ( a l - k h i b r a h ) , and, 
l a s t l y , from experience t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l 
1 o I b i d o , I I , p»9° 
2 » I b i d o , I I , p ° 9 ; and Ibn al-Nadlm, al-ffihrist«, 
( L e i p z i g 1 8 7 2 ) p o 2 5 6 ° 
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knowledgeo A l - K i n d i considers the path to r a t i o n a l 
knowledge as c o n s i s t i n g of three steps onlyz 
' s e n s a t i o n ' ; the 'formative power' (al-musawwirah); 
and the ' i n t e l l e c t ' (al°'aql)«. Perhaps a l - K i n d l 
o 
i n c l u d e s A r i s t o t l e ' s 'memory' and 'experience' 
under the s i n g l e heading of 'formative power 1, and 
the ' p r a c t i c a l ' and the ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' powers under 
the ' i n t e l l e c t ' <> 
Thus the powerB of the s o u l f o r a l - K i n d i would 
"become t h r e e o n l y c Two of these f a c u l t i e s w i l l "be 
considered here, whereas the ' i n t e l l e c t ' as a 
f a c u l t y w i l l he d e a l t with i n the next c h a p t e r 0 
According to a l - K i n d l ' s t e x t F I mahiyyat a l -
Sinawm wa a l - r u ' y a h , the 'sensation' i s supposed to 
p e r c e i v e the s e n s i b l e forms which are immanent i n 
the o b j e c t s perceivedo On the other hand, the 
'formative power' i s supposed to deal w i t h the 
forms of t h i n g s i n a b s t r a c t i o n , having no connec-
t i o n w i t h the e x t e r n a l worldo That i s to say, that 
1 o The B a s i c Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed. R i c h a r d McKeon 
(New York 19*J-l) Metaphysics 1 , 1 , p 0 6 8 9 » 
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'formative power' i s sometimes a k i n d of a mental 
r e f l e c t i o n s , and sometimes a k i n d o f introspections, 
where the soul does not use i t s e x t e r n a l senses at 
a l i o 1 
There i s a very important problem w i t h regard 
t o the theory of knowledge, r a i s e d "by a l - K i n d l i n 
h i s l e t t e r F I mahiyyat al-|ffiawm wa al-ru^yaho con-
cerning the d i r e c t i o n of the soul towards the 
objec t o f t h i n k i n g , whether t h a t object i s r e a l 
or f i c t i t i o u s * He sayss " I t may happen t h a t we 
f i n d i n the awakened person, whose soul i s us i n g , 
i n the normal way, some of h i s f a c u l t i e s of sense, 
t h a t the forms of those t h i n g s which are the 
object of h i s t h i n k i n g , are represented t o him as 
though he was a c t u a l l y p e r c e i v i n g them,, The more 
h i s mind i s r e f l e c t i n g upon the object of t h i n k i n g 
without the use o f the senses, the more i t appears 
as i f he i s p e r c e i v i n g i t by h i s sensation,. More-
over there are many cases i n which one i s i n d u l g i n g 
i n deep t h i n k i n g where one i s us i n g n e i t h e r s i g h t 
1 o R a s a ^ i l a l - K i n d l a l - f a l s a f iy.yah, ed„ Abu Ridah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p . , 2 9 5 ° 
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nor hearing;; when i t often..happens t h a t the t h i n k e r 
does not answer any one who c a l l s him- He i s even 
unaware o f t h i n g s which are i n f r o n t of h i s eyes» 
When t h i s t h i n k e r has been asked, a f t e r he has 
ceased from t h i s deep t h i n k i n g , about c e r t a i n 
objects t h a t were i n f r o n t of h i s eyes, he does 
1 
not recognise them 0" 
Although t h i s l e t t e r i s p r i m a r i l y concerned 
w i t h sleep and dreaming, h i s epistemology is . 
s u f f i c i e n t l y consistent f o r us t o include i t i n 
our p r e s e t discussion of a l-Kindi's"conceptidh 
of the operation of thin k i n g o He gives the' 
impression t h a t the f i r s t stage i s t h e d i r e c t i o n 
o f the power o f ^sensation' towards the perceived 
ob j e c t <> I n t h i s stage, the soul can grasp sensi-
b l e forms t h a t have been perceived d i r e c t l y from 
a m a t e r i a l object<> The second stage i s t h a t the 
soul d i r e c t s the 'formative power' towards the 
'sensible forms' which have been reproduced i n 
the soul through the senses« Then, as a t h i r d 
1 c I b i d o , I , p p » 2 9 5 » 2 9 6 . . ; 
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stage, when the 'formative power' d i r e c t s i t s opera-
t i o n towards these reproductions or impressions f o r 
forming r a t i o n a l concepts, these r a t i o n a l concepts 
"become the object of the i n t e l l e c t , which i s a 
•i 
f a c u l t y i n the soulo 
Let us now consider i n more d e t a i l the d i s -
t i n c t i o n between the 'sensation' and the 'formative 
f a c u l t y ' o The primary d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t the 
'formative power' i s not supposed t o perceive the 
m a t e r i a l substances, or any q u a l i t y 1 t h e y may have, 
as has been mentioned before<. 
The second d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t the sensation 
represents the e x t e r n a l objects as they a r e 0 But 
the 'formative power' when i t represents any 
imaginary o b j e c t , i s able t o perceive i t as i t 
wisheso Therefore the scope of the fo r m a t i v e 
power i s wider than the scope of the sensationo 
For the formative power can perceive an imaginary 
human being w i t h h i s body covered w i t h f e a t h e r s , 
or w i t h horns on h i s head- But no such imaginary 
2 
o b j e c t can be perceived by sensationo 
1 , I b i d , o I , p p o 3 0 0 - 3 0 2 „ 
2 . I b i d c , I , p p o 2 9 9 , 3 0 0 „ 
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The t h i r d d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t the 'sensation' 
i s passive, while the 'formative power' i s active<> 
The work of 'sensation' i s no more than t o make 
copies and p i c t u r e s of the e x t e r n a l otojects. But 
the work of the 'formative power' i s wider than 
r e c e i v i n g copies of the corporeal forms abstrac-
t e d from t h e i r matter.. The 'formative power' can 
arrange, c l a s s i f y , and suggest any a l t e r a t i o n i t 
wishes t o the forms of knowledge which i t receives» 
There i s a k i n d of a s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e t h a t 
i s exercised toy the 'formative power' upon the. 
otoject of t h i n k i n g , tout no such i n t e r f e r e n c e of 
2 
sense perce p t i o n can o r i g i n a t e from the sensation. 
The f o u r t h d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t the 'sensation' 
i s subject t o any decay or d i s a t o i l i t y t h a t may 
occur t o any of the sense organs. But such a 
decay and d i s a t o i l i t y has no e f f e c t upon the 
3 
'formative power'. 
Moving on t o Avicenna's Viiew o f the f a c u l t i e s 
of the s o u l , one f i n d s t h a t he d i s t i n g u i s h e s the 
1 o I b i d , , I , p o 2 9 9 -
2 . Itoido, I , p . 2 9 9 . 
3 = I b i d . , I , p . 2 9 8 . 
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powers of the soul i n t o 'perceptive' ( i d r a k i y y a h ) 
a n d ' i n t e l l e c t u a l ' (" a q l i y y a h ) . The perceptive 
powers may he f u r t h e r d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n t o the 
2 
e x t e r n a l and the i n t e r n a l powers. 
The e x t e r n a l powers are the usual f i v e senses, 
s i g h t 9 hearing, s m e l l , touch, and t a s t e . There i s 
no "basic d i f f e r e n c e between Avicenna and a l - K i n d l 
on the p o i n t of the number and the f u n c t i o n of the 
f i v e senses, exce p t - t h a t , while Avicenna attempts 
at l e n g t h t o r e f u t e the P l a t o n i c theory of s i g h t 
3 
as proposed i n Timaeus, and accepts an A r i s t o t e l i a n 
L 
e x p l a n a t i o n , t h i s question i s not considered by 
al=KindT.. 
The powers of ' i n t e r n a l perception' (quwpa a l -
h i s s al=batinah) f o r Avicenna ares common sense 
( a l - h i s s al-amm), r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (al-musawwirah) 9 
e s t i m a t i o n ( a l - m u f a k k i r a h ) , and memory ( a l ~ 
mutadhakkir). The 'common sense* receives the 
1 . The i n t e l l e c t u a l powers w i l l be considered i n the 
next chapter. 
2 . Avicenna, De Anima, I , 5 S p.U. 
3 « P l a t o , Timaeus, h5 B, 6 7 C. 
k° S i r David Ross, A r i s t o t l e (London 1968) p p 6 1 3 6 - 1 3 9 . 
5 . This f a c u l t y , when i t appears i n animal, appears t o 
be known as imagination (al-mukhayyalah). De_ Jejuna 
IV, 1,' p. 1 6 0 . 
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corporeal forms, which are copied "by the f i v e senses 
and t r a n s m i t t e d t o i t from thenu The f u n c t i o n of 
the f a c u l t y of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s t o preserve what 
the common sense has received-from the f i v e senses, 
even i n the absence of the m a t e r i a l o b j e c t ; t h a t of 
th e esti m a t i v e power i s t o perceive the non-
sensible i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t e x i s t s i n the i n d i v i d u a l 
substances; and, f i n a l l y , t h a t of the r e t e n t i v e 
f a c u l t y (memory) i s t o r e t a i n what the es t i m a t i v e 
1 
power perceiveso 
To conclude the discussion of the f a c u l t i e s 
o f s o u l , i t seems necessary t o p o i n t out t h a t 
n e i t h e r a l - K i n d i nor Avicenna regards the f a c u l t i e s 
of soul as substanceso They are merely the i n s t r u -
ments of the s o u l , which i t uses i n order t o 
acquire knowledge- Even the i n t e l l e c t , as a 
f a c u l t y of the s o u l , cannot be considered t o be a 
substance, as w i l l be explained i n the f o l l o w i n g 
chapter. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note the i m p l i c a t i o n 
t h a t the soul must e x i s t i n a body i n order t o use 
these f a c u l t i e s . , 
1 o For a more d e t a i l e d account of these f a c u l t i e s ; 
see, Avicenna De Anima, IV, pp0157~lt>3» 
This b r i n g s us on t o the r e l a t i o n between the 
soul as a substance and i t s body. There i s no 
doubt, as noted above, t h a t the Muslim philosophers 
appose A r i s t o t l e ' s claim t h a t the r e l a t i o n between 
the human soul and i t s body i s no more than t h a t 
of two elements i n one single substance<> I t would 
be u s e f u l t o examine what arguments they have 
advanced against such a claim.. 
We w i l l f i r s t present a l - K i n d l ' s view as 
expressed i n h i s l e t t e r al-Qawl f i a l - n a f s a l -
mukhtasar min k i t a b Arisfcu wa A f l a ^ i n wa s a H r a l -
1 
f a l a s i f a h . Here, he i s c l a i m i n g t o summarize 
A r i s t o t l e ' s view on the s o u l , yet h i s summary owes 
much t o P l a t o and the Pythagoreans. Although 
A r i s t o t l e ' s De Anlma i s supposed t o be the object 
2 
of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a l - K i n d i shows h i m s e l f more 
sympathetic towards these other philosophers. 
A l - K i n d i n e i t h e r i n the t e x t under considera-
t i o n , .nor i n h i s other w r i t i n g s which are known t o 
1 . Ra s a ' i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f iy.yah, ed. Abu Ridah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I? p ° 2 7 2 . 
2 ° I b i d . , I , p . 2 7 3 -
us, r e f e r s to a r e l a t i o n of coexistence "between the 
body and the s o u l , as two d i f f e r e n t substances, even 
though t h i s i s the view of A r i s t o t l e , . However, i t 
i s d i f f i c u l t to be c e r t a i n t h a t a l - K i n d i b e l i e v e s i n 
the pre-existence of the soul before the c r e a t i o n of 
i t s body, as P l a t o d i d o The r e l a t i o n between the 
soul and the body during the process of generation 
may be one e i t h e r of coexistence, or of the soul's 
pre-existence; there seems t o be no other a l t e r n a t i v e o 
The duty of the soul during the e a r t h l y l i f e , i n 
a l - K i n d i ' s previous t e x t , i s t o d i r e c t the body i n 
the r i g h t way, by not a l l o w i n g i t t o regard sensual 
pleasures as the only aim and end. Such an i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n seems t o be.Platonic i n character, f o r , t o 
depict the r e l a t i o n s h i p between body and s o u l , 
a l - K i n d l has recourse t o a metaphor i n which the 
2 
body i s an untamed horse and the s o u l , i t s rider» 
This bears a s i m i l a r i t y t o Plato's analogy i n the 
Phqedrus» where the body i s l i k e n e d t o a c h a r i o t , 
1 o David Ross, A r i s t o t l e (London 1 9 6 8 ) p 0 1 3 2 o 
2 o R a s ^ ' i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. by Abu Ridah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p 0 2 7 3 « 
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of which the r a t i o n a l soul i s the r i d e r and the other 
powers of the soul are the horses •„ Al-Kihdx's 
metaphor owes a debt also t o another P l a t o n i c con-
c e p t i o n , t h a t o f the body as a ship in.which the 
2 
soul resides as a p i l o t o 
I n the same t r e a t i s e of a l - K i n d i ' s -the soul 
and the body are s a i d t o be two d i f f e r e n t substances 
which t e m p o r a r i l y share a common existence d u r i n g 
e a r t h l y l i f e - . . For they are not once and fo r e v e r 
t i e d together i n such a way t h a t no separation at 
a l l . can take place; the soul i s supposed t o leave 
the body a f t e r death and r e t u r n t o the other world„^ 
Like Plato a 1-Kindl i s co n s i d e r i n g the body, 
as a p r i s o n f o r the s o u l , from which the" s o u l , 
d u r i n g t h e i r common l i f e , i s always continuously 
s t r i v i n g to; escape, and r e t u r n t o the d i v i n e woi'ldo 
The soul i n i t s t u r n i s u n w i l l i n g t o leave the 
d i v i n e w o r l d , f o r when i t descends t o the m a t e r i a l 
1 o P l a t o , Phaedrus, 2hG A° 
2 . I b i d . , 2kl C c 7 » 
3 » Rasa/11 a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed» Abu Ridah 
(Cairo 1950) I , p » 2 7 7 ° 
ho P l a t o , Phaedrus, 6 2 B. 
world i t comes i n t o contact w i t h the body, so t o 
speak, and'suffers e a r t h l y e v i l s . 
Thus, the r e l a t i o n of soul t o "body would seem 
above a l l t o "be a temporal connexion, i n which the 
soul acts as guide, the "body f o l l o w i n g . Coexistence 
i s not mentioned "by .al-Kindland i t would seem t h a t 
he departs from an A r i s t o t e l i a n d o c t r i n e of so u l . 
Perhaps A r i s t o t l e ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the soul and 
1 
the "body as two elements i n a s i n g l e substance does 
not a l l o w the n o t i o n of s u p e r i o r i t y of the human 
soul over the body. For such a s u p e r i o r i t y cannot 
be achieved unless the soul i s f i r s t considered as 
a substance of d i f f e r e n t nature. This may w e l l be 
the reason f o r a l - K i n d l ' s tendency towards, a 
P l a t o n i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n between 
body and s o u l . 
We t u r n now t o Avicenna, who argues s t r o n g l y 
against any view which does not recognise the 
s e p a r a b i l i t y of the soul from the body. Any 
A r i s t o t e l i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the connexion between 
1 . The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed. Richard McKeon 
(New York 19U-L) De_ Anima p.556. A r i s t o t l e says:; 
"From t h i s i t i n d u b i t a b l y f o l l o w s t h a t the soul 
i s inseparable from i t s body." 
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the soul and the "body i s r e j e c t e d . To r e f u t e such 
opinions he produces a series of arguments i n the 
De Anima (V,2). However, there seems t o "be l i t t l e 
t h a t i s new i n these arguments, f o r they merely 
f o l l o w the p a t t e r n of those which were adduced t o 
prove the soul's s u b s t a n t i a l i t y , and which were 
discussed above. To discuss them here would be 
merely t o repeat what has been s a i d already. 
Avicenna does not admit any r e l a t i o n of 
e s s e n t i a l attachment between soul and body f o r 
the f o l l o w i n g reasons. F i r s t l y , because there i s 
no r e l a t i o n of e s s e n t i a l interdependence between 
the soul and the body 0 He argues as f o l l o w s ; i f 
soul and body were e s s e n t i a l l y interdependent upon 
each other, they would lose t h e i r s u b s t a n t i a l i t y 
and become two elements i n a s i n g l e substance« 
This means t h a t n e i t h e r the soul nor the body 
would be able t o be q u a l i f i e d as a substance. But 
as they are two substances of d i f f e r e n t natures, 
1 . I b i d , p.556, and Metaphysics V I I , 1 1 0 p.801, and 
V I I , 3 , p.815. 
they are not mutually dependent upon each other* 
Therefore there i s no e s s e n t i a l attachment between 
1 
soul and. body, but r a t h e r an a c c i d e n t a l one. 
Secondly, i f soul and body were e s s e n t i a l l y 
interdependent upon each ot h e r , then soul would 
p e r i s h by the d e s t r u c t i o n of the body. I n t h i s • 
ease the existence of the soul would depend upon 
the existence of the body 0 Thus soul would be 
p o s t e r i o r t o the body, which would i n t h i s case 
he the cause Of i t s existence- I n t h i s c o ntext, 
the body woulAbe e i t h e r e f f e c i e n t ( f a ' i l a h ) , or 
m a t e r i a l (madiyyah), or formal ( s t t r i y y a h ) , or 
f i n a l (tamamiyyah) cause. Since i t appears t o 
be unable t o f u l f i l any of these r o l e s , t h e r e 
i s no r e l a t i o n of e s s e n t i a l attachment ( i t t i s a l 
'dhatl) between soul and body c^ . -
For Avicenna, there i s only an a c c i d e n t a l 
r e l a t i o n of attachment ( i t t i s a l 'aradx) between-•-
the soul and the body. He considers the body as; 
1 . Avicenna, De Anima, V,U, p.22U» 
2 o I b i d . p. 2 2 k . 
3 » I b i d , p . 2 2 6 . 
the a c c i d e n t a l cause of the existence of the soul« 
He sayss "The t r u t h i s t h a t the "body and the tempera-
ment are an a c c i d e n t a l cause of the soulo" He also 
explains ho?/ t h i s a c c i d e n t a l attachment "between soul 
and body takes place from the very beginning of l i f e . 
He says; "When the matter of a body s u i t a b l e t o 
become the instrument of the soul and i t s proper 
subject comes i n t o existence, the separate causes' 
b r i n g i n t o being the i n d i v i d u a l s o u l , and t h a t i s 
2 
how the soul o r i g i n a t e s from them,," 
The r e j e c t i o n of an e s s e n t i a l attachment of 
soul and body allows the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e i r 
s eparation. I t should be n o t i c e d t h a t the separation 
of the soul from the body, f o r a l - K i n d l and Avicenna, 
3 
happens once o n l y , at the end of t h i s l i f e . Only 
when a person dies i s h i s soul separated from the 
bodyo By no means can t h e soul leave the body 
d u r i n g sleep, or when the person i s under the 
i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a n t s . 
1 o F. Rahman, Avicenna ? s Psycjiology, (Oxford 1 9 5 2 ) 
P ° 5 9 ° ° - . 
2 o I b i d . , p . 5 9 ° 
3 o Rasa"!! a l - K i n d l a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed= Abu Radah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , ' p . 2 7 7 ° 
A discussion Of the. r e l a t i o n s h i p "between the 
soul and the "body would not he complete i f i t f a i l e d 
t o r a i s e the question, " I s a soul able t o "be r e l a t e d 
t o more than one "body?11 I n other words, " I s the 
soul able t o transmigrate t o another body a f t e r the 
d e s t r u c t i o n of the previous one?" A l - K i n d i gives 
no d e t a i l e d arguments concerning t h i s matter, and 
we are f o r c e d t o r e l y upon some minor passages t o 
discover how he would have answered our question,. 
Let us examine h i s d e f i n i t i o n of 'reckoning' 
(al-bJ-sab). He says, " ( A l - h l s a b ) i s the r e t r i -
b u t i o n exacted from the p a r t i c u l a r soul f o r i t s 
a c t i o n w h i l e i t had i t s a f f e c t i o n f o r the sensible 
world and stayed w i t h the body." A l - K i n d l here 
r e f e r s t o the soul as having a r e l a t i o n only w i t h 
one body., I f he had b e l i e v e d i n the t r a n s m i g r a t i o n 
(tanasukh) of the human s o u l , he would probably 
have used i n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n the term 'bodies' 
(al-a.isad) i n s t e a d of 'body' (al-.iasad) 0 However, 
1 . S'o M„ Stern,"Notes on al-Kindx's t r e a t i s e on 
d e f i n i t i o n s " , The Journal of the Royal A s i a t i c 
Society ( 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 0 ) p 0 3 2 o ' ~ ~ ~ ~ 
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i t does not seem possible t o o f f e r any more than a 
t e n t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n here. 
A l - K i n d i also gives the impression t h a t he does 
not favour the n o t i o n of t r a n s m i g r a t i o n of the soul 
from one body t o another, i n h i s t e x t known as 
Kalam l i l - K i n d i f x a l - n a f s mukhtasar wajiz.o He sayss 
"Plato does not mean by h i s d e f i n i t i o n [ o f ' s o u l ' ] , 
'united w i t h the heavenly body through which i t s 
a c t i o n s appear i n the bodies', t h a t i t i s u n i t e d 
w i t h the heavenly body, but only means t o say t h a t 
i t acts i n the bodies by the interme.diacy of the 
heavenly body which i s the sphere; not t h a t i t puts 
on a heavenly body by which i t enters i n t o a body 
and by.which i t leaves it» Such a view i s mani-
f e s t l y erroneous, and t h i s would have been 
r e a l i z e d by one even of much lower standing than 
,1 " " '•' ' • P l a t o o " .Though a l - K i n d i i s c e r t a i n l y not.arguing 
against t r a n s m i g r a t i o n here, i t would seem t h a t he 
i s r e j e c t i n g the idea of the soul passing i n t o a 
human body' from some c e l e s t i a l body 0 Does t h i s , mean 
1 . S o M o S t e r n , Isaac I s r a e l i 0 (Oxford 1 9 5 8 ) p . o | 3 . 
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t h a t the soul cannot pass from one tody t o another 
i n the case of human "bodies also? This appears t o 
"be i m p l i e d "by what f o l l o w s i n the passage quoted 
1 
aboveo Again, no conclusive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n seems 
po s s i b l e o 
This problem has been t r e a t e d at greater l e n g t h 
by Avicermao I n h i s t e x t Risalah adhawiya f l amr 
al-ma'ad he gives a summary of d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s 
of t r a n s m i g r a t i o n against which he intends t o a r / g u e o 
Some, he says, b e l i e v e t h a t souls can migrate t o a l l 
l i v i n g bodies, others t h a t they migrate only t o 
animal bodies; and others again t h a t they can.only 
p 
pass, t o human bodies <> A l l these t h e o r i e s are 
r e j e c t e d by Avicenna-, who believes t h a t , once the 
soul has l e f t the body at death, i t can never 
3 ' 
r e t u r n t o any body whatsoever. 
He a l s o r e j e c t s the concept of t r a n s m i g r a t i o n 
i n the De Anima (V 9k) where he says the f o l l o w i n g ; 
1 o I b i d . , p o l + 2 . 
2 o Avicenna, Risalah adhawiya f i amr al-ma'ad, _ed. 
S o Dunya (Cairo 1949) PP»Jj-l» 8 1 = 9 3 ° 
3 o I b i d o , p 0 8 9 « 
" I f we suppose t h a t many bodies have been inhabited* 
"by one s o u l , whereas each of these bodies has i t s . 
own s o u l j which was created e s p e c i a l l y f o r i t , then 
i n t h i s case every body may have two souls. As we 
have s a i d the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the soul and the 
body i s not i n the sense t h a t the soul i s i m p r i n t e d 
i n the body» I t i s only i n the sense t h a t the soul 
is . occupied w i t h the r u l i n g o f the body, and the 
body i n i t s t u r n i s p a s s i v e l y a f f e c t e d by the actions 
of the s o u l . I n f a c t every r a t i o n a l animal f e e l s 
t h a t he has no more than one so u l , which i a a c t u a l l y .. 
occupying and r u l i n g h i s body.. So i f there i s 
another soul of which the r a t i o n a l animal neither-
knows, nor f e e l s t o be occupied w i t h h i s body, then 
such a soul has no r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s body, f o r 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p only e x i s t s i n t h i s way 0 Conse-
1 
quently there i s no t r a n s m i g r a t i o n i n any sense•>" 
From t h i s quotation i t i s clear t h a t Avieenna 
accepted no r e l a t i o n o f t r a n s m i g r a t i o n between the 
human soul and a m u l t i p l i c i t y of human bodies<> Also, 
1 » Avicenna, De Anima V,i|, pp°230s, 231° And FoRahman 
Avicenna's Psychology (Oxford 1952) p 0 64» 
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he t r i e s t o say t h a t the 'soul' i s always the subject 
whieh r e f e r s t o one's 'essence/, and can n e i t h e r 
accept another soul t o share the same body, nor 
when i t i s separated from i t s "body can i t serve as 
a new 'essence' or 'soul' f o r another person,, 
The f i n a l question t o he considered i n t h i s 
chapter i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p "between human souls as 
i n d i v i d u a l separate substances» For i t i s necessary 
t o i n v e s t i g a t e whether a l - K i n d i and Avicenna b e l i e v e 
i n an e s s e n t i a l u n i t y o f human souls i n one soulo 
A l - K i n d l ' s view on t h i s matter i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
d i f f i c u l t t o d i s c e r n 0 Our f i r s t source i s the 
B r i t i s h Museum manuscript (add* 7473) where about 
1 
twenty-nine d e f i n i t i o n s have been recorded. I n the 
d e f i n i t i o n of ' r e t u r n ' (al-ma'ad) he sayss " ' r e t u r n ' 
i s the passage of the p a r t i c u l a r soul t o the u n i v e r -
s a l s o u l , when i t i s not e n t i c e d by the desire of 
1 o T h i r t e e n of these d e f i n i t i o n s , which are t r a n s l a t e d 
i n t o E n g l i s h and have been s t u d i e d by Pgof-ogggg 3)r 
Stern, were not mentioned i n the (Aya Sufya) manus-
c r i p t (I | .832)o See S o M„ S t e r n , "Notes on a l - K i n d l ' s 
t r e a t i s e on d e f i n i t i o n s " , The Journal of the Royal 
A s i a t i c Society (1959-1960) p»32» 
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n a t u r e . " And i n the d e f i n i t i o n of 'the assembly*, 
(al-hashru) he sayss "'The assembly' i s the ga t h e r i n g 
of the p a r t i c u l a r souls at the u n i v e r s a l soul and the 
2 
i n t e l l e c t ' s glance at them-" Also i n the d e f i n i t i o n 
of 'the road' ( a l - s i r a k u ) he sayss "'The road' i s the 
s t r a i g h t way which leads the p a r t i c u l a r souls t o the 
3 
u n i v e r s a l s o u l . " 
I n these three d e f i n i t i o n s a l - K i n d i uses the 
terms ' u n i v e r s a l soul' ( a l - n a f s a l - k u l l i ; % a h ) and 
' p a r t i c u l a r soul' ( a l - n a f s a l - . j u z ? i y y a h ) 9 hut he does 
not define ' u n i v e r s a l s o u l ' , nor does he sta t e i t s 
r e l a t i o n t o the p a r t i c u l a r souls o The e s s e n t i a l 
u n i t y of a l l human souls i n one soul does- not seem 
t o "be i m p l i e d here. 
When one t u r n s t o h i s work al^Qawl f i a l - n a f s 
al-mukhtasar min k i t a h A r i s ^ u wa A f l a ^ i n wa s a y i r 
a l - f a l a s i f a h s , one f i n d s t h a t he speeks i n terms of a 
1 . I b i d . , p»35» 
2. I b i d . , p»35° 
3- I b i d . , p .35° 
p l u r a l i t y of souls i n the a f t e r l i f e s "When the soul 
a t t a i n s the utmost degree of p u r i t y »»» i t w i l l he 
ahle t o converse w i t h those souls t h a t have already 
1 
separated from t h e i r bodies»" This passage implies, 
t h a t the souls maintain t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t y , 
and t h a t they are able t o converse w i t h each other, 
which would scarcely he possible i f they were u n i t e d 
t o become one soulo 
He also sayss "This e a r t h i s only a br i d g e t o 
the nobler heavenly world, where the souls make 
t h e i r permanent abode i n p r o x i m i t y t o t h e i r c r e a t o r , 
and where they see him i n t e l l e c t u a l l y but not, 
p 
s e n s i b l y o " Once again, al-Kindx c l e a r l y envisages 
t h a t separate existence of p a r t i c u l a r souls which 
maintain t h e i r i d e n t i t y a f t e r deatho 
Nor. can i t be s a i d t h a t Avicenna believes or 
suggests any e s s e n t i a l u n i t y among the human souls; 
although they emanate from the same source, yet 
1 * George No A t i y e h , A l - K i n d i (Karachi, 1 9 6 6 ) p < , 1 0 1 » 
2 o l b i d o , p o l 0 2 o And R a s a y i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h 
edo AbH Hidah (Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p 0 2 7 7 « 
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they should, as i n d i v i d u a l s , d i f f e r i n essence from 
one another. For instance, he says, the soul o f 
one baby i s d i f f e r e n t from the soul of another babyj 
s i m i l a r l y the soul of an ancient man d i f f e r s 
e s s e n t i a l l y from t h a t of a modern man.. For i t is. 
impossible f o r souls i n a l l bodies t o be the same. 
His j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s statement i s t h a t i f the 
souls are the same i n a l l bodies, then every body 
knows what a l l the others know. That i s t o say, 
i f the souls are j u s t the same, then, i n s p i t e of 
the d i f f e r e n c e s of time and the i n t e l l e c t u a l capacity 
of the i n d i v i d u a l s , there should be a u n i v e r s a l 
agreement over every knowable subject among a l l . the 
human race^ Since t h i s i s not the case, human souls 
are n e i t h e r e s s e n t i a l l y the same, nor are they able 
t o be u n i t e d together a f t e r death t o form one s i n g l e 
substance 0 
This conclusion i s reached i n a d i f f e r e n t manner 
i n al°Najaho^ He says; "But a f t e r t h e i r separation 
1 . Avicenna, De Anima, V , 3 ? p < > 2 2 2 o 
2. I b i d , , p p 0 2 2 2 , 2 2 3 » 
3° Avieenna, a l - N a j a h (Cairo 1938) p018i+<. 
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from t h e i r bodies the souls remain i n d i v i d u a l oy/ing 
t o the d i f f e r e n t matters i n which they had been, 
and owing t o the times of t h e i r b i r t h and t h e i r 
d i f f e r e n t d i s p o s i t i o n s due t o t h e i r bodies, which 
-j 
n e c e s s a r i l y d i f f e r of t h e i r p e c u l i a r c o n d i t i o n s o " 
Here we see t h a t Avicenna regards the circumstances 
t h a t the soul had experienced i n the body^f as 
p e r t a i n i n g t o i t even a f t e r death, so as t o d i s -
t i n g u i s h i t from a l l other immortal souls,. 
Although Avicenna b e l i e v e s t h a t souls are 
•: • 2 r e l a t e d t o each other a f t e r death, i t seems 
probable t h a t he d i d not regard t h i s ; connexion 
as one of e s s e n t i a l u n i t y 0 I t would have been 
impossible f o r him t o d i s t i n g u i s h between the 
3 
souls of sinners and o f j u s t men a f t e r death, i f 
he had done so; only one soul could be punished 
or rewarded a f t e r deatho 
1 o F o Rahman, Avicenna's Psychology (Oxford 1 9 5 2 ) , 
2 o Avicenna , Hadiyat a l - r a y i s <•°- mabhath' an al-quwa 
al-nafsaniyyah, ed.'-E. van Dyck (Cairo 1 3 2 5 ) p ° 7 6 o 
3 » Avicenna c l a s s i f i e s souls a f t e r death i n t o those 
which aire p e r f e c t and j u s t (nufus kamllah_wa 
munaz|ih|iah), and those which are p e r f e c t but not 
j u s t , and those which.are not p e r f e c t but j u s t , 
and l a s t l y those which are n e i t h e r p e r f e c t nor 
j u s t o Avicenna, Risalah a^hawiyyah f l amr al° 
ma'ad, edc S. Dunya (Cairo 1 9 U 9 ) PP.12 0 , 1 2 1 « 
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I t seems, moreover, t h a t i f a l l souls were a 
u n i t y , he would he forced t o acknowledge both p r e -
existence ( o f the s o u l , p r i o r t o the body) and t r a n s -
m i g r a t i o n , as every soul would be born from, and 
r e t u r n t o , t h a t u n i t y ; whereas, i n f a c t , he r e j e c t s 
these theorieso 
Here we may conclude t h a t , f o r Avicenna, even 
though the human souls a f t e r the c o r r u p t i o n o f 
t h e i r bodies; r e t u r n t o the Higher world (al°'alam 
al - m u f a r i a ) and remain t h e r e , they do not j o i n 
t o g e t h e r , without any exception, t o form one s i n g l e 
u n i v e r s a l substance» This r e f l e c t s a t r a d i t i o n 
among the Muslim philosophers, namely, a r e f u s a l 
t o a l l o w t h a t two or more substances may combine 
i n such a way as t o create from themselves one 
u n i t e d substance» E i t h e r the o r i g i n a l p a r t s would 
be incomplete and t h e r e f o r e f a i l t o q u a l i f y as a 
substance or the r e s u l t i n g ' u n i t y ' would be 
a c c i d e n t a l and not s u b s t a n t i a l 
Hence a l - K i n d l and Avicenna argue against 
A r i s t o t l e who does not acknowledge the soul and the 
-.128 = 
"body t o "be two d i f f e r e n t substances i n r e l a t i o n t o 
the l i v i n g being- Hence also they r e j e c t the 
1 
P l a t o n i c view t h a t i n d i v i d u a l souls can be u n i t e d 
i n one wo r l d - s o u l . This may be regarded as a 
p r i n c i p a l d i f f e r e n c e between Muslim philosophers, 
on the one hand, and the P l a t o n i c and A r i s t o t e l i a n 
t r a d i t i o n s , on the other» 
1 , P l a t o , Philebus, 3 0 a - b o 
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• CHAPTER 5 
The I n t e l l e c t as a substance 
I n t h i s chapter i t i s proposed, f i r s t l y , t o 
consider how a l - K i n d l and Avicenna d e f i n e the 
i n t e l l e c t and prove i t s s u b s t a n t i a l i t y . ; and secondly, 
t o estimate the extent t o which they agree i n t h i s 
matter o 
A l - K i n d l i n R i s a l a h f x hudud al-ashya 9 wa 
rusjlmlha defines ' i n t e l l e c t ' as f o l l o w s ^ "The 
i n t e l l e c t i s a simple substance, which conceives 
1 
t h i n g s as they are i n t h e i r r e a l i t y o " The i n t e l l e c t 
here has been described as having three e s s e n t i a l 
p r o p e r t i e s ^ ( 1 ) I t i s supposed t o have a s u b s t a n t i a l 
existence; ( 2 ) having been allowed such a s u b s t a n t i a l 
e xistence, i t i s excluded from being considered a 
compound body, or an i n d i v i d u a l substance; ( 3 ) i t i s . 
i n i t s nature t o conceive the essence of t h i n g s , t h i s 
being i t s main function<, 
1 . V ^ l i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ J j ^ j ^ j f - a S J ' T R a s a ^ i l / a l ^ i n d l 
a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abu Ridah (Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) . I , p o l 6 5 „ 
See Abu Haiyan a l - T a u h i d i , a.l~Muqabasat, ed., H. a l -
Sandubi (Cairo 1 9 2 9 / 1 3 ^ 7 ) Muqabasah 9 . 1 , p.317.0. I n 
t h i s muqabasah there i s a passage s i m i l a r t o 
a l - K i n d i ' s d e f i n i t i o n s "The i n t e l l e c t i s a simple 
substance which i s able t o conceive the essence of 
t h i n g s i n t h e i r r e a l i t y without the i n t e r f e r e n c e 
of time.," 
I n a l - K i n d l ' s works the i n t e l l e c t i s supposed 
t o conceive the i n t e l l i g i b l e forms (al-suwar a l -
ma' qHlah), which may he described as r a t i o n a l 
concepts. For he says i n the t e x t Risalah f i al° 
1 
( a q l g "There are two kinds of forms; f i r s t l y , the 
m a t e r i a l form which i s the object of sense percep-
t i o n , and secondly immaterial form, which i s the 
object of the i n t e l l e c t and which i s the s p e c i f i c a -
l i t y of t h i n g s (the species of t h i n g s ) (n&w'iyyat 
j^jy^hyik') and t h a t which i s above i t [ i . e - . t he genus, 
which i s a u n i v e r s a l higher than the species:]," 
Therefore, i t appears t h a t the i n t e l l e c t i s 
regarded as a substance, because the objects v/hich 
i t i s used t o apprehend or t o describe, i , e , species 
3 
and genus, are themselves q u a l i f i e d as substances. 
Just as they e x i s t s u b s t a n t i a l l y by themselves, the 
i n t e l l e c t also' has been defined as having s u b s t a n t i a l 
existence, and j u s t as they have been declared t o be 
substances, the i n t e l l e c t also has been c a l l e d 
'substance', 
1 , Rasa 3 i l a'l-Kindl a l - f a l s a f i y y a h 9 ed, AbO. RIdah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , :p,33kl -
2 , A, Altman and S, M, Stern, Isaac I s r a e l i (Oxford 
1 9 5 8 ) , p , 3 8 , 
3 , See Chapter Is d e f i n i t i o n of 'substance'. 
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I t i s necessary t o discover which k i n d o f i n t e l l e c t 
a l - K i n d i has intended t o define as a substance i n h i s 
l e t t e r ffl"l-hududy f o r he holds the existence of f o u r 
kinds of i n t e l l e c t , as we s h a l l see. 
The f o l l o w i n g passage seems t o i n d i c a t e which 
k i n d of i n t e l l e c t i s being r e f e r r e d t o by a l - K i n d i 0 
He says, i n h i s book ffl a l - f a l s a f a h a l - H l a l , "Every-
t h i n g which has been brought from p o t e n t i a l i t y i n t o 
a c t u a l i t y must be produced by some other t h i n g which 
i s always i n actuality» The u n i v e r s a l s are supposed 
t o be those t h i n g s which have brought the soul from 
the s t a t e of p o t e n t i a l i t y t o t h a t of r a t i o n a l 
a c t u a l i t y 0 That i s t o say, the u n i v e r s a l s , which 
are the species and the genus, when they have been 
u n i t e d w i t h the s o u l , render the soul r a t i o n a l , or 
r a t h e r enable-the soul t o possess an i n t e l l e c t <> I n 
other words, t h e soul becomes r e c e p t i v e of the 
1 £ 'universals of t h i n g s ' ( k u l l i y a t aJLj^a^hya9) 0 There-A 
f o r e when the u n i v e r s a l s are u n i t e d w i t h the s o u l , 
the soul w i l l be brought from p o t e n t i a l i t y i n t o 
1. i o e D species and genus» 
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a c t u a l i t y ; i n t h i s case the soul comes t o possess an 
acquired i n t e l l e c t 9 which i t used t o have only i n 
p o t e n t i a l i t y . Thus the u n i v e r s a l s are the i n t e l l e c t 
which i s always i n a c t u a l i t y , which has awakened the 
1 
soul from p o t e n t i a l i t y i n t o a c t u a l i t y . " 
I n the previous passage s many of the concepts. 
employed appear t o he synonymous. They are: ( 1 : ) That 
which a c t u a l i z e s knowledge. ( 2 ) That which i s always 
i n a c t u a l i t y ( a l - l a d h i huwa di^iman b i 9 l ~ f ' I ' l ) . 
( 3 ) The u n i v e r s a l s of things; ( k u l l i ^ y a t al-ashya"). 
(k) The species, and genus as u n i v e r s a l s . ( 5 ) The 
2 
I n t e l l e c t which i s always i n a c t u a l i t y . Although 
al=Kindx does not say so e x p l i c i t l y . , a l l o f these 
concepts appear t o have been used synonymously as 
names f o r t h a t i n t e l l e c t which has been defined as* 
a substance. 
A l - K i n d i was probably faced w i t h the problem of 
c o i n i n g a t e c h n i c a l term f o r t h a t k i n d of i n t e l l e c t 
Which has been defi n e d as a substance. I t does not 
1 0 Rasa 9 i i a l - K i n d i a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abu1 RTdah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p . 1 5 5 . 
2 ° I b i d . , p . l 5 5 o 
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seem t h a t he i s w i l l i n g t o c a l l i t the " a c t i v e 
i n t e l l e c t " ( a l - ' a q l a l ~ f a ' ' a l ) , i n an A r i s t o t e l i a n 
sensej f o r t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n of any such 
usage i n the works of a l - K i n d l s t i l l extant. One 
p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t he was u n f a m i l i a r w i t h t h i s 
concept. Yet again, he may have f e l t i n c l i n e d t o 
exclude the concept from h i s account of t h i s type 
of i n t e l l e c t , i n the l i g h t of the problematic 
explanation of the l a t t e r given by Alexander of 
2 
Aphrodisias, This p o i n t w i l l be de a l t w i t h l a t e r . 
I t i s possible t o conclude t h a t when a l - K i n d l 
defines the i n t e l l e c t as substance, he means the 
' f i r s t i n t e l l e c t ' ^ ( a l - ' a q l al-awwal) i , e , the 
i n t e l l e c t which i s always i n a c t u a l i t y , as i t has 
been described i n h i s l e t t e r P I a l f ' a q l , ^ " 
1 , The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ecL Richard McKeon 
(New York 19%1) Be Ahima I I I , 5 9 p o 5 9 2 0 
2, For a f u r t h e r account of Alexander's view of the 
a c t i v e i n t e l l e c t see Et» Gilson., "Les sources 
reco-Arabes De L'Augustinisme i b r i c e n n i s a n t " , 
rchive' d ' h i s t o i r e d o c t r i n a l e et l i t t & r a i r e du 
moyen-gge (P a r i s 1929). •> IV, p,19° A r i s t o t l e ' s 
De Ahlma, ed, by Badawi (Cairo 195k) 9 app° 1US . 7 5 ° 
3= I t seems none of the other i n t e l l e c t s , which are 
p a r t s of the hitman s o u l , are able t o be 
considered as substance. Therefore they would 
not q u a l i f y f o r such a d e f i n i t i o n , 
ho Rasa\ sil a l - K i n d l a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed, AbH Ridah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ; I , p ° 3 5 3 ° 
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This may he equated w i t h the 'un i v e r s a l i n t e l l e c t ' 
(al'.aql a l - k u l l i ) , since i t i s supposed t o he the 
1 
species of th i n g s ( s p e c i f i c a l i t y of t h i n g s ) <> 
We must now consider Avicenna's views on the 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the concept of substance t o the 
i n t e l l e c t o Our i n v e s t i g a t i o n w i l l proceed p a r t l y 
by considering some d e f i n i t i o n s which are a p p l i e d 
t o the i n t e l l e c t , and p a r t l y by considering some 
passages which serve as a d d i t i o n a l evidence« 
Avicenna's views on the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the 
i n t e l l e c t cannot be t r a c e d t o a s i n g l e p h i l o s o -
p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n , but have r a t h e r t o be i n v e s t i g a t e d , 
as f a r as i s p o s s i b l e , w i t h reference t o a l l t h e 
schools of philosophy by which Avicenna i s i n f l u e n c e d , 
e 0 g 0 A r i s t o t e l i a n , Neo-PlatoniCo 
None o f the f o l l o w i n g types of i n t e l l e c t , i n ^ 
way t h a t Avicenna has de f i n e d them, should be 
1 o Al-Kinda i n t ^ h e ^ B r i t i s h Museum manuscript ( A d d o 7 4 7 3 ) 
says v\*r&^\^jfi&*^\$t£\ Stern t r a n s l a t e d 
t h i s passage as f o l l o w s : "The u n i v e r s a l i n t e l l e c t 
i s t he s p e c i f i c a l i t y o f t h i n g s . " A. Altaian and 
S-o H e S t e r n , Isaac I s r a e l i (Oxford 1 9 5 8 ) pp« 3 7 , 3 8 . 
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q u a l i f i e d , as a substanceo ( 1 ) The m a t e r i a l i n t e l l e c t 
( a l - " a q l al-°h&yulani) 9 d e f i n e d ass Ulc, » a power 
(guwwah) i n the soul prepared t o receive the q u i d d i t i e s 
of t h i n g s abstracted from t h e i r m a t t e r ( 2 . ) The 
h a b i t u a l i n t e l l e c t ( a l - ' a q l bigl°malakah), defined ass 
" o o o a p e r f e c t i o n t h a t occurs t o the previous power 
(the m a t e r i a l i n t e l l e c t ) b r i n g i n g i t t o the p o i n t 
where i t has n e a r l y become i n t e l l e c t i n act."' (3) 
The i n t e l l e c t i n act (al-'aql b i ^ l - f i ' l ) d e f i n e d aa: 
" „ o o a p e r f e c t i o n which occurs t o the s o u l , making 
i t able t o t h i n k adequately, and producing i n 
a c t u a l i t y the forms o f knowledge w i t h i n i t , when-
3 
ever i t wishes o " So f a r , none of the previous 
types of i n t e l l e c t has been defined as a substance,-
L 
nor, as i t seems, would i t be j u s t i f i a b l e t o do so, 
Moreover, as i t appears, the term ' substance,' 
cannot be usedi o f the 'acquired i n t e l l e c t ' (al° eaqil 
1 o Avicenna, T i s * r a s a g i l f i al~hikmah wa a l ~ t a b i 6 i.vyat 
(Constantinople 1 2 9 8 ) p o 5 5 ° 
2» I b i d o , p o 5 5 « 
3 ° Ibido 9 P 0 5 5 " , t' 9 -
ko I t i s not only i n these d e f i n i t i o n s t h a t Avicenna 
d e c l i n e s t o r e f e r t o these types of i n t e l l e c t as 
substances, but also i n h i s other- p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
works, e o g»' De Ahima, 1 , 2 "and al--Na j a h , I I , ' 6 , 
al-mustafad) nor of the 'holy i n t e l l e c t ' ( a l - ' a q l a l -
qudusi) o Avicenna defines, the former as follows? 
"The acquired i n t e l l e c t i s an abstract q u i d d i t y deep-
r o o t e d i n the s o u l , since i t has been imbibed from 
o u t s i d e o " I n f a c t , even though he has r e f e r r e d t o 
t h i s i n t e l l e c t as an abstract q u i d d i t y (mahiyyah 
mu.jar-ra.dahy, he has admitted t h a t t h i s q u i d d i t y 
should be p a r t o f , i . e . a higher f a c u l t y i n , t h e 
human sou l . Therefore, we may conclude t h a t Avicenna 
does: not consider t h i s type of i n t e l l e c t as a 
substance. 
The 'holy i n t e l l e c t ' , which remains undefined 
i n Avicenna's l e t t e r ffl'l-hudGd may/not be charac-* 
t e r i z e d as a substance, as i t appears from h i s De 
Anima. Avieenna considers t h i s type of i n t e l l e c t 
r a t h e r as a higher r a t i o n a l c a p a c i t y , i n the sense 
of a f a c u l t y or power t h a t belongs t o the human s o u l , 
which he also c a l l s , ' i n t u i t i o n ' (al-had^s.). He says.s 
1 . Avicenna, Tie* r a s S y i l f a al-hikmah wa a l - t a b l " i y y a t 
(Constantinople, 1 2 9 8 ) p . 5 5 ° 
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"The holy in t e l l e c t s , or the i n t u i t i v e power, i s so 
strong i n certain people that they do not need great 
e f f o r t , or i n s t r u c t i o n and ac t u a l i s a t i o n , i n order 
to make contact w i t h the 'active intellect'.," 
I t appears that the term 'substance', according 
to Avicenna, i s applicable only to the i n t e l l e c t s 
which are known as the 'active' and 'pure' 
i n t e l l e c t s (al'uqtll al-mahdah) o The follow i n g 
passage, seems t o provide us with the grounds on 
which 'the active i n t e l l e c t ' may be i d e n t i f i e d as 
a substance? "The active i n t e l l e c t , as i t i s 
supposed to be an i n t e l l e c t , that i s t o say, i n 
the sense of a pure i n t e l l e c t , i s a formal subs-
tance whose essence i n i t s e l f i s an abstract 
quiddity (mahiyyah mu.jarradah) which has no material 
involvement.. I t i s the basic o r i g i n of the essence 
of every existing beingo As for i t s being an 
'active i n t e l l e c t ' , i t i s a substance, whose 
1 <» Avicenna, De Anima V , 6 , p p 0 2 U U , U 5 ° And P, Rahman, 
Avicenna's Psychology (Oxford 1 9 5 2 ) p ° 3 5 ° 
2 o Gilson says; "The active i n t e l l e c t , which i s a 
separable substance, f o r the Arabs i s d i s t i n g u i -
shable from God and. the human-intellect-<>-" 
Eto Gilson, "Les sources G^reco-Arabes de 
1'-August inisme iLvicennisaht", Archive d'h i s t o i r e 
doctrinale et l i t t e r a i r e du n^enjkge, (Paris 1 9 2 9 ) , 
IV, p < , 1 9 ° 
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character i s to actualize, "by the act of i l l u m i n a t i n g 
A 
the material intellect«,fi 
The 'active i n t e l l e c t ' seems to have "been given 
the name 'substance' f o r the following reasons. 
F i r s t l y , i t i s a transcendental e n t i t y having no; 
connection with the material bodieso Secondly, such 
an e n t i t y i s self-subsistingo T h i r d l y 9 i t i s assumed 
to "be the direct source of the essences; (souls.)\of 
human "beings o Fourthly, i t has-the power of a c t u a l i -
sihg the material intellect» Neither the material, 
nor the habitual, nor the acquired? nor the holy 
i n t e l l e c t s , , which may "be grouped together as human 
i n t e l l e c t a, are claimed to conform t o these c r i t e r i a . , 
I t i s on t h i s "basis that the 'active i n t e l l e c t ' may 
(while these i n t e l l e c t s may not ) he regarded as. GL 
substanceo 
We may now pass, on to the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the 
pure i n t e l l e c t s : (al-*ugQl al-mahdah). Here, the 
foll o w i n g quotation seems t o be relevant. I n 
Avicenna, Tis' r a s a g i l f l al-hikmah wa al-^abx'iyyat 
(G on s t ant i n o ^ • 
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al~lsharat Avicenna sayss " I t has been understood 
that the necessary "being (wa.jib al-v/u.jGd) is, neither 
allowed t o "be the immediate o r i g i n of two i n t e l l e c t s , 
together without one of these i n t e l l e c t s being used, 
as intermediary s nor can he "be the direct o r i g i n of 
"bodies o Therefore the ' f f i r s t caused' (al-ma'151 
al-awwal) s which i s one of these i n t e l l e c t u a l 
substances 9 must be an i n d i v i d u a l e n t i t y which!;'-'has. 
been emanated d i r e c t l y from him (God) .> Meanwhile; 
the other i n t e l l e c t u a l substances must be issued 
by the intermediacy of that i n d i v i d u a l entity. 
just as i t i s the case that the heavenly beings 
(that i s to say the souls of the heavenly bodies) 
must be emanated by the intermediary of these 
Q 
i n t e l l e c t s ; (that i s to say the pure intellects)»" 
B r i e f l y , on the basis of the previous passage, 
one may arr i v e at an i n t e g r a l account of Avicenna's; 
1 o For a fu r t h e r account of the ' f i r s t caused' ( a l -
ma.'lul. al-°awwal) see Henry Gorbin, Avi.cenna and 
the visionary Recital<> English t r a n s l a t i o n 
(London 1 9 6 > 0 ) , p 0 5 7 ° 
2 o Avicenna» al-Isharat wa al-tamblhat g ed 0 Sulaiman Dunya (Cairo 1949) H I / p.. 190. And Nasir al^Din 
al-T,usi and Fakhr al-DIn al-Razi, t h e i r commen-
t o r i e s on al-Isharat (Cairo 1 3 2 5 ) I I , p° hh» 
Attd: A p M o G-oichon? Lexique de l a Lahgae Philoso-
phi que d' Ibn Sina (Avicenna),, (Paris 193oT7'p<> 23h-> 
- 1 ^ 0 -
view, which recognises a m u l t i p l i c i t y of transcen-
dental i n t e l l e c t s , which are called substances<» 
Although there i s some categorisation of the trans-
cendental i n t e l l e c t s . , p u t t i n g the ' f i r s t caused' as. 
an intermediary "between the 'Necessary Being' , and 
the other transcendental i n t e l l e c t s , Avicenna does 
not go so f a r as to r e s t r i c t the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of 
the concept of substance to one specific instance, 
or even t o a specific group, of these i n t e l l e c t s . 
Therefore, i t seems that the term 'substance', 
without any exception, has been ascribed to each 
of the transcendental i n t e l l e c t s , regardless: of 
t h e i r h i e r a r c h i c a l standing, i n accordance with 
the theory of emanation.. 
Moreover, elsewhere i n al-Isharat» Avicenna 
sayss "The F i r s t (al-awwal) who i s r e a l l y the 
Innovator (al-mubdi'), innovates (creates without 
any intermediary) an i n t e l l e c t u a l substance« Then 
1 . I n the Commentaries of al-Isharat (Cairo 1 3 2 5 ) ?Hj 
P P ° 5 0 j , 5 1 ? al-Razi says., "Innovation (al-"ibda*) 
means to bring i n t o being the thi n g without the 
intermediary of a t o o l , or matter, or time, or any 
other object o" Also Avicenna i n one of his works 
which i s al-Risalah al-nairilzlyyah distinguishes 
between (1 ) (al° yIbda*77(27Xal-Khalq), ( 3 7 £ 1 -
takwln), as follows? al- 9Ibda" concerns the 
i n t e l l e c t s , al-Khalq concerns the physical objects, 
al-takwin concerns things which are i n the state 
of coming t o be and passing away> Avicenna, Tis* 
r a s S ^ i l fx al-hikmah wa al- ^ a b i ' i y y a t (Constantinople 
- 1 4 1 -
"by the mediation of t h i s innovated i n t e l l e c t u a l subs-
tance , the F i r s t (the Necessary Being) creates; 
another i n t e l l e c t u a l substance, and c e l e s t i a l body 
(.jirm samawi)o I n t h i s manner the creation goes on, 
u n t i l i t reaches the point where a l l the c e l e s t i a l 
bodies have been issued, at that stage there w i l l 
be aii i n t e l l e c t u a l substance (the active i n t e l l e c t ) , 
•j 
but from t h i s no c e l e s t i a l body can be issuedo" 
Here, we may understand Avicenna to be consi-
dering the innovation of the transcendental 
i n t e l l e c t s from the standpoint of immediate creationo 
F i r s t of a l l 'God' or 'the Necessary Being' (wa.jib 
al°wu,igd) innovates an i n t e l l e c t u a l substance 
(.jawhar ' a q l i ) „ which Avicenna sometimes, calls, 
'the f i r s t cause' (al-ma'lffl al-awwal) or the 
'primordial originated' (al-mubda' al-awwal), and 
sometimes 'the f i r s t i n t e l l e c t ' ( a l - ' a q l al-awwal)„ 
1. Avicenna, al-Isharat wa al-taTiblhat, ed. So Dunya 
(Cairo 1 9 4 9 ) , p» 1 9 2 = — — 
2 o Henry Corbin, Avicenha and the Visionary Recital. 
(English t r a n s l a t i o n ) (London 1 9 6 0 ) , p D 5 7 ° 
3 ° Eogo Avicenna sayss "Since the f i r s t t h i n g t o 
emanate from God was not a body, i t follows that 
i t was an abstract substance, namely, the F i r s t 
I n t e l l i g e n c e o " Arberry, Avicenna on Theology, 
(London 1 9 5 1 ) » P° 3 6 ° 
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Secondly, "by the intermediacy of the . ' f i r s t i n t e l l e c t ' 
(al-ma"lul al-awwal), the'Necessary Being' innovates 
another i n t e l l e c t u a l substance and a spherical "body 
( j i r n r samawx) ° Thirdly, i n the same manner 'the 
Necessary Being' innovates another i n t e l l e c t u a l 
substance and a spherical body 0 Lastly comes the 
innovation of the active i n t e l l e c t , which i s the 
immediate o r i g i n of the human souls, and "piiy-siea-l 
bodies' (.al-alsam al-madiyyah)» 
Therefore, i n the l i g h t of the previous passage, 
i t may be assumed that Avicenna has included the 
transcendental i n t e l l e c t s under the concept of 
substance, p a r t l y on account of t h e i r being separable 
e n t i t i e s (mahiyyat mu.jarradah) having no r e l a t i o n 
whatsoever to material bodies; and p a r t l y because- of 
the creative, and active task that each of these 
i n t e l l e c t s takes i n the process of emanation 0 Neither 
of these c r i t e r i a i s s a t i s f i e d by the human i n t e l l e c t s : , 
i 0 e o those i n t e l l e c t s which are considered as passive 
powers i n the human spul 0 I t i s precisely t h i s 
1 o Naslr al-DIn al-Ttis 1 , and Fakhr al-Dxn al-Razx,'. 
t h e i r commentaries, on al-Isharat (Cairo 1 3 2 5 ) ?' II» 
p p o 5 0 , 5 1 o 
~ I m -
passivity that precludes the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the 
term 'substance' t o the human int e l l e c t s , , 
I t i s possibles, therefore, i n t h i s case, t o 
assume that Avicenna i s presenting us with a t r a d i -
t i o n a l Neo-Platonic view. I t i s true that i n some 
of h i s works Proclus j destinguish.es> between primary 
i n t e l l e c t s ( a l - ' u q i l l a l - a w a y i l ) i n the sens;e of 
transcendental i n t e l l e c t s ( a l ' u q i l l al-mnfariqah), 
which he terms; 'substances', and secondary 
i n t e l l e c t s (al'uqHl al-thawani), i n the sense of 
human i n t e l l e c t s ^ ; Avicenna, however, does not 
re f e r t o God as a substance, whereas such a,des-
c r i p t i o n i s used by ; Proclus., as w i l l b e shown i n 
the next chaptero 
1 o A f l u t i n -'ind a l - * arab, ed„ by- A» Badawi (Cairo 
1 9 5 5 ) j , pp 0 1 3 4 - 1 5 5 and 1 5 8 - l 6 4 c 1 . Badawi has that the Theology of A r i s t o t l e , wrongly 
ascribed to A r i s t o t l e , was the work of Plotihuso 
2 o Al-AflatHniyyah al-muhdathah 'ind a l - * arab, edo 
Ao Badawi (Cairo, 1 9 5 5 ) , PP= 7 (al-'idah f i al= 
khair al-mahd)c And Proclus, The Elements of 
Theology, ed. by E„ E, Dodds (Oxford 1 9 6 3 ) » 
P° 1 5 7 o 
saaewn 1 ewn 
3 ° I b i d o , p 0 7 ° 
The meanings of the terms 'innovation' (al-^ibda') 
and ' c e l e s t i a l body' (al-.jirm) 9 which appeared i n the 
passages quoted above, are somewhat d i f f e r e n t f o r 
a l - K i n d i o With respect to the term a l i i b d a " , al-Kindx 
sayss "Innovation (al-Tbda*) i s to b r i n g i n t o existence 
the thing which does not exist beforeo"' Also he says J 
p 
"al-'ibda* i s the creation of the t h i n g from nothing-" 
Moreover, he says: "We explain what action ( f i ' l ) i s 
and i n which senses i t i s used. The f i r s t kind of 
action i n the proper sense i s making existent existences 
from the non-existent does not belong to any body 
except Him0 To t h i s kind of action belongs properly " 
the name 'innovation' ( a l ' i b d a * ) , 
Therefore, the name 'innovation' ( a l 9 i b d a ' ) f o r 
a l - K i n d l , i s not to be used i n connection with the 
transcendental i n t e l l e c t s , as i t i s f o r Avicennao^ 
For a l - K i n d l , the term 'innovation' (al-'ibda*) i s 
applicable t o a l l created beings which exist i n the 
1 „ Ras a y i l al-Kindl al°falsafi.v.vah, ed 0 Abu RIdah, 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p„ l 6 5 o 
2 . S o Mo Stern, "Notes on al-Kindl's t r e a t i s e on d e f i n i -
t i o n " , The Journal of the Royal A s i a t i c Society 
(London, 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 0 ) , p 0 3 3 : o — 
3 ° A o Altman and S» M o Stern, Isaac I s r a e l i (Oxford 
1 9 5 8 ) p 0 6 8 o 
ho For Avicenna's usage here see below page 1 ^ 0 , n o t . 
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universes whether 'God' i s t h e i r direct cause or not 0 
Moreover t h i s terra i s applicable to the universe as 
something not eternal, as i t i s innovated, i 0 e 0 
brought i n t o being by 'God'. For Avicenna, on the 
other hand, the reference of t h i s term i s r e s t r i c t e d 
t o the transcendental i n t e l l e c t s , as explained 
previouslyo However, al-Kindx does not use the term 
i n the Neo-Platonic sense_which i s i m p l i c i t cinv 
Avicenna's usageo 
The philosophical usage of the term jf i r m , as i t 
seems from those passages from Avicenna quoted 
e a r l i e r , i s that i t applies to ' c e l e s t i a l bodies' 
(al-aj.ram al-samawiyyah)'But no usage such as t h i s 
i s adopted by al-Kindx, who i s ready t o employ the 
term f o r both material bodies (as we may gather from 
his d e f i h i t i o n of 'material substance') and c e l e s t i a l 
bodies. For instance, he sayss "Also the planet i s a 
jji r t o , and every j i r m i s either l i v i n g or not l i v i h g . " ' 
But i n general al-Kindl;prefers t o refer t o the, 
1 . R a s a y i l al-Kxndx .al-falsafiyyah, ed. by Abu RIda|i-
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) s I I , p : o 6 3 o 
2 o I b i d . , I , P P o l S S i , 2 0 4 - 2 0 5 o 
= 146 « 
c e l e s t i a l "bodies by the term 'higher individuals,' 
1 
(al-ashkhas al°'aliyyah)» 
However, i n most respects al-Kindi and Avicenna 
are i n agreement about the nature of the heavenly 
bodies^ Both regard them as l i v i n g beings, without 
the lower f a c u l t i e s of soul such as the n u t r i t i v e 
(al-ghadiyyah), perceptive (al-hassah), emotional 
(al-ghadabiyyah), and appetitive (al-shahwaniyyah) 
powers, but possessing only the r a t i o n a l power ( a l -
quwwat al-'aqilah)„ Both consider them not to 
reproduce, but to be created once and destroyed 
once. They also agree that the c e l e s t i a l bodies 
are the cause of the existence of the in d i v i d u a l 
earthly creatures to which creation and destruction 
appertain <>^  
Let us now examine the proof of the substantia-
l i t y of the i n t e l l e c t o The extant works of al-rKindi 
1 o Rasa pil al-Kindi al-falsafiyyah,edo, by Abu RTdah 
(Cairo. 1 9 )« I * pp» 2 2 5 - 2 2 7 o 
2 . For al-Kindi's view of the nature of the c e l e s t i a l 
bodies, see Ibido, I , pp D 2 4 8 = 2 5 6 , and I I , pp« 6 1 , 
6 2 , 6 3 ° And f o r Avicenna's view see Avicenna, 
Risalah fx al~sa'adah, (Haidarabad 1 3 5 3 ) PP° 1 3 ° 
14, 1 5 o 
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suggest no argument dealing exclusively 1 and d i r e c t l y 
w i t h t h i s mattero Even though al-Kindx has defined 
the universal i n t e l l e c t as a substance, he omits t o 
advance any proof of the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the trans-
cendental i n t e l l e c t . Perhaps, f o r him, the l a t t e r 
was self-evident <> 
In examining Avicenna's view of t h i s issue one 
discovers that even though he has considered the 
matter of the proof of the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the 
transcendental i n t e l l e c t s , h is proof does not include 
a v a r i e t y of arguments as was the case both with the 
proof of the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the soul and with the 
proof of the existence of the transcendental 
1 
i n t e l l e c t s o The following i s a b r i e f summary of .. 
Avicenna's argument„- "There i s a self-evident 
knowledge which exists i n the mind without being 
learnedo I n looking f o r the o r i g i n of t h i s knowledge, 
i t seems there are two po s s i b i l i t i e s . . Either sense-
experience i s i t s o r i g i n or i t has been produced i n 
the mind through the divine emanation.. Let us now 
1 . For the proof of the existence of the transcendental 
i n t e l l e c t s see AVicenna, al-Najah (Cairo 1 9 3 8 / 1 3 5 7 ) ? 
pp 0 278=280o 
take i n t o consideration the f i r s t p o s s i b i l i t y , .which 
i s the occurrence of t h i s knowledge through sense-
experience o As i t i s known that sense-experience 
does not give self-evident knowledge, e 0g 0 that the 
whole i s greater than i t s p a r t , or that two things 
which are equal to a t h i r d one, are equal t o each 
other, consequently t h i s knowledge must be a t t r i b u t e d 
t o some cause d i f f e r e n t i n nature from sense-
experience o 
I t remains then, that t h i s self-evident knowledge 
has been imprinted on the mind through the divine 
emanation,. That i s to say, when the divine emanation 
ahd the r a t i o n a l soul are united, the former w i l l 
produce (imprint) necessary knowledge i n the l a t t e r . 
Now, i f the divine emanation does not presuppose i n 
i t s essence such a self-evident knowledge, i»e = • the 
forms of r a t i o n a l i t y , i t w i l l not be able t o produce 
them, or to p r i n t them on the r a t i o n a l soul. As i t 
i s known (at least, i n terms of the previous arguments 
of the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the human soul) that every 
e n t i t y possessing essentially the forms of r a t i o n a l 
- 1 4 9 
knowledge i s a substance, and not i n the corporeal 
sense, thus, as a re s u l t the 'divine emanation' 
( a l - f a i d a l - ' i l a h l ) with which the r a t i o n a l soul 
comes in t o contact during the process of emanation, 
i s an i n t e l l e c t u a l substance» This i n t e l l e c t u a l 
substance i s neither a body, nor i n a body, and i t s 
r e l a t i o n t o the human soul i s similar t o the r e l a -
1 
t l o n of l i g h t to s i g h t o " 
Although the previous proof was directed 
towards establishing the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the 
active i n t e l l e c t , i t could (at least analogically) 
be used to establish the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the 
other transcendental intellects<» For the 'active 
i n t e l l e c t ' i s regarded, by d e f i n i t i o n , as the last 
phase of the emanation of the intellects<> . .'fche 
A. ' 
characterisation as substances of these transcen-
dental i n t e l l e c t s comes the implication that other 
i n t e l l e c t s may be so characterised, i n as much as 
they share the same nature» 
1 o Avicenna, Hadiyat a l - r a ' i s ° ° <> mabhath 'an 
al-quwa al-nafsaiiiyyah, aw kitab f i al-nafs 
'ala.sunnat a l - i k h t i s a r , ed. E» van Duck (Cairo 
1325T P P c 7 4 , 7 5 o 
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We may now commence a more detailed examination 
of the extent to which al-Kin'dl'; $nd" Avicenn^agre-e on 
the issue of the human and transcendental i n t e l l e c t s 0 
I n t h i s connection, i t may he h e l p f u l t o outline, t h e i r 
differences i n a tabular form; 
Al-Kinda 
Al-Kindi does not: have any-
primary or transcendental 
i n t e l l e c t above the univer-
sal i n t e l l e c t ( i n the sense, 
of substance) 
l o The f i r s t i n t e l l e c t or 
the universal i n t e l l e c t s, or 
the i n t e l l e c t which i s 
always i n a c t u a l i t y , defined 
as a substanceo 
The human i n t e l l e c t a 
Secondary i n t e l l e c t s ; 
2 o The i n t e l l e c t which is. 
i n p o t e n t i a l i t y 
3 o The i n t e l l e c t which has 
passed i n the soul from 
p o t e n t i a l i t y i n t o 
a c t u a l i t y o 
ho The i n t e l l e c t called 
apparent« 
5 o 
Avicenna 
Avicenna has three primary 
i n t e l l e c t s , or transcen-
dental i n t e l l e c t s , above 
the active i n t e l l e c t ( i n 
the sense of substance) 
l o This i n t e l l e c t i s 
known as the active 
i n t e l l e c t o / :.. \,. 
The. human i n t e l l e c t s 
Secondary i n t e l l e c t s 
2 o The material or the poten-
t i a l i n t e l l e c t o 
3 o The habitual, intellect« 
ho The acquired intellect» 
5 o The holy intellect» 
I t appears that al-Kindl and Avicenna with regard 
to the transcendental i n t e l l e c t s agree on one point only 0 
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They agree i n not allowing the ' f i r s t i n t e l l e c t ' ( f o r 
al-Kindl) or the 'active i n t e l l e c t ' ( f o r Avicenna) t o 
he understood as God« Such a view had "been held by 
i 
Alexander of Aphrodisias.. 
There are fundamental disagreements s however*. 
They d i f f e r , f i r s t l y , on the number of the transcen-
dental i n t e l l e c t s o Al-Kindi assumes that there i s 
only one primary universal i n t e l l e c t ( i n the sence of 
substance), whereas Avicenna believes f i r m l y i n a 
m u l t i p l i c i t y of transcendental intellects... 
Secondly, although al-Kindl does not seem to put 
forward.a clear i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of how "the i n t e l l e c t 
which i s always i n a c t u a l i t y " , i s able to produce 
knowledge from p o t e n t i a l i t y to a c t u a l i t y , he does 
not assume that there is'some power which emanates 
from "the f i r s t i n t e l l e c t " and-proceeds t o the" object 
of imagination which are p o t e n t i a l i n t e l l i g i b l e s , and 
makes them actual intelligibles» Such a view, which 
i s adopted by Avicenna, i s neither mentioned by 
al-Kindl i n any of his works that deal with the 
1 o According t o Ross*"Alexander i d e n t i f i e s the active 
reason with God", David Ross, Aristotle^(London 1 9 6 8 ) , 
p« 1 5 2 o See Et'o .Gilson, "Les-sources. ^ reco-Arahes de 
1'Augustinisme ^.vicennisant", Archives d'histpire 
doctrinale et l i t t e r a i r e du moyen age ( P a r i s ' 1 9 2 9 ) 
iV, p 0 1 9 o ' 
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i n t e l l e c t , nor did he introduce i t i n t o Islamic 
philosophy <> We may note i n passing that the view 
i n question probably found i t s way i n t o Islamic 
philosophy through the works of al-Farabi p such as 
his book al-Madlr^at a l - f a d i l a h , and his l e t t e r F I 
p 
ma'ani al-aqJLo before i t became an Avicennian view.. 
There appears to be l i t t l e difference between 
al-Kindx's and Avicenna's concept of p o t e n t i a l 
intellects, except that al-Kindx does not describe 
t h i s i n t e l l e c t as 'material'o But we may draw a 
contrast between al-Kindx's t h i r d i n t e l l e c t and 
Avicenna's 'habitual i n t e l l e c t ' , which shows that 
al-Kindx considers t h i s type of i n t e l l e c t as a 
valuable property that the r a t i o n a l soul possesses, 
3 
and which he c a l l s qunyffat» This property is. 
i 
merely a mental power or a r a t i o n a l f a c u l t y , which 
the soul can employ at w i l l o Al-Kindx does not 
allow t h i s t h i r d kind of i n t e l l e c t t o be referred, 
to as an 'habitual i n t e l l e c t ' ; here he i s either 
1 0 Al-FarabI, Srg yahl al-madx^at a l - f a d i l a h (? 1 9 0 7 ) 
pp 0 6 2 , 660 
2 . Al-Farabx, al-Jam' bain ra^yai al-hakxmain (Cairo 
1 9 0 7 ) , P o 5 . 
3 . Rasa^il aljCindx a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abil Rxdah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 J , I , p p < > 3 5 7 ~ 3 " 5 8 o 
presenting his own view on the matter, or conveying 
h i s understanding of A r i s t o t l e ' s position,, A r i s t o t l e 
himself, however, does not use the term 'habitual 
i n t e l l e c t ' „ 
The f o u r t h of al-Kindi's kinds of i n t e l l e c t , 
'the i n t e l l e c t that i s called apparent' ( a l - ' a q l 
al°zahir) B which i s l a s t on the table above, is., 
2 
despite i t s name, very similar t o the acquired 
i n t e l l e c t ( a l - ' a q l al-mustafad) i n Avioeniia,, Of 
Avicenna's holy i n t e l l e c t ( a l - ' a q l al-qudus) ^ 
however, we may discover no analogue either i n 
al~Kindi*s l i s t of i n t e l l e c t s , or elsewhere i n his 
extant works„ Furthermore, t h i s concept does not 
appear to be A r i s t o t e l i a n i n origin,, 
I t i s important t o notice that both philoso-
phers agree i n not regarding the secondary i n t e l l e c t 
(the human i n t e l l e c t s ) as substances, nor do they 
1„ The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed„ b y Richard McKebn 
(New York 1 9 U 1 ) » De Anima, I I I . 
2 o Rasa'il al-Kindi al°falsafiyyah, e d o b y Abu RTdah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) , I , . p . 2 5 8 . 
3 o Avicenna, De Anima„ p„ 5 0 ° 
ko I b i d o , pp 0 2 ^ 5 = U 6 o And P. Rahman, Avicenna's 
Psychology, (Oxford 1 9 5 2 ) pp° 3 5 = 3 6 ° 
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grant any of these i n t e l l e c t s a substantial existence 
as sucho I t may "be that t h e i r view of the secondary 
i n t e l l e c t s as psychological e n t i t i e s having no subs-
t a n t i a l existence i s i n l i n e with t h e i r more general 
doctrine of substance.. 
There appears to he a certain s i m i l a r i t y "between 
Avicenna's and Alexander of Aphrodisias' concept of 
i n t e l l e c t , especially with regard t o the terminology 
which they usee Nevertheless, as i t seems, i t i s f 
very hard to f i n d any co r r e l a t i o n "between Alexander's 
view and that of al-Kindlo F i r s t l y , Alexander, as: 
many commentators note, referred to only three kinds 
of i n t e l l e c t o They are, the material i n t e l l e c t , the 
habitual i n t e l l e c t , and the active i n t e l l e c t j whereas: 
al-Kinda's l i s t of i n t e l l e c t s comprises four kindSo 
Secondly, al=Kindi does not appear to apply to the 
1 
i n t e l l e c t any of the terms used by Alexander 
We may conclude that al-Kindl was not influenced 
by Alexander's account of the i n t e l l e c t ; on the other 
1 o A r i s t o t l e ' s "De Anima", ed. Badawi (Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) 
P o 3 5 8 c 
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hand, i t seems possible that Avicenna was, although 
such a conclusion would have t o he supported "by 
furt h e r evidence*, However, we do not intend t o 
argue such a conclusion here, as i t seems to he of 
purely h i s t o r i c a l significance° 
1 o For f u r t h e r discussion of the h i s t o r i c a l 
importance of t h i s question see rBt-v.-. Gilson, 
"Les sources g-rteco-Arahes de 1'Augustinisme 
dvicennisant", Archives d'histoire doctrinale 
et l i t t e r a i r e du mo^en lUge (Paris 1 9 2 9 ) . IV a 
PP° 5 - ' 7 5 ° u 
CHAPTER 6 
Can the term 'Substance8 
"be applied t o God? 
The purpose of t h i s chapter i s twofold; f i r s t , a 
short h i s t o r i c a l sketch w i l l show how the problem of 
the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of God was treated, before alKKindx 
and Avicennao Then follows a section dealing with 
t h e i r controversial arguments on t h i s subject, i n 
which we s h a l l attempt to explain why al-Kindi and 
Avieenna did not consider God as a substanceo 
I t i s not clear whether or not Plato considered 
the question of the use of the term 'substance' as. a 
description of Godo I f one may regard his; "Idea of 
the good" i n Republic as a d i v i n i t y , then Plato i s 
quite e x p l i c i t that i t i s above a l l substance, being 
rather, the cause of substance» But, f i r s t l y , i t i s 
never made p l a i n whether the "Idea of the Good" may be 
i d e n t i f i e d w i th the creator=God of Timaeus though 
2 
there are cer t a i n indications that i t should be; and, 
secondly, i t i s uncertain whether the term used i n 
1 . Plato, Republic 5 0 9 B. 
2 o e.go Republic 5 0 7 C;» Timaeus 2 9 E» 
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Republic ( 5 0 9 B) may "best "be translated as 'substance', 
since other senses are also possible« 
While, i n Timaeus, the creator-God i s not to be 
i d e n t i f i e d w i th either of the two substances mentioned 
3 5 A\, there i s never any e x p l i c i t denial of the subs-
t a n t i a l i t y of Godo Even i n Laws; X which i s devoted to 
2 
theology and the existence of God, Plato neither says; 
that God i s an eternal substance, nor gives any reason 
why he may not be so consideredo 
I t seems that A r i s t o t l e was the f i r s t ancient 
philosopher t o a r r i v e at the concept of one God i n the 
sense of an eternal substance»^ For him, God as an 
eternal and unmovable substance must be one i n number 
and i n definition.. I t i s probable that the main 
purpose of Metaphysics X I I r i s t o prove t h a t , besides 
the primary and the secondary substances there is. 
another one, which i s eternalo I n t h i s respect 
1 , Here too we need not employ the term 'substance's 
see Francis M o Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (New, 
York . 1 9 5 7 ) p p ° 3 3 to 5 8 o But contrast al-Farabi, 
Jawgmi' kit a b T^i^aus f 1 a l ' i l m a l - t a b i ' 1 , eds. 
Paulus Kraus and 'KTcnardus Walzer (London 1 9 5 1 ) P » 4 » 
2 o Ao E. Taylor, Plato the Man and His Work. (New York 
1 9 6 0 ) p p . 4 9 0 - 9 5 -
3 ° The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e 9 ed 0 Richard McKeon (New York 19kl) pp» 8 7 2 = 8 8 8 , See Averroes, TafsSr 
ma ba'd a l - t a b l ' (Beirut, 1 9 4 9 ) , I I I , p 0 l 6 8 8 . 
A r i s t o t l e says; "Since there were three kinds of subs-
tance s two of them physical and one unmovable, regarding 
the l a t t e r we must assert that i t i s necessary that 
1 
there should "be an eternal and unmovable substance»" 
For A r i s t o t l e not only the objects to which motion 
is. imparted., nor only the "moved movers" but also the 
"prime mover" should be calied "substance"« He sayss 
"And since that which i s moved and moves, i s i n t e r -
mediate, there i s something which moves without being 
2 
moved, being eternal substance and a c t u a l i t y = " 
Therefore, i t follows that God, i n A r i s t o t l e ' s 
view, can be defined i n the same way as any other 
object„ Moreover, any d e f i n i t i o n given of God must 
take into consideration that God i s a substance which 
i s eternal and immovable, and separable from sensible 
3 
substances 0 From t h i s i t follows, too, that this, 
substance cannot have any magnitude, but i s without 
1 „ I b i d . , p o 8 7 7 ° See Aristu" ' inda al- 8arab, e d o 
Badawi (Cairo 1 9 4 7 ) P o 3 ° 
2 o The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , edo Richard McKeon 
(New York 1 9 4 1 ) Metaphysics.XII,7 , p . 8 7 9 . 
3 o I b i d o , p o 8 7 9 o 
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parts and indivisible<> However, i t should be noticed 
that A r i s t o t l e believed i n the e t e r n i t y , and the non-
m u l t i p l i c i t y , of the world and the eternal substanceo 
I n commentesries on A r i s t o t l e ' s Metaphysics X I I , 
2 
and a r t i c l e s published i n Aris^u 'inda al~*arab, 
Alexander of Aphrodisias does not seem to raise any 
objection t o A r i s t o t e l i a n doctrine with regard t o the 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the term 'substance' t o Godo For 
instance, he sayss "That unmovable substance i s God's 
3 
i n t e l l i g e n c e which i s eternal;" and? "We intend i n 
t h i s polemic t o t a l k about the substance which i s 
unmovable, and t o explain what our predecessors 
imagine i t t o beo"^r I n t h i s respect, Alexander, 
unlike al-Kindi and Avicenna, would appear t o see no 
reason why God cannot be called "substance"» 
Plotinus' concept of God, i s complicated, f o r us., 
by problems 6f terminology and translation,. For 
1. Averroes, T a f s i r ma ba'da al-tabi'ah, (Beirut 1914-8), 
I I I , p p o l 3 9 2 ^ 1 6 2 5 T 
2o Ar i s t a 'inda al-'arab, ed, Badawi (Cairo 1 9 4 7 ) I s P ° 7 ° 
3 ° Ibido o p „ 2 7 Z o 
i+o Ibido, p o 3 3 2 » 
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Plotinus, i n so f a r as he follows Plato and i d e n t i f i e s , 
1 
the Platonic Good with his one God, holds that God is, 
2 
hyperousios<, that i s t o say above a l l substance i n 
the A r i s t o t e l i a n sense, that i s , ousia» 
However, Plotinus used another term f o r God which 
has been translated i n t o Arabic by the term 'substance' 
(.iawhar) ° This term i s hypostasis, which may be 
translated i n t o the Lati n term substantia, that i s , 
something that stands beneath the surface. Just as* 
the L a t i n substantia has been used to translate both 
A r i s t o t l e ' s ousia and Plotinus' hypostasis, so the 
Arabic word (al-° .iawhar) i s used i n both cases;,. 
Consequently Muslim philosophers believed that 
Plotinus considered God to be a substance 0 For 
instance, one t r a n s l a t i o n sayss "one should not be 
amazed at the creative a b i l i t y of the supreme 
3 
substance,," Plotinus;' "God" i s translated as 
1 . Plotinus, Enneada, V , 6 , l i n e 3 5 ? . p V H ? i n the 
e d i t i o n of E o Brehier (Paris 1 9 5 6 - 6 l j . ) „ 
2 o Ibid„ 0 l i n e s 3 0 - 3 1 o Also V , 5 p 6 , l i n e s 5-10, p< > 9 7 (Brehier). 
3 » A f l u t l n 'inda al-'arab, ed„ Badawi (Cairo 1 9 5 5 ) ? 
p o l 6 1 0 = ~ ~ 
"complete supreme substance" (al-jawhar al-tamm a l - f a d i l 
a l - s h a r i f ) , a substance which i s of transcendent o r i g i n 
and the f i r st cause of a l l things -
I t would appear that Proclus also regarded God as 
substantial? "The substance of every God i s a supra-
2 
e x i s t e n t i a l excellence;." % " A l l that i s divine has:a 
substance which i s goodness.»„>" 4"Every God embraces 
i n his substance" the function of exercising providence 
towards the universeb„„,"^» What i s , perhaps, more 
important f o r our purposes" i s that his Arabic trans-
5 
lat&rs rendered his text thus° I t i s these t r a n s l a -
tions with which we may suppose al-Kindl and Avicenna 
t o have been familiaro 
. I n r e l a t i o n to the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of God "we may 
mention the b e l i e f of certain followers of the Eastern 
6 . . . Churcho Although i t i s outside the scope of our present 
1 . Ibido o p 0 l 6 2 , and p p 0 1 7 2 , 1 7 5 = 
2 o Proclus, The Elements of Theology, ed« E. R» Dodds 
(Oxford 1963) prop. 1 1 9 . , P o I 0 5 o 
3 « Ibido 9 p r o p . 1 2 1 , p o 1 0 5 o 
'ho Ibido B propo 1 2 0 , p o 1 0 5 » 
5 o A l - i f l a ^ u h i y y a h al-muhdatha ' ind a l - ' arab, ed« Badawi 
(Cairo 1 9 5 5 ) PP° 2 5 - 3 3V and p p D 2 4 8 - 2 5 6 = 
6 o Ibn Hazm, a l - f i s a l f I a l - m i l a l wa. al-?ahwa wa a l - n i h a l 
(Cairo 1 3 1 7 ) 9 V, po'UiSo .  
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discussion t o give an adequate explanation of how the 
term 'substance' found i t s way i n t o the theology of 
the Eastern Church, i t seems possible t o conjecture 
that such a usage i s of Greek ( A r i s t o t e l i a n ) o r i g i n 0 
I t appears that the Jacobites, Nestorians, and 
Meliki t e s , sects i n the Eastern Church, had begun t o 
2 
consider God a supreme substance. Al=BaqillanI i n 
3 k At-Tamh!id, and al-Juwainx i n Al-Irshad mention 
arguments which these sects employ t o prove the subs-
t a n t i a l i t y of Godj fo r example, that everything that 
exists i n the universe i s either a substance or an 
accident 0 Since there appear t o be s i m i l a r i t i e s , 
between the attributes, of God and those of substance, 
1 o Ibn a l - 8 A s s a l , a 1 3 t h century Christian theologian, 
describes; how the followers of the Eastern Church 
applied the term 'substance' to-God, but not i n a 
material sense. He believed that t h i s term had. been 
inh e r i t e d from the ancient philosophers, probably 
meaning-Aristotleo Vihgt Traites Philosoptiiques; et 
Apologetiques d'Auteurs Arabes:. Chretiens du IX au . 
XIV s i e c l e , ed. by P. Paul Sbath (Cairo 1929)» 
p p 0 1 1 1 > 1 2 2 0 
2 . J o ' W o Sweetman, Islam and Christian Theology (London 
1 9 5 5 ) part two, I , pp«20-32'. 
3 o Al=BaqillShX, Kitab at-tamhid, ed. by Richard McCarthy 
(Be i r u t , 1 9 5 7 ) P P ° 7 5 ~ 7 9 o . 
ko Al-Juwaini, al-Irshad, eds. M. Y. M\lsa and A o M.'Abdal 
Hamld (Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) , ppol|.6°51i0 
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"because "both are self-subsisting and "both are creative 
powers, then i t seems inevitable that God should be 
called wsubstance"• 
I t may be noticed that the proofs of the subs-
t a n t i a l i t y of God, of the three persons, and of the 
r e l a t i o n between the supreme substance and the three 
hypostases, were a matter of debate and controversy 
between the previous Christian sects arid the Muslim 
i 
theologians. Among the. early apologists, defending 
C h r i s t i a n i t y against Islam, were John of Damascus, 
Theodore Abu Qurra ( 9 t h century), Yahya* bn 'Adi 
( 9 7 9 ) , Hunain ;bn Ishaq ( 8 7 3 ) } a l - B a q i l l a n i and 
al-Juwaini were among the defenders of Islamo 
Most of the Muslim sects (al-Firaq al-islamiyyah) 
refused to consider God as a substance with the 
exception of the sect al-Firaq. ai-Karamiyyah 0 I n t h i a 
respect al-Razi i n h i s book I'tiqadat f i r a q al-Musiimln 
1 o A o Abel. "La Polemique Damasceniehne et son influence 
stir l e a origines de l a theologie Musulmane", 
L'Elaboration de L'Islam (Paris 1 9 6 1 ) . p p o 6 1 - 8 5 ° 
2o J o W o Sweet man, Islam arid Christian Theology., (London 
1 9 4 5 ) part onep I , p o 6 0 o 
wa al-Mushrikxn, speaks as follow'&s " A l l the followers 
of Firaq. al-Karamiyyah "believe that God i s a "body, 
substance, and receptacle of creationo" Also 
al-Shahrastanx i n a l - m i l a l wa a l - n i l i a l , confirms that 
the al~Karamiyyah sect hold that there must "be one 
2 
God of one essence and one substance» 
I t would seem t h a t , i n the view of 'Ilm al-Kalam, 
the claim of al-Earamiyyah s that one may c a l l God a 
3 
body and a substance, may be refuted i n two ways. 
F i r s t l y , God cannot be called a body, because bodies 
are. always compound, and they are l i a b l e to be seen, 
or at least t o be located, i n some one place,, The 
denial of t h i s could be j u s t i f i e d neither on r a t i o n a l 
h 
nor on r e l i g i o u s grounds. Secondly, God cannot be 
defined as 'substance', because the majority of 
Muslim theologians use the term substance i n a material 
1 o Fakhr al-Dxn al-Razx, I'tiqadat f i r a q al-Muslimxn wa 
al-Hushrikln (Cairo 1 9 3 8 / 1 3 5 6 ) , p 0 6 7 » " 
2 . Al~Shahrastanx, a l - M i l a l wa a l - n l h a l (Cairo 19^ 8 / 
1 3 6 8 ) , p.159° 
3 . A l - B a q i l l a n I , Kitab at-tamhxd, ed. by Richard McCarthy 
(Beirut 1 9 5 3 ; , pp°I91-196<, See al-Juwainl, Kitab 
a l - I r s h l d , eds. M. Y. Musa and A. M. 'Abdal Hamxd 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) pp.i+2-lUu 
It-o The Theology of al-Ash'arI, ed. and trans, by Richard 
McCarthy (Beirut 1 9 5 3 ) p p ° 9 ~ 1 0 (Question 1 2 ) . , 
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sense, considering that there i s one substance only, 
t o which they used t o re f e r as the ' i n d i v i s i b l e 
- p a r t i c l e ' (al-.juz^ a l l a d h l l a yatanazza"). 
Having given an h i s t o r i c a l outline of the problem, 
we shall now consider the basis on which al=Kindi and 
Avicenna refused to apply the term 'substance' t o God. 
F i r s t , we shall examine al-Kindl's arguments, beginning 
wi t h a comparison between A r i s t o t l e ' s and al-Kindi's 
view of the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the term 'one' or '.unity' 
(wahid aw wahdah) to the categories.. 
A r i s t o t l e i n Metaphysics ( ¥ , 6 ) distinguishes 
2 
between what i s one by accident, and what i s one of 
3 
i t s own natureo- Accidental u n i t y i s a unity i n the 
sense., f o r example, that the same person may be a 
painter and a musician. Both of these (painter and 
musician) are called one by v i r t u e of an accidental 
s i m i l a r i t y , because musical and a r t i s t i c a b i l i t y are 
accidents of one substance ( i . e . the man) 
1 o al^-Shahrastani, Kitab nihayat4 ?1-Iqdam f l ' I l m i 
'1 Kalam, ed. and trans, by A l f r e d Guillaume 
4 ° The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed» by Richard McKeon 
(New York) Metaphysics V,6, p . 7 5 7 ° S.ee also Averroes, 
Tafs i r ma" ba' d. a l - t a b l ' a, ed. by Maurice Bouyges 
'(Beirut 1 9 4 2 ) , I I , pp. 5 2 3 = 2 6 „ 
2 o This term i s known i h Arabic as; (wahid bi-^l-'arad) 
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A r i s t o t l e i n the Metaphysics regards four kinds 
of object as being a,one by t h e i r own nature." ( 1 ) The 
things which are n a t u r a l l y continuous. (2) That which 
i s a wholeo ( 3 ) The in d i v i d u a l object which i s i n d i v i -
s i b l e i n numbero (1+) The universal which i s i n d i v i s i b l e 
i n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y and i n knowledge. Al-Kindi opposes 
vigorously such a d i s t i n c t i o n He i s considering one, 
or u n i t y as something that relates to created beings, 
i n an accidental manner ( b i ^ t a r l q a h 'aradiyyah). For 
al-Kindi "one i n a rea l sense" (al=wah.id bi-f-haqlqah) 
i s not predicable of the following categories:, "genus,, 
species, i n d i v i d u a l , d i f f e r e n t i a , property, common 
accident, universal (genera), element, whole, and parte"' 
A further problem concerns the manner i n which 
al-Kindi arrived at the view that 'one' or u n i t y i n 
created beings (al-wahdah f x al-maqttlat) cannot be 
distinguished i n t o r e a l and accidental u n i t y . I t is; 
beyond the scope of t h i s thesis t o consider a l l the 
arguments that al-Kindi produced t o prove that one i n 
1 o I b i d . , Metaphysics X , l , p . 8 3 5 , and V,6, po75,8... 
2. Rasa yil al-K i n d l al°falsafiyyah, ed. AbQ Ridah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p.128. 
=» 16 . 7 " 
a r e a l sense (al-'wahid. al-haqq.) i s not predicable of 
1 
any of the previous categories, but we must mention 
those categories that he recognises as substances^ 
genus, species * and in d i v i d u a l as c o l l e c t i v e subs;-
tances (.jawlhir .jami' ah), and d i f f e r e n t i a as a d i f f e r e n -
t i a l substance (jawhar mufarriqj „ Through an examination 
of the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of these categories, we s h a l l 
endeavour t o gain an understanding of the reason f o r 
al-KindU's refusal to consider God as a substanceo 
Ai~Kindi's "view of the i n d i v i d u a l , or the primary 
substance (al°shakhs), i s d i f f e r e n t from that of 
A r i s t o t l e i n the categories ( c h o 5 ) ° For a l - K i n d l , i t 
i s neither a 'real one' (al-wahid al-haq_qj, nor has i t 
a" r e a l unity« I t i s one only i n location (wahid 
b i - g l - w a d ' ) o Because the i n d i v i d u a l may be analysed 
i n t o form and matter, i t f a i l s t o s a t i s f y the c r i t e r a 
of s i m p l i c i t y , and hence i t i s not a r e a l one0 
Although al-Kindx's argument here i s not well formu-
late,^, i t would seem to imply that one or unit y i s not 
1 - On unity" and oneness i n al-Kindi see Mo E o Marmura 
and J o Mo R i s t , "al=Kindi's Discussion of Divine 
Existence and Onene.ss.o" Mediaeval Studies 25 ( 1 9 6 3 ) 
P P ° 3 3 8 = 3 5 4 o 
2° The Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed. Wo Do Ross: (Oxford 1 9 5 5 ) , 
I , Categories., chapter 5 » a n d Mantjq Arisfru., e d o 
Badawi (Cairo 1 9 4 8 ) , I , polio 
found i n the i n d i v i d u a l as an essential a t t r i b u t e . 
I t i s only a product of an act of another cause that 
exists outside the i n d i v i d u a l . Therefore, unity or 
1 
one should "be ascribed to the i n d i v i d u a l accidentally. 
Unity of genus and species ( A r i s t o t l e ' s secondary 
substances.) do, not represent, f o r al-Kindx, a r e a l 
u n i t y (one by i t s own nature), i n opposition t o 
A r i s t o t l e ' s view, i n Metaphysics ( V , 6 ) . Al-Kindx's 
, view i s that unity of genus i s not a r e a l unity (wahdah 
haqxqiyyah). Since genus i s predicable of many "beings., 
then i t i s d i v i s i b l e i n t o many species.. Therefore, 
genus, i n t h i s sense., i s a compound object (murakkab) , 
not a simple one ( b a s l t ) • Furthermore each of the 
species which the genus contains may be analysed i n t o 
many in d i v i d u a l s , each self-subsisting. Therefore, 
al-Kindx arrived at the conclusion that one or u n i t y 
i n a r e a l sense (al~wahid aw\al-wahdah al-haqiqiyyah) 
does not belong to the genus as an essential a t t r i b u t e . 
I t i s only to be found as an accident i n i t , that i s to 
say, as the product of an external cause. 
1 . Rasa yil al-Kindl al^ falsafi,yyah-» ed. Abu Rxdah 
(Cairo 1950) I , p. 128." 
2. The Basic Works of A r i s t o t l e , ed. Richard McKeon 
(New York 1 9 4 1 ) Metaphysics, V,6, p . 7 6 0 and V,28, 
p . 7 7 6 . 
3 » RasS'il al-Kindx a l - f a l s a f i y y a h . ed. AbU Rlda. 
F u r t h e r , he argued t h a t species lacks r e a l 
u n i t y i n two respectss ( 1 ) Although i t i s one i n 
l o c a t i o n , species i s not a simple concept! f o r 
example, i n the d e f i n i t i o n of the human species 
two t h i n g s have t o he incl u d e d , animal which i s 
i t s genus, and r a t i o n a l i t y which i s i t s differentia<> 
Therefore species' i n terms of the d e f i n i t i o n i s a 
comppund concept6 ( . 2 ) The species, moreover, i n 
r e l a t i o n t o the i n d i v i d u a l which i t embraces, i s 
not one, nor i s i t a simple u n i t y , "but r a t h e r 
m u l t i p l e x and compound <> 
The d i f f e r e n t i a i s predicaple of "both the 
species and the i n d i v i d u a l s - Therefore i t is; one 
n e i t h e r i n r e l a t i o n t o the species nor t o the 
i n d i v i d u a l s which i t i s supposed t o q u a l i f y , f o r 
"both have already "been explained as multiplex<> 
Consequently u n i t y i n the d i f f e r e n t i a i s a c c i d e n t a l 
2 
r a t h e r than e s s e n t i a l o 
We may conclude t h a t a l - K i n d i considers u n i t y 
i n the previous categories (genus, species, i n d i v i d u a l , 
1 0 I b i d o , p „ 1 2 8 o 
2 ? I b i d , , p c 1 2 . 8 0 
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and. d i f f e r e n t i a ) t o be an e f f e c t of another, e x t e r -
n a l cause (athar min m u ? a t h t h i r ) . This explains why 
u n i t y i n any substance, whether i t be c o l l e c t i v e 
(.jarni') , or d i f f e r e n t i a l ( m u f a r r i q ) , iloes not r e l a t e 
t o i t s i n t e r n a l r e a l i t y , and also why u n i t y ( o n e ) , 
i n a l - K i n d i ' s view, i s predicable of the categories 
only i n a metaphorical sense (bi'l-majaz)» On the 
other handj, he h e l d t h a t Tonicity, or oneness., of the 
r e a l one (al-wahid al-haqaj does not r e l a t e t o a 
cause other than himself» U n i c i t y of God i s simple 
i n the sense t h a t h i s Oneness i s n e i t h e r separable 
i n t o form and matter (sQrat wa maddat), nor i n t o 
u n i t y (wahdah) and i d e n t i t y (huwiyyah) 9 nor i n t o 
genera arid compound elements- Therefore the r e a l 
one, f o r a l - K i n d l , i s "The f i r s t , the Creator from 
n o t h i n g , who maintains i n existence what he has; 
2 
created from nothing.," 
We may summarise as f o l l o w s a l - K i n d l ' s reasons, 
f o r not regarding God as a substance; ( 1 ) The act 
1 o I b i d o , p o 2 0 7 o 
2 » Richard Walzer, Greek i n t o Arabic (London 1 9 6 3 ) 
P 0 I 8 8 0 
of u n i t y i n substance comes from beyond i t s own 
i d e n t i t y , but God's Oneness, as a l - K i n d i understood 
i t 9 i s inseparable from h i s i d e n t i t y 0 ( 2 ) U n i c i t y 
or Oneness of God i s something a b s o l u t e l y r e a l , but 
one or u n i t y i n substance i s an a c c i d e n t a l a t t r i b u t e , 
and predicable of i t only i n a metaphorical sense» 
There seems t o be a t h i r d reason f o r t h i s ; 
r e f u s a l t o c a l l God 'substance', but here we can do 
no more than conjecture„ A l - K i n d l probably h e l d 
t h a t , i f God i s regarded as a substance, then He is> 
e i t h e r an object or predicable of a subject» The 
i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t God i s d e f i n a b l e , as i s substance, 
and i s also l i a b l e t o partake of the same q u a l i t i e s . 
and a t t r i b u t e s as substance.. Moreover, t h i s would 
c o n s t i t u t e a d e c i s i v e o b j e c t i o n t o the o r i g i n a l 
hypothesis; as a l - K i n d i sayss "The r e a l one (the 
e t e r n a l ) , who i s one i n essence, i s n e i t h e r many nor 
subject t o any k i n d of d i v i s i b i l i t y , e i t h e r i n r e l a -
t i o n t o h i s essence or i n r e l a t i o n t o others» The 
r e a l one (God) i s n e i t h e r a time nor a place., He i s 
- 1 7 2 -
n e i t h e r . a n o b j e c t , nor predicable of a s u b j e c t , nor a 
genus ? nor an element, nor a substance , nor aid 
a c c i d e n t o " 
F i n a l l y , we may mention a l - K i n d i ' s debates w i t h 
C h r i s t i a n a p o l o g i s t s , on the question of whether the 
term 'substance' i s t o "be a p p l i e d t o God0 Notable 
amongst these philosophers was Yahya bn 'Adi; who, 
i n a b r i e f Apology, considered some of the arguments 
t h a t a l - K i n d l advanced against the C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e 
2 
of the T r i n i t y o The main t o p i c of debate would 
appear t o be tha t a l - K i n d i understood genus, species', 
i n d i v i d u a l and accident as compound o b j e c t s (as we 
have seen already) i n h i s argument against t h i s ;' 
d o c t r i n e o B r i e f l y , h i s view was t h a t any substance 
must be e i t h e r genus, or species, or i n d i v i d u a l j 
which, being compound, cannot be eternal» I f God 
i s regarded as a substance, as i n the d o c t r i n e of 
the t r i n i t y , then He would not be e t e r n a l , which i s 
absurd., However, Yahya bn 'Adi p o i n t e d out, although 
1 „ Ra s a ' i l al-Kindx a l - f a l s a f i y y a h , ed. Abu Rldah 
(Cairo 1 9 5 0 ) I , p 0 l 6 l » 
2 . Sees A c P e r i e r , "Un T r a i t e de sYahya b i n 'Adi en 
defence du dogme de l a t r i n i t e contre l e s 
o b j e c t i o n s d'al-Kindl„" Revue.de 1 ' O r i e n t C h r e t i e n , 
i i ( X X I I ) , 1 9 2 0 o 
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C h r i s t i a n s have the n o t i o n of three persons sharing 
a s i n g l e substance , they do not n e c e s s a r i l y regard 
t h i s substance i n any of the senses of genus, 
species or individual» 
We s h a l l now examine Avicenna's views on the 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the term 'substance' t o God„ I t 
appears t h a t a l - K i n d l ' s ' r e a l One' (al-wahid a l -
haqq) was adopted by Avicenna as the 'Necessary 
Being by himself" (wa.jib al-wu.jud b i gl°dhat) o 
Just as th e r e a l one was not predicable of any of 
the c a t e g o r i e s , nor i s the Necessary Being by him-
s e l f thus p r e d i c a b l e , as Avicenna sayss "You should 
understand t h a t the Necessary Being by h i m s e l f i s 
not p r e d i c a b l e of the well-known categories l i k e 
1 
genuso" 
The a p p l i c a t i o n of the term 'Necessary Being 
by h i m s e l f , i s r e s t r i c t e d t o God alone and has 
no t h i n g i n common w i t h those categories known aa 
substanceso He sayss "Necessary Being by himself 
1 - Avicenna, a l - I s h a r a t wa a l - t a n b i h a t , ed, by 
Sulaiman Dunya (Cairo 1 9 4 8 ) I I I , p.,7*4-0 
- 1 -Jh, -
shares n o t h i n g i n common w i t h the q u i d d i t y of any-
t h i n g , "because every q u i d d i t y , of anything other than 
h i m s e l f i s contingent... Therefore Necessary Being 
does hot share a generic or a s p e c i f i c idea w i t h any 
other b e i n g , hence i t does not need t o "be d i f f e r e n -
t i a t e d by an idea of d i f f e r e n c e , s p e c i f i c or 
acc i d e n t a l o " But the term 'substance' ,- f o r 
Avicenna (as we have explained) i s predicable not 
only of the above mentioned cat e g o r i e s , but also 
of those beings, which are e i t h e r of s e l f - s u b s i s t i n g 
q u i d d i t i e s , e 0 g 0 the pure i n t e l l e c t s and human souls, 
or of q u i d d i t i e s l i k e compound bodies <> 
I t i s p l a u s i b l e t o suppose t h a t Avicenna avoided 
c a l l i n g God 'substance' f o r the f o l l o w i n g reasonso 
F i r s t l y , because the Necessary Being by hi m s e l f has, 
no q u i d d i t y ( l a mahiyyat l a h u ) , and because those 
beings which have q u i d d i t i e s and are known as subs-
tances, have o r i g i n a t e d from him, according t o 
Avicenna% "The f i r s t has no q u i d d i t y , and as f o r 
1 • I b i d o . p p o 7 0 , 7 1 o See A« M. Goichon, "On the 
Philosophy of Being" <» Avicenna Commemoration 
Volume, ( C a l c u t t a 1 9 5 6 ) , p 0 l l - 3 o 
those beings which have q u i d d i t i e s , t h e i r existence 
emanated from him D He i s always being i n such a 
way t h a t non-beirig and other q u a l i t i e s a l l r e l a t e 
t o him n e g a t i v e l y o Moreover the t h i n g s which have 
q u i d d i t i e s are contingent because t h e i r existence 
has o r i g i n a t e d from h i m o " 
Secondly, those beings which have q u i d d i t i e s 
and are known as substances ( f o r instance, the 
m a t e r i a l body) are e i t h e r composite or capable of 
being t r e a t e d as compound objects., The Necessary 
Being by h i m s e l f i s n e i t h e r composite nor considered 
as a compound? Avicenna says% "The Necessary Being 
by h i m s e l f should not be t r e a t e d i n the sense of 
2 
compounds" and; "-When i t i s said t h a t he i s n e i t h e r 
a body hor i n a body, i t i m p l i e s t h a t there i s no 
comparison between bodies and the F i r s t i n n o v a t o r , 
the Necessary Being, who i s f a r e x a l t e d from being 
& substance, or a body, or an accident, or among 
3 
the pure substances«" Avicenna was probably arguing 
1 o Avicenna, a l - S h i f a , eds.. M„ Y o Moussa, S o Dunya, 
and Sa'Id Zayyed(Cairo 1 9 6 0 ) I I , p , , 3 U 7 ° 
2 o I b i d o , p 0 3h5> 
3 = Avicenna, T i s * r a s a . ' i l f i al-hikmah wa a l - f r a b l ' -
i^yjat (Cairo 1 3 2 8 / 1 9 0 8 ) , p 0 l ; 5 o 
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against the d o c t r i n e of God as a "body and substance , 
which we f i n d i n F i r a q 'al-Kar amiyya <, 
T h i r d l y , the Necessary Being "by him s e l f i s an 
absolute r e a l i t y (haqiqah mu^laqah), because he 
depends upon no cause f o r h i s existence 0 Avicenna 
sayss "Since the absolute existence which i s by 
him s e l f has no cause, then i t remains t h a t the 
Necessary Being by h i m s e l f must be absolute r e a l i t y o " 
But substance, f o r Avicenna, as a 'necessary being by 
another' (wa.jib al-wu.jfld b i ? l - g h a i r ) , must derive 
i t s existence e i t h e r from a q u i d d i t y , or from 
another causeo This means t h a t substances i n 
r e l a t i o n t o God are r e l a t i v e and contingent ( n i s b i 
wa muhtamal)o Hence Avicenna avoided a p p l y i n g the 
term 'substance' t o Godo 
Moreover, he./held t h a t the act of e x i s t i n g i n 
the created pure substances (human souls and the 
pure i n t e l l e c t s ) i s d i s t i n c t from t h e i r q u i d d i t y , 
2 
although t h e i r q u i d d i t y i s immaterial» Because 
1 o Avicenna, a l - S h i f a , eds. M. Y o Moussa, S» Dunya, 
S a ' i d Zayy<ld(Cairo 1 9 6 0 ) I I , p 0 3 ^ 7 » 
2 = Avicenna, a l - I s h a r a t wa a l - t a n b i h a t , e d o S o Dunya 
(Cairo 1 9 ^ 8 ) I I I , p p d g i ^ ^ o See St „ Thomas 
Aquinas, On Being and Essence, trans° by Armond 
Mourer (Toronto 1 9 ^ 9 ) p p ° 5 0 = 5 4 ° 
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the q u i d d i t i e s i n these substances are not i d e n t i c a l 
w i t h t h e i r existences, they "belong t o the category 
of substanceo But the essence of the Necessary 
Being by h i m s e l f , as Avicenna maintains, i s i n d i s -
1 
t i n g u i s h a b l e from h i s existence<» That i s t o say, 
h i s essence i s not other than h i s act of e x i s t i n g . 
From t h i s i t f o l l o w s t h a t the Necessary Being by 
himse l f i s not a substance, and belongs t o no 
category of substance,. Avicenna says: "Since i t 
i s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t he has no e f f i c i e n t cause, i t 
f o l l o w s i n t h i s respect t h a t h i s essence i s not 
other than h i s r e a l existence, or i n other words, 
not other than h i s beingo He i s n e i t h e r a substance 
2 
nor an accident«" 
The f o l l o w i n g question remains t o be answered: 
since the Necessary Being by hims e l f i s not substance 
as such, i s i t p o s s i b l e at a l l f o r him t o be given 
the d e s c r i p t i o n t h a t i s used of the separable 
substances? The p o i n t i s put by Avicenna h i m s e l f : 
1 o Avicenna, a l - S h i f a , I I , p<,3Uho 
2 » Avicenna,, on Theology, t r a n s . by A» J o A r b e rry, 
(London 1 9 5 1 ) , p „ 2 7 , And Ma.jmu' r a s a p i l al-Shaikh 
a l - r ' a y i s (Haidarabad 1 3 5 4 ) a l - r i s a l a t a l ~ 4 a r s h i y a 
przn 
" I t may be t h a t someone says t h a t even i f you have 
avoided c a l l i n g God substance, i t seems t h a t you 
have not avoided g i v i n g him the meaning which i s 
attached t o the substance t h a t you have considered 
as a genus, because the Necessary Being by himself 
does not seem t o be e x i s t i n g i n a subject.." We 
must consider whether he regarded the Necessary 
Being as not being i n a subject» 
The answer seems c l e a r l y t o be i n the negatives 
" I t i s wrong, i f i t i s thought t h a t the meaning, 
t h a t which i s not i n a s u b j e c t , as a d e s c r i p t i o n 
of substance, applies t o of the F i r s t (God) as we l lo" 
He h e l d t h a t , i n saying " t h a t which i s not i n a 
s u b j e c t " , i t i s meant only t h a t s e l f - s u b s i s t i n g 
q u i d d i t y , which i s n e i t h e r i n a body, nor a f a c u l t y 
3 
i n the soul., i»e 0 pure i n t e l l e c t . But God i s not 
s e l f s u b s i s t i n g q u i d d i t y , t h e r e f o r e God cannot be 
given the d e s c r i p t i o n " t h a t which i s not i n a 
subject." For Avicenna, i t i s improper t o describe 
1 . Avicenna, a l - S h i f g o eds» IvL Y o Moussa, S . Dunya, 
and S = Zayyed ;(Cairo I96O) I I , 3Z+80 
2 . Avicenna, a l - I s h a r a t wa a l - t a n b l h a t , ed= S o Dunya 
(Cairo 19k8)III, p p 0 7 2 = 7 3 o 
3 » Avicenna, a l - S h i f a , eds. S 0 Dunya, M o Y o MQussa, 
and S o Zayyed (Cairo 1 9 6 0 ) I I , p 0 3 ^ 8 o 
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the Necessary Being by himself i n any way t h a t subs-
tance may he described,, 
Moreover, Avicenna i s e x p l i c i t t h a t the use of 
the expression "not i n a subject" ( l a i s f I mawdH') 
does not determine e x a c t l y whether t h a t which i t i s 
supposed t o describe has r e a l existence or not„ He 
says; " I n the way t h a t when one knows t h a t Zaid 
i n h i m s e l f i s a substance, one knows t h a t he always 
e x i s t s i n a d d i t i o n t o any q u a l i t i e s he may haveo" 
Thus i t would appear t h a t , f o r Avicenna, not only 
the term 'substance' , but also any c r i t e r i o n or des-
c r i p t i o n r e l a t i n g t o t h i s term, i s excluded from 
being one of the a t t r i b u t e s of G-odo 
What then are the a t t r i b u t e s t h a t can be ascribed 
to, God? Avicenna' s view i s the f o l l o w i n g ; the f i r s t 
a t t r i b u t e of the Necessary Being i s t h a t he i s existent„ 
The other a t t r i b u t e s have t h i s s p e c i f i c meaning w i t h 
some a d d i t i o n a l q u a l i t y e i t h e r i n the negative or i n 
the p o s i t i v e , or i n both senses, without t h e i r 
m u l t i p l i c i t y coming t o destroy h i s u n i c i t y or c o n t r a d i c t 
1 o Avicenna, a'l-Isharat wa a l - t a n b l h a t , ed<, S o Dunya 
(Cairo 19U8) I I I , po73-« 
1 8 0 ™ 
the f a c t t h a t he i s the Necessary Being by himself«' 
Examples of such p o s i t i v e a t t r i b u t e s ares " h i s being 
p 
Creator, O r i g i n a t o r , and a l l the A t t r i b u t e s of A c t i o n ; " 
and of the compound of both: " h i s being W i l l i n g and 
Omnipotent, f o r these a t t r i b u t e s are compounded of 
3 
knowledge and creativenesso" 
As f o r the negative a t t r i b u t e s Avicenna says: 
"The negative a t t r i b u t e s are such as when someone 
does not avoid c a l l i n g the F i r s t 'substance', i n 
which case one does not mean more than t h a t the f i r s t 
i s e x i stence, and t h i s i m p l i e s the d e n i a l t h a t h i s 
being i s i n a subjecto And when i t i s s a i d that he 
i s one, t h i s means t h a t h i s existence does not s u f f e r 
any d i v i s i o n i n q u a n t i t y and t h a t he has no partnero»„"^ 
Yet i t seems t h a t some commentators have taken t h i s 
passage t o mean t h a t Avicenna i s con s i d e r i n g God as 
5 
a substanceo 
1 . AvLcenna9<• a l - S h i f a , eds. ML Y 0 Moussa, So Dunya, and 
Si Zayyed (Cairo 1 9 6 0 ) I I , p . 3 6 7 . 
2 0 A r t h u r J. A r b e r r y , Avicenna on Theology (London 1 9 5 1 ) Po32c 
3 o I b i d o , pp Q32, 33.o 
ko Avicenna, a l ^ S h i f a , eds. Mo' Yo Moussa, So DunyS and 
So Zayyed (Cairo 1 9 6 0 ) I I , p 0 3 6 7 o 
5<> See f o r example Soheil Mo Afnan, Avicenna h i s l i f e 
and works (London 1 9 5 ° ) P°l74s "As a pure substance, 
he i s simple and u n l i k e possible beings, his. 
essence and existence are one." 
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Here, Avicenna appears t o express two viewso 
F i r s t we may suppose t h a t Avicenna himself thought 
i t "best t o avoid c a l l i n g God 'substance'; secondly, 
he seems t o argue t h a t , i f anyone f a i l s t o avoid 
denoting the F i r s t by the term 'substance', he cannot 
be understood t o mean anything p o s i t i v e t h e r e by Q That 
i s , the d e s c r i p t i o n merely reveals and i m p l i e s only 
t h a t the F i r s t i s e x i s t e n t , i 0 e 0 not non-existent» 
A co n s i d e r a t i o n of t h i s s o r t , however, does not imply 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of the existence of two Necessary 
Beings by themselves 0 
A d d i t i o n a l evidence f o r Avicenna's view on t h i s 
subject i s t o be found i n an unpublished work 
At°T"amjid. Here he maintains t h a t God i s not subs-
tance, since he cannot support accidents; nor i s he 
an accident, since h i s existence does not"presuppose 
t h a t of any substance<> He hi m s e l f i s the crea t o r of 
a l l substances, he i s one, simple, and i n d i v i s i b l e , 
impossible t o imagine or t o define* He has no 
beginning and no end, and i s beyond a l l temporal 
e x i s t e n c e D 
1 „ B r i t i s h Museum ( A d d o l 6 , 6 5 9 ) . 
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Therefore, we may conclude f i n a l l y t h a t a l - K i n d i 
and Avicenna share the same view t h a t God should not 
he considered as a substance D F u r t h e r , Avicenna 
seems t o have been in f l u e n c e d by a l - K i n d l ' s views on 
t h i s problem, as we may gather from the above dis-= 
c u s s i o n 0 Not only d i d Avicenna use some of a l - K i n d i ' s 
t erminology, such as 'the F i r s t ' , 'the E t e r n a l ' 
( a l - a z a l i ) and ' t h a t whose u n i c i t y i s not other than 
h i s i d e n t i t y ' (which i s expressed by Avicenna as 
'tha t whose essence i s not other than h i s existence') 
1 2 5 but a l s o , i n a l - I s h a r a t , al-Najah, and a l - S h i f a , 
Avicenna adopted the views expressed by a l - K i n d i at 
the end of h i s t r e a t i s e Fl a l - f a l s a f a h al-nia<> For 
example, i n a l - S h i f a, we f i n d the f o l l o w i n g % " I t has: 
appeared that^j the F i r s t has no genus, no q u i d d i t y , 
no q u a n t i t y , no s i t u a t i o n ( p l a c e ) , no equivalent,.no 
p a r t n e r , and no contrary„ He has n e i t h e r a d e f i n i -
t i o n , nor a p r o o f o He i s s e l f - e v i d e n t o I n 
1 o Avicenna, a l - I s h a r a t wa a l - t a n b l h a t , ed» S o Dunya 
(Cairo 19U8) I I I , p 0 7 7 = 
2 c Avicenna, al-Na,iah ( ? 1 3 5 7 / 1 9 3 8 ) , p p 0 2 5 1 - 2 5 2 o 
3 o Avicenna, a l - S h i f a , eds= M. Y» Moussa, S o Dunya, 
and S c Z ay ye d (Cairo 1 9 6 0 ) I I , p 0 3 5 ^ < . 
ho I b i d c , p 0 3 5 ^ - 0 
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a d d i t i o n t o agreeing w i t h a l - K i n d l t h a t God i s not a 
substance, he f u r t h e r agrees w i t h him i n denying 
e x p l i c i t l y the a p p l i c a t i o n of these a t t r i b u t e s t o Godo"' 
I n denying the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of such terms t o God, 
they may both have been i n f l u e n c e d t o some extent by 
Neo-Platonism, For P l o t i n u s regarded God as being 
2 
without q u i d d i t y and without q u a l i t y , n e i t h e r r e s t i n g 
nor moving, n e i t h e r f i n i t e or i n f i n i t e , He i s 
h 5 i n e f f a b l e , without form, and above a l l beings, 
Yet a l = K i n d i and Avicenna were more vigorous than 
P l o t i n u s i n t h e i r r e f u s a l t o use any term of God t h a t 
might imply t h a t he was s u b s t a n t i a l o E qually, they 
r e j e c t e d the Neo-Platonic theory of the three 
hypostases, which had i n f l u e n c e d the C h r i s t i a n doc-
t r i n e of the T r i n i t y , Such a theory, i n t h e i r eyes, 
.was i n c o n f l i c t w i t h s t r i c t monotheism, i n t h a t i t 
i m p l i e d the d i v i s i b i l i t y of God, Thus, t h e i r some-
what unorthodox metaphysical conception of God i s , a t 
1 o R a s a * i l a l - K i n d i a l - f a i s a f i y y a h , ed, Abu Ridah 
"(Cairo 1950) I I , pp. 160-161. 
2 , P l o t i n u s , Enneads, ed, E, Brehier ( P a r i s 1956-64) V, 
5 9 6 , 1 . 2 2 - 2 3 , P o 9 8 < . 
3« I b i d , , V, 5s 10 , 1,16=20, pp,102-103, 
k. Xbido. V, 5 , 6 , 1.2/+, p , 9 8 » 
5° r b i d o V , 5? 6, 1 , 5 , p , 9 7 ° 
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the same t i m e , an a f f i r m a t i o n of a fundamental tenet 
of r e l i g i o u s "belief* We may conjecture t h a t , f o r 
them, once G-od i s conceived t o "be a substance, then 
i t i s po s s i b l e t o ask whether there i s more than one 
Godo I t i s t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t they would 
v i g o r o u s l y have deniedo 
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Conclusion 
I t w i l l have "become clear from the discussion 
above that al-Kindi and Avicenna were f a m i l i a r w i t h 
A r i s t o t l e ' s view of substanceo Furthermore, they 
appear to have "been able t o o f f e r many inte r p r e t at ionsj 
of his philosophical opinions<, Those comparisons that 
have "been drawn between the Muslim philosophers and 
t h e i r predecessors reveal that t h e i r debt to him i s 
not that of disciples t o t h e i r teacher; t h e i r 
acceptance of his doctrines i s c r i t i c a l and they d i d 
not hesitate t o r e j e c t what they regarded as falseo 
Especially s i g n i f i c a n t i n our evaluation of t h i s 
relationship i s the fa c t that the Muslim philosophers 
adopt the methods of A r i s t o t l e , thereby revealing 
the importance of his method of investigation,.. This 
i s so with regard both t o the employment of genus 
and d i f f e r e n t i a i n the process of d e f i n i t i o n , and t o 
the d i v i s i o n of the philosophical sciences i n t o 
physical, mathematical, and metaphysical„ 
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They disagreed with A r i s t o t l e on the substan-
t i a l i t y of the soul, howevero I t i s , perhaps, f o r 
r e l i g i o u s motives that they i n c l i n e d toward a 
Platonic teaching, and accepted the immortality of 
the soul and, consequently, i t s substantiality.. 
Here they were prepared to defend t h e i r own opinions; 
against those of A r i s t o t l e . They agreed also that 
A r i s t o t l e had "been mistaken i n applying the term 
'substance' both to the Creator and to created 
"beings o 
Thus, i t would not he possible t o adhere t o 
the view that al-Kind! and Avicenna adopted 
A r i s t o t l e ' s theory of substance and accidents as a 
matter of course, simply because i t i s A r i s t o t l e ' s ; 
they c l e a r l y "believed i t to "be correct. I n adopting 
the theory, however, they nevertheless, retained w i t h i n 
t h e i r w r i t i n g s a sense of t h e i r own personalities, as 
philosopherso 
On the question of the measure of agreement 
"between al-Kindl and Avieenna, i t must be concluded 
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that the l a t t e r d i d not follow the former i n h i s 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of substance <> Al-Kindi, unlike:; 
Avicenna, distinguished between c o l l e c t i v e and. 
d i f f e r e n t i a l substances, yet the l a t t e r enlarged 
upon the d e f i n i t i o n of substance by applying the 
term t o every essence that exists by i t s e l f , con-
sidering the essence as something that precedes, 
the existence.. Al-Kindi i s s i l e n t upon t h i s 
question, and i s apt to avoid r a i s i n g such prob-
lems and thin k i n g i n such terms as essence oi?-
quiddity, i t seems that Arabic philosophical 
language had not yet reached the maturity that 
i s to be found i n Avicenna» 
In the case of the material substance al-Kindi 
has shown himself to take the conservative view, 
defining i t i n terms of the three dimensions 0 
Although we may r e f e r i n a loose sense t o his: 
concept of "the f i v e substances", we have seen 
that he does not genuinely wish t o regard move-
ment, place, and time as true substancesio 
Avicenna has rejected a l l d e f i n i t i o n of material 
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substance that refers to i t s dimension, and. uses; 
the concept of quiddity "by which to define i t o 
This quiddity i n the material substance i s neither 
the form nor the matter, but rather the compound 
of both 0 Al-Kindi i s once again s i l e n t on the 
question of quiddity; and while Avicenna regards 
d i v i s i b i l i t y as the basic characteristic of the 
material substance, al-Ki n d l does not seem to 
recognise the importance of t h i s feature, regar-
ding the concept of dimensions as basic= With 
regard to movement, space, and time, al-Kindl 
may be seen to d i f f e r from Avicenna who holds 
that movement precedes. time D 
I n respect of t h e i r w r i t i n g s on the soul, 
al-Kindi is. apparently content t o define i t , 
assuming i t s existence to be a f a c t , while 
Avicenna i s anxious to establish the existence 
of the soul before attempting to define i t c 
Al-Kindi appears to have the i n t e n t i o n of proving 
the s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of the soul, although he has; 
not l e f t a great deal of evidence on this; 
questiono Avicenna, on the other hand, has 
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produced many arguments to demonstrate that the 
soul i s a substance.. Both agree that the soul is. 
a substance of a d i f f e r e n t kind from the "body, and 
of a d i f f e r e n t natureo There i s no essential u n i t y 
between the soul and body or between separate souls 
these philosophers appear to believe that no two 
substances may be united to form another e They 
appear to agree that the theory of transmigration 
i s i n c o r r e c t , and also that the f a c u l t i e s of the 
soul are not substances» In general, we find, that 
Avicenna was more imaginative than al~ K i n d i i n h i s 
ideas on the soul, and that his debt t o Neo-Plato= 
nism on t h i s subject was greater than his; 
predecessor'So 
Al-Kindl refers to only one i n t e l l e c t , i n the 
sense of substance, while Avicenna holds a number 
of them to be substantialo Neither agree that 
those i n t e l l e c t s which are f a c u l t i e s i n the soul 
should be called substances„ Al-Kindi does not 
use the A r i s t o t e l i a n concept of an active i n t e l l e c t 
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and though Avicenna does so, he does, not regard 
i t as a Godo Once again Avicenna shows signs of 
having been influenced more strongly by the Neo-
PlatonistSo 
Both are agreed that the term 'substance" is; 
not applicable t o God„ Terms inapplicable t o 
substance may not be applied t o Godo I n general, 
Avicenna i s i n agreement with al-Kindl on the 
nature of those terms, e»go genus, species, d e f i -
n i t i o n , e t c , and both use terms reminiscnent of 
Neo-Platonism by which to describe God, e«go One, 
the F i r s t , the Innovator; but they w i l l not take; 
from Neo-Platonism any term which suggests God 
may be a substanceo 
The t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o Latin of many of t h e i r 
works, both philosophical and medical, made t h e i r 
thought accessible t o t h e i r European contemporaries. 
S t o Thomas Aquinas noted Avicenna's views and, even 
i f he did not wholly agree with jhim, he evidently 
found him', worthy of discussion,. Descartes seems 
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often to have been influenced by Avicenna, f o r 
examples over the questions of the quiddity of 
material bodies; of the p r i o r i t y of essence t o 
existence, and of the difference between the 
natures, of body and soulo 
An important point of difference between the 
Muslim philosophers and the European t r a d i t i o n 
of thought, however, l i e s i n t h e i r refusal t o 
use the term 'substance' of Godo This i s i n 
contrast t o both A r i s t o t l e and Descartes., who 
seem to have thought G-od, above a l l , must be 
a n ens "per se 0 I t remained only f o r Spinoza, 
completely t o r e s t r i c t the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the 
term 'substance' t o God alone, thus reversing 
t o t a l l y the view of al-Kindi and Avicennao Yet 
t h i s may not be as paradoxical as i t seems, i n 
view of Spinoza's undoubted acquaintance with 
Avicennao The l a t t e r ' s c r i t i c i s m of the equi-
vocal sense of 'substance' i n A r i s t o t l e might 
well have provided Spinoza with food f o r thought« 
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Thus? we have seen how al-Kindi and Avicenna 
stand, as i t were, between two Vifestern philoso-
phical traditionso Their philosophical influence 
has "been f e l t at various points i n the h i s t o r y of 
the subject, from the early Scholastics to the 
Rationalists, I n saying t h i s , we indicate 
further avenues of research i n t o the work of the 
Muslim philosophers and here conclude our d i s -
cussion of t h e i r concept of substance. 
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